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Abstract 
 
 
 
'The ecological emergency’ describes both our emergence into, and the way we 
relate within, a set of globally urgent circumstances, brought about through 
anthropogenic impact. I identify two phases to this emergency. Firstly, there is 
the anthropogenic impact itself, interpreted through various conceptual models. 
Secondly, however, is the increasingly entrenched commitment to divergent 
conceptual positions, that leads to a growing disparateness in attitudes, and a 
concurrent difficulty with finding any grounds for convergence in response. 
 
 
 
 
I begin by reviewing the environmental ethics literature in order to clarify which 
components of the implicit narratives and beliefs of different positions create the 
foundations for such disparateness of views. I identify the conceptual frameworks 
through which moral agency and human responsibility are viewed, and that justify an 
ethical response to the ecological emergency. In particular, I focus on Paul Taylor's 
thesis of 'respect for nature' as a framework for revising both the idea that we are 
‘moral’ and the idea that we are ‘agents’ in this unique way, and I open to question 
the idea that any response to the ecological emergency need be couched in ethical 
terms.  
 
 
 
 
This revision leads me to formulate an alternative conceptual model that makes 
use of Timothy Morton’s idea of enmeshment. I propose that we dramatically 
revise our idea of moral agency using the idea of enmeshment as a starting point. I 
develop an alternative framework that locates our capacity for responsibility within 
our capacity for realisation, both in the sense of understanding, and of making real, 
sets of conditions within our enmeshment. I draw parallels between this idea of 
‘realisation as agency’ and the work of Dōgen and other non-dualists. 
 
 
 
 
I then propose a revised understanding of ‘the good’ of systems from a biophysical 
perspective, and compare this with certain features of Asian traditions of thought. I 
consider the practical implications of these revisions, and I conclude that the act of 
paying close attention, or realising, contains our agency, as does the attitude, or manner, 
with which we focus. This gives us the basis for a convergent response to the ecological 
emergency: the way of our engagement that is the key to responding to the 
ecological emergency. 
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Introduction 
'The ecological emergency’ is a phrase that encompasses both the environmental crises of 
pollution, deforestation, desertification, mass species extinction, and climate change, and 
also the human attempts to conceptualise this impact.1 There is the view that we are 
doomed to pathological progressivism and that no amount of geo-, bio- or social 
engineering or strategy shift will alter this. This contrasts with the view that there is no 
crisis to concern ourselves with, and that any attempt to articulate what is happening as 
an emergency is a threat, undermining economic flourishing that is epitomised by the 
'business-as-usual' approach.  
However, among those who acknowledge an emergency, and who are working to 
formulate a response, there are conflicting views, too: from the idea that the response 
needs to be couched in increasingly inclusive ethical terms to the pragmatist's view that 
contracts the circle of those who could be included in any plan for survival.2 Within the 
field of ethics, one key debate is over the boundaries of what ought to be included in 
ethical consideration.  
From doomsters to deniers, from inclusivism to exclusivism, one common theme 
emerges: attitudes are becoming more divergent and views on how to respond, more 
entrenched. Instead of discussing the problems themselves, the focus is shifting to the 
                                                           
1
 See Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Harvard University Press, 2010); in relation to explaining 
more complex features in terms of more basic features, see Edward Slingerland and Mark Collard, Creating 
Consilience: Integrating the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
2
 The classic example of this is Garrett Hardin, ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’, 
Psychology Today, 1974, 800–812. 
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nature of the belief systems that underlie the different approaches and the initial reasons 
for discussion are buried beneath issues of perspective, narrative or ideology.  
First, then, I examine the spectrum of responses to the ecological emergency with a focus 
on exploring the underlying narratives and belief systems they imply. In particular, I hone 
in on the underlying view of moral agency. In the light of this approach, I re-examine 
how both being ‘moral’ and being an ‘agent’ could be understood in the context of the 
ecological emergency.  
This leads me to revise both ideas substantially. Given this adjusted view, I go on to 
explore a revision of ‘the good’, from the atomistic approach of Paul Taylor, to a more 
relational, systems-based approach.3 How does this revision affect how we view our 
potential for responsibility, given our 'enmeshment'? I then consider whether or not this 
revised approach might address the disparateness, and entrenchment, of attitudes, that has 
arisen as a key problem in drawing attention away from the ecological emergency and 
our responsibility towards it.  
Chapter One 
The first chapter is an overview and exploration of the belief systems that underlie the 
different perspectives on the ecological emergency. I explore the narratives implicit in the 
different approaches and pay particular attention to what these say about our 
understanding of what (human) moral agency can do. In particular, in preparation for a 
specific focus on Taylor's theory of ‘respect for nature’, I consider how a broad range of 
                                                           
3
 Paul W Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environment Ethics (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 1986). 
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perspectives views the relationship between moral agency, moral considerability, and 
biophysical systems.  
Some perspectives consider humans to be distinct, while others expand the circle of 
ethical consideration to all sentient beings.4 Further perspectives reason that the 
phenomenon of life itself is distinctive and therefore deserves this special kind of 
considerability, while further still from the human centre is the view that all biophysical 
systems, including the non-living systems that underpin and interact with living systems, 
are ethically considerable. 
Beyond these is an alternative approach that sees no essential difference, because no 
separation, between nature, background, existence or environment, on the one hand, and 
humanity on the other. In Timothy Morton’s terms, we are ‘enmeshed’. This is an 
extension of the very old debate about whether or not humans are a part of, or radically 
distinct from, other kinds of existence on the planet. I take the approach that humans are 
biologically consistent with, and that therefore it is reasonable to consider them a part of, 
other evolved systems.  
I then extend Morton’s approach in contending that the ecological emergency is not 
composed of isolated problems, and therefore cannot be solved by the kinds of belief 
systems that emphasise our distinctiveness, a narrative we have been heavily dependent 
                                                           
4
 There is no hard and fast distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ but a useful rough dividing line for the 
purpose of this thesis is to think of ‘moral’ as referring to the personal value system one uses to decide on 
what is the right thing to do. ‘Ethical’ acts are therefore more broadly social. For example, I am a ‘moral’ 
agent, in this sense, because I, personally, can decide to act respectfully towards others. An ethical system, 
like the theory of ‘respect for nature’, is a broader social norm that might put me under a less personal, 
more communal obligation to adhere to its principles (although I can only do so because I am a ‘moral’ 
agent: hence the difficulty with making a hard and fast distinction). 
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on for four hundred years or so.5 Rather, we need to review the context with the 
recognition that we are inside the results of interactions (climate change, biodiversity 
loss, habitat destruction, for instance) and they (pollution, radiation, modified food) are 
inside us. 
We are distinct enough to be able to perceive these interactions, but we must also 
acknowledge that we are so implicitly involved and included in them that this perception 
is inseparably a part of the interaction. How to conceive of this relationship becomes a 
framing problem, but it also offers an opportunity to re-examine our understanding of our 
moral agency and, with a revision both ideas (‘moral’ and ‘agent’), the broader sense of 
our responsibility: our ability to respond, and our ability to be accountable. We are 
looking out at, but also from within, the issues to be considered, but it is precisely this 
capacity we have to understand, or realise this explicit implicitness that allows us to 
develop a clearer idea of our role in the ecological emergency. 
Bringing the conceptual frameworks into focus is also key to understanding how 
differently the problems (or fabulations) of the ecological emergency are viewed, 
differences that become irreconcilable and that lead to attitude disparateness. On the one 
hand, there are those who conclude the problems have been ignored or played down; on 
the other, those who believe they have been exaggerated, hyped up or even invented. 
                                                           
5
 ‘The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects 
in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these 
were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made 
during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural 
objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in 
repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life.' Engels, 
Friedrich, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans. Barrie Selman, from Marx & Engels: Collected Works, 
Volume 24 (1874-1883). (International Publishers. New York, NY: 1989): 299. (Quoted in Ross Wolfe, 
'Man and Nature' in Thinking Nature Timothy Morton and Ben Woodward, eds., 2011). 
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Even where there is agreement that the problems need addressing, views on what sort of 
response is viable are strongly divergent, often aggressively so. My second aim is to 
reflect on the implications for philosophical practice arising from this revised idea of 
what responses are available to us in the context of this tendency to divergence. If we are 
enmeshed within an ecological emergency and responding with increasingly disparate 
reactions, what prospects are there for mitigating this tendency since it, too, is an obstacle 
to any prospects for a convergence in response?  
Chapter Two 
In chapter two, I focus on a detailed discussion of Taylor's thesis of 'respect for nature'. 
One focus of Taylor's thesis is a closely discussed view of moral agency, the specifics of 
which I question. Yet his arguments for a non-anthropocentric approach, and his 
reasoning that a particular attitude can arise as a result of a clear understanding of our 
situation, are both ideas I am sympathetic with. Taylor argues that there are grounds for 
holding an attitude of respect towards the entire biosphere and all the systems within it.  
He proposed his theory of a ‘life-centred’ ethic in 1986 (he has somewhat modified it 
since then) as a philosophical response to the destruction of ecosystems and species, 
pollution, and other destructive effects of human-centred systems, technologies and 
human-centred thinking. The radical response he demanded has not materialised, and the 
gap between ethical theories in response to the emergency, and actual practice, continues 
to widen. It is important, therefore, to understand whether a philosophical response 
couched in ethical terms can ever contribute meaningfully to the strategies and practices 
that are implemented as a result of thinking about the ecological emergency. 
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Taylor’s approach to addressing these critical issues forms part of a spectrum of 
responses that attempt to urge us to take responsibility for our disruptive and destructive 
impact on other living systems, both for our own sakes, but more fundamentally, because 
it is, morally and ethically, the right thing to do. Taylor’s reasoning crystallises around 
the idea that we consider ourselves as agents, in the sense of self-directed individuals, and 
moral, in the sense that we can be held accountable for duties and responsibilities 
imposed by human cultural systems. He also uses the idea that all organisms are 
teleological beings with ‘goods’ that they pursue, and that, therefore, conditions can be 
‘good for’ other organisms in a parallel sense to the way that conditions can be ‘good for’ 
humans. Having explored the key features of Taylor’s theory, I lay the groundwork for a 
revision, in the light of the underlying framework that Taylor himself accepted: 
evolutionary biology.  
Chapter Three 
In revising Taylor moral agency, I extend the idea that humans are a part of other evolved 
systems into the broader context of physical systems. I use Morton’s concept of 
enmeshment, along with recent research into living and non-living systems, to develop 
the idea that we can describe the human capacity for self-awareness as something that is 
both within the mesh and yet able to perceive itself and its enmeshment. I argue that our 
agency consists in this ability to perceive ourselves and the systems of our enmeshment. 
This contrasts with the idea that our agency involves making (mental) decisions and then 
(physically) acting on them.  
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In the context of the ecological emergency, this is consistent with understanding 
ourselves as 'natural'. However, one aspect of our evolutionary trajectory, that of 
irresponsible exploitation, has been exacerbated by the narrative and belief systems that 
we used to create conceptual models for ourselves (in the global 'North') that, in some 
sense, segregate our own capacities, and therefore our responsibilities, from all else. We 
have agency, and the capacity to respond, through direction and the manner (or attitude) 
of our attention and not through the deliberative will that Taylor attributes to us.  
Our agency lies in our capacity to realise, in both senses, what we are involved in, and to 
shift our manner of engagement, or attitude, towards this. In two senses, our conceptual 
models have deluded us: in falsely attributing to ourselves agency of a ‘free will’ kind, 
and in segregating our sense of what we respond to, and are responsible for, when we act. 
Because of this, we have placed the vast net of biophysical systems that sustain us in 
jeopardy. Only by revising our view of our enmeshment, and realising just how our 
agency actually works, can we hope to change this.  
Next, I discuss a revision of the idea that we are ‘moral’ in Taylor’s sense. I suggest that 
we dispense with the term, and, indeed, with an ethical approach to the ecological 
emergency, given the context of our understanding as evolved systems. We cannot be 
moral if we have no consistent locus of value. If we are systems, then it is our 
relationships, and not us, or even others, as individual entities, that matter. This does not 
imply that individuals do not matter, just that their interests are better served if our 
attention is on the relationships, on beings as systems and processes, and on our attitude 
towards them, than on a consideration of their moral validity as ‘ends in themselves’.  
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We can envisage this activity of paying attention, or seeing ourselves as the observer, 
self-reflecting, realising, as a 'meta-system' that feeds back and shifts our interactions 
with other systems within which it is enmeshed. It is through the process of attention, or 
realisation, that we are able to respond to the jeopardy we have placed the planet in. I 
draw parallels between this idea of agency and Dōgen's idea of 'practice realisation', and 
so I call this 'agency as realisation' with an awareness of the dual meaning of realisation 
as both 'making real' or 'creating', and 'understanding' or 'seeing'. 
I then move on to the related idea of how to 'realise' this agency. Considering ourselves as 
systems does not, at first glance, give us grounds for deciding how to do this. I review the 
narrative we have of how systems work, and revise it in broader, more inclusive terms. 
This allows me to posit a different picture of our enmeshment that includes seeing 
systems as hugely complex energy dissipation processes, developing intricate webs of 
interrelationships that filter energy in intricate and subtle ways.6 
Living systems dissipate energy by graduating the flow, building up neg-entropic 
functions, participating in relationships that suck energy into and through them so that as 
much dissipation as possible can take place. I argue that this parallels Taylor's idea that 
conditions can be 'good for' living systems (organisms, or communities) in the physical 
(and therefore in the biological) sense. This leads me to revise Taylor's idea that this 
implies that organisms or even communities or species have inherent worth, since when 
                                                           
6
 Thermodynamic systems are not traditionally seen as informational exchange systems, but in a 
mathematical, or physical sense, the dissipation of energy is the exchange of information between 
mathematically differentiated quantities that come into closer equilibrium (although never perfectly) as 
greater entropy is reached. See, for instance, John Harte, Maximum Entropy and Ecology: A Theory of 
Abundance, Distribution, and Energetics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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conditions are 'good for' systems in the physical sense, this just means that they allow the 
graduated dissipation of energy. 'Good for', in this sense, is instrumental, not inherent. By 
the same token, if energy is blocked and unable to participate in informational exchanges, 
unable to be dissipated, then conditions are 'bad for' systems.  
Biodiversity loss, the production of plastics, the loss of habitats through desertification 
and deforestation, are all 'bad for' systems by this analysis since systems can no longer 
graduate the flow of energy either because energy is blocked, or else because it cannot be 
filtered through systems and is lost. To realise our agency in the context of the ecological 
emergency, then, is to turn our attention to discriminating between activities that block, 
and ones that graduate, this dissipating flow.  
Chapter Four 
In chapter four, I consider the practical implications of the thesis of agency as realisation 
and realising 'the good' of systems. I argue that there are a number of ways in which this 
thesis elicits a set of practices, including reviewing and altering how we talk about our 
relationships, and revising how we act in discussions on the emergency. When we alter 
where we focus our attention, we shift how we relate, in particular to the more violent 
relationships of our enmeshment.  
We can practice through mindful commentary and observation on, and drawing back to 
attention, those relationships in the societies and political communities we inhabit that 
block the dissipation of energy or that are, in other ways, 'bad for' systems.7 I explore the 
                                                           
7
 Morton has written extensively about how a reasonable view of life is to see it as striving towards its own 
ending. Nevertheless, picturing the graduated dissipation of energy is useful as a way of understanding how 
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idea that what realisation offers is a way, in the sense of a manner, of engagement with 
relationships. Rather than a goal-oriented focus on any interaction, these approaches 
allow human participants in discussion to step back from ideological commitments. They 
can do this by realising both that their agency is tied up with how they are viewing the 
conditions they find themselves in, and so with their attitude, and also that an unreflective 
commitment to an ideology is at the heart of attitude divergence. Finally, I consider the 
practice of eliciting an attitude that includes both compassion and humility, in the process 
of realising our enmeshment.  
Chapter Five 
In the final chapter, I consider some criticisms that have not been dealt with in the text so 
far in relation to this approach. I acknowledge the difficulties with talking about an 
'unconditioned' view. I explore the idea that we are inextricably conditioned, in the end, 
by our inescapably human perspective. I address the criticism that a systems-based 
approach can never transcend this limitation coherently, given that we can never achieve 
a 'view from nowhere'. I argue that this approach allows us to get a view from now, here, 
a complete acknowledgement of our conditionality, the conditionality of our 
commitments (however firmly held) and the condition of the planet, on which we depend.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
systems work, when 'capturing' as much energy as possible to dissipate. When we understand ourselves in 
this context, we can see that our good and the good of functioning systems that graduate the flow of energy 
by capturing it (as biodiverse communities of living organisms and ecosystems, for instance) then we can 
understand why it is in our interests to allow those systems to maintain themselves, given that our capacity 
to dissipate (eat, breathe, and so on) depends entirely on theirs.  
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I address the difficulty with envisaging a non-competitive ‘anti-meme’, defying 
reproduction, and the problem that there can be no general theoretical framework to the 
activity of 'agency as realisation'. I go on to address criticisms relating to the experiential 
nature of this approach: if realisation as agency is necessarily a mere experience rather 
than a theory, is it paradoxical to propose this as a thesis? 
I argue against the potential criticisms of passivity, fatalism, quietude and impracticality 
or ineffectiveness. I discuss the idea that the attitudes of humility, and compassion, that I 
argue is elicited by the realisation of this kind of agency, are ethically neutral, given the 
tendency to view attitudes as ethical virtues. I consider whether or not this approach is 
really ethically neutral because we can never be ideologically neutral, and I address the 
criticism that this approach is simply a shallow version of Zen Buddhism.  
In considering the implications and areas for further research, I observe that there is 
limited research that supports some areas of this thesis, for instance in the realm of 
neurological studies. However, I suggest that much more research would be warranted in 
this area to support the idea that we revise how we understand agency. I suggest that this 
research could be cross disciplinary, and could involve field work in a number of 
unexplored areas. This is also a call for more cross-disciplinary communications between 
the humanities and the sciences when it comes to discussing research findings. I comment 
that scientific understanding could be strengthened if there was a clearer understanding of 
the manner in which conceptual frameworks and narratives play a role in how evidence is 
presented, and that bringing this to light can help to avoid the kind of attitude divergence 
and entrenchment that currently haunts this area of discussion.  
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Understanding ourselves as systems within systems requires the revision of how we 
describe our relations and use language. The arts, crafts, literature, and other creative 
explorations could all help us to re-imagine how we relate, as could our work choices and 
options. I suggest that extensive scope exists for a philosophical approach to the 
ecological emergency in facilitating the discussions and negotiations between parties with 
different ideological priorities. By bringing these priorities to light, and seeing them as 
part of the perceiver's context, it is possible to take a view from ‘now, here’, in approach 
to these issues. 
We are in a precarious and dangerous situation. We both need to, and can, respond by 
realising the agency we have. Nevertheless, we cannot simply impose or enforce this as a 
systematic approach. Instead, we must find ways of communicating through becoming 
aware of, understanding, and developing a creative relationship with, our context. This 
relationship is necessarily experiential, non-competitive, and effortful. Yet the practice 
itself has the consolation of creating a deeply enriching experience. We realise our 
interrelatedness, and our agency becomes a response that is both creative and 
compassionate. One momentary shift of perspective changes how we approach all our 
relationships. 
Essentially, I have attempted to address the question, can contemporary humans respond 
to the emergency in which they are enmeshed? Many see this as a biological question: 
our evolutionary (genetic) inheritance has not kept pace with our species' ecological 
(environmental) impact.8 I see it as a philosophical one: our responses rely at least as 
                                                           
8
 We could see this as analogous to how we consume: 'We love sweets and fats, of which in Pleistocene 
times humans could seldom get enough. But now we overeat and grow fat.' Holmes Rolston III, 'The Future 
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heavily on how we understand and respond to the narratives we inherit as they do on our 
physiology. My research establishes that there are grounds for sobering pessimism: our 
species has the capacity for responsibility, but it requires an effort to take an objective 
view of the narratives that frame our response. It is easier to distract ourselves than it is to 
pay close attention. However, there are two reasons why such pessimism might not be 
entirely warranted. Firstly, the effort of paying attention by a single person has 
exponentially cumulative effects, given the systematic character of our involvement. 
Secondly, exercising the close attention that realisation as agency implies is its own 
reward: the consolation for this effort is enriched understanding, appreciation, and a more 
creative exploration of experience.  
Realising the kind of agency we have, and exercising this, offers a coherent response to 
the ecological emergency. It allows us to accept and acknowledge the limits of our own 
action, but fully to explore, respond, and take responsibility for the sphere of our 
autonomy. It therefore mitigates the harm, as well as the suffering, that is caused by 
attempts to avoid or escape the current context, both to humans but also to other species 
and systems. It elicits attitudes of compassion, humility and forgiveness in response to the 
recognition of our interrelatedness. The main motivation for wanting to respond to the 
ecological emergency is to avoid the catastrophic effects it will have on human affairs. 
However, the paradoxical conclusion of this dissertation is that we can only change the 
trajectory of the human narrative by coming to an understanding that our capacity for 
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action lies in the effort we make to be completely aware of our current context. Given the 
perilous condition we are in, we certainly have an incentive to respond in this way.  
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Chapter One: Context 
What is ‘the ecological emergency’? 
There are many ways to look at ‘the ecological emergency’, a phrase coined by Timothy 
Morton, whose concern with the intimacy of our involvement leads him to conclude, ‘We 
can’t spit out the disgusting real of ecological enmeshment. It’s just too close and too 
painful for comfort'.9 ‘Disgusting’, like ‘delicious’, is a label of taste, the implicitly 
human ‘we’ arriving at a conclusion too intimate for analysis: we ‘just can’t trust touchy-
feeliness to think through the ecological emergency’.10 This is where we find ourselves, 
chewing on our involvement that is also chewing us up, having to find some way of 
stepping back to discriminate that goes beyond subjective taste. That is the crux of this 
investigation.  
From some perspectives, there is no emergency whatsoever to view: the so-called 
emergency has been exaggerated, hyped up or even invented.11 From others, we are 
doomed no matter what we do.12 Richard Watson illustrates the 'naturalistic' argument:  
Humans' actions, regardless of their effect on other organisms, are natural and 
perfectly acceptable … we should be allowed to live out our 'evolutionary potential to 
[our own destruction] because this is 'nature's way'.13 
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Beyond these views are those that acknowledge the emergency and call for a response.14  
This implies that ‘the Anthropocene’, a term that recognises the deep impact of the 
human species on other evolved systems, is something over which we have some level of 
control, or influence.15 Before beginning to talk about the multiple perspectives on ‘the 
ecological emergency’, it is worth spending a moment considering what Morton meant by 
that phrase. Evidently, there is something particular about the use of the word 
‘ecological’, rather than the more commonly used word ‘environmental’, that needs 
attention. Oikos, the Greek for home, family or household, provides us with the prefix, 
eco, that we use in both the words economy and ecology.  
In referring to an ‘ecological’ emergency, Morton is asking us to acknowledge that we 
are in, and a part of, it. It is where we live, what we are at home in. It includes what 
Morton has termed ‘hyperobjects’, the vast intangible (and much debated) fluctuations in 
global temperature patterns that are variously termed ‘climate change’ or ‘DAGW’ 
(Dangerous Anthropogenic Global Warming).16 It also includes the subtle chemical 
alterations that take place under the skin as a result of the presence of synthesised 
pollutants and other by-products of industrialised living.  
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This is a shift from the idea of ‘environment’, a word that captures a relationship between 
atomistic organisms, on the one hand, and what surrounds them, their neighbourhood, on 
the other. We do not need to be at home in our neighbourhood. We can inhabit it, and yet 
live in relative isolation from it, if we choose to. The shift, in Morton’s phrase, is 
therefore from something about which we can concern ourselves as citizens or members 
of a community, to something about which we are concerned because it is the place 
where we eat, it is what we consume, and it is also what consumes us, how our bodies 
metabolise, what is preserved when we consume preservatives, and how we return to 
dust, or ashes. We cannot exist outside the ecological emergency because it includes what 
is happening within us. While it might once have been possible to consider nature and 
humanity as occupying two different and separable realms, this is no longer the case, as a 
result, both, of our scientific understanding, and of the degree of anthropogenic impact. 
The second part of the phrase, the idea of an emergency, is equally important. Morton 
exploits its ambiguity: it is urgent and threatening, but it is also the dynamic and transient 
context that is emerging into our awareness, bringing with it new forms of engagement, 
new relationships. In order for us to consider how to respond to species and habitat loss, 
erosion, pollution, climate change and the associated issues of human impact, we have to 
shift not just how we understand human responsibility but also how we decide to frame 
the conditions within which any response takes place. In summary, ‘the ecological 
emergency’ is a dynamic, on-going set of conditions that involves us, not just as catalysts, 
but as interactive features of the emergency. We need to acknowledge that what we are 
involved in is bringing us into an unfamiliar relationship with the reference points we 
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have traditionally used to guide our activity: we need to investigate this relationship as a 
matter of urgency.  
The various perspectives on the ecological emergency 
 (i) Denialism 
The problems we face as a result of our impact, as a species, on other systems have 
emerged out of deeply rooted ideas we have of our relationship to the rest of existence. 
One narrative considers that our impact on the planet has been relatively minimal: the 
space that contains it is so enormous that nothing we do could significantly affect it. This 
view is most often restricted to that aspect of the Anthropocene - data on climate change - 
that is most controversial. Less attention is paid by those who adopt this narrative to data 
on the mass extinction of species, habitat and ecosystem degradation and loss, pollution 
and acidification of oceans and river systems, and other impacts about which there is 
significant statistical evidence.  
There are also those who consider that the changes taking place as a result of the 
Anthropocene are somehow beneficial for the human species, that fewer large mammals 
is advantageous, or that if we want to, we could keep such mammals alive as would 
enhance human amusement or the advancement of human knowledge.17 A wider group, 
including these optimists and also those who regret recent extinctions, reasons that human 
ingenuity will at least ensure that human flourishing can and will continue. The survival 
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of the human species is not only entirely separable, for people holding this view, from the 
flourishing of anything else. The changes humans are bringing about are seen as more 
exciting, offering more potential benefits, than anything natural selection without human 
impact would have managed: 
There were doubtless periods in the transition so picturesque that any change in the 
kaleidoscope seemed as if it must inevitably be a change for the worse. Yet changes 
came, and unsuspected beauties were revealed.18 
 
 (ii) Naturalism and predictions of doom 
 
In general terms, if Nature is one thing, then 'natural' is another. Nature is used to 
describe the living world, or sometimes to describe the living world and all else besides 
(rock, water, air, the rest of the universe, ourselves in nature). Natural is contrasted with 
supernatural, or unnatural, where the latter means 'against the order of nature' and the 
former means 'above the laws of nature'. For George Edward Moore, 'natural' is 
contrasted with 'intuitive', and this split is the basis of his idea that we must be wary of 
the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, the claim that evaluations arise from natural states of affairs, an 
idea I will return to when discussing the problems with an ethical approach.19  
What I am referring to here is the idea of 'naturalism' depicted by Watson: the idea that 
the human species has indeed engendered a dangerously destabilising situation, but that 
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this has been an inevitable outcome of its own evolutionary trajectory. There is nothing to 
be done: we are doomed because, as natural beings, our every activity (including our 
responses and reactions), is subject to natural 'laws' or probabilities. Nothing that the 
human species does can be considered immoral or even wrong: we are simply following a 
pre-ordained course and it is as inevitable that we follow it through to this wave of 
destruction as it is that night follows day. 
According to James Lovelock, humanity will run its course and we, its members, must 
just accept that it will destroy countless other species, and cause vast suffering to its own, 
along the way.20 Lovelock estimated that we could face the loss of seven out of the 
projected eight billion humans who will be in existence within the next twenty years.21 
This 'extinction event', will, he says, also involve the loss of most of those species which 
are relatively close to us – a great proportion of the larger mammals (except those ones 
we use to feed ourselves), marsupials, fish, amphibia and birds - which depend on the 
same kind of environment that we do, and which will not, without direct human 
intervention, be able to protect themselves from the loss of that environment as a result of 
human impact.  
Lovelock shrugs off the need for any ethical reaction, although he does seem 
disappointed at human intelligence.22 We are past the tipping point and if there is any 
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obligation to do anything, it is to enjoy ourselves while we can, because the future is 
bleak. It is possible to infer from Lovelock's vision that this apocalyptic series of events 
might, in the end, cause a kind of awakening.23 If that were to happen, survivors might 
(naturally) experience a mass change of heart and spontaneously understand that their 
species was responsible and so, in some new sense, must they be, for how they relate to 
the ecological context. On the other hand, there is still the possibility that the human 
species will reject any sense of responsibility and continue to exploit and destroy other 
systems or even that evolution may take another turn and the human evolutionary 
experiment may fizzle out altogether, for this or unrelated reasons. The future is hard to 
predict, even with natural, probabilistic, laws to guide us. 
Lovelock, Watson, and others, effectively imply that, up to now, humans have, like all 
other naturally arising systems, been subject to conditions out of our control, whether 
those are to do with limitations to our own evolved intelligence and ability to make 
connections, or whether they are to do with the larger context of evolution itself. In this 
narrative, our activity is as natural and inevitable as gravity and just as the laws of 
probability shape gravitational activity, so they shape what we have done. Bill Devall and 
George Sessions give one of the many examples of instances that imply that our response 
so far tallies with this assessment: ‘If sustainability is to be achieved the rate of 
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deforestation will have had to have slowed dramatically by the end of the decade. Soon 
thereafter it will come to a halt.’24 
 
If denialists argue that we not in an emergency, and apocalyptics argue that we are 
natural, and therefore we are in an emergency, antagonists could be characterised as 
arguing that (whether we are natural or not) the rest of the natural world is hostile and 
alien, and requires suppression. During the nineteenth century, when European 
expansionism was at its height, as Bruno Latour put it, a 'we shall overcome' attitude may 
have been thought an entirely appropriate response.25 Even now, this reaction is evident 
among those who experience ‘natural disasters’: Nature is the monstrous Other who will 
overwhelm us if we do not strike back, preferably pre-emptively.26 The human response 
is based on the capacity to exercise a strong (mental) determination, translated into the 
(physical) action of overcoming adverse (physical) circumstances.  
Extending the argument from antagonism to the enemy within, there is also the view that 
we now perceive pressure to lower current rates of consumption as, in Guy Claxton’s 
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words, ‘loss, sacrifice and threat’.27  Claxton (quoted in King's essay) argues against the 
idea that we would willingly change our ways. It will take more than education to wean 
us from a consumer lifestyle that now intertwines with our beliefs. Even if we attempt to 
restrain ourselves, the rewards are less obvious, less tangible, than those immediate and 
somewhat addictive gratifications of consumption. As Claxton puts it, 'one wants, and 
one wants not to want. The problem is how to translate the wanting not to want into not 
wanting'.28 Here, our capacity for responsibility is in question: we can be in conflict with 
ourselves, having both a (mental) determination, and a (physical) capacity to respond 
differently, but insufficient (mental) strength to put that capacity into (physical) practice.  
 (iii) Ethics or pragmatism 
The next set of views acknowledges that there is an ecological emergency that we have 
the capacity, and obligation, to respond to. I want to separate them into those that 
understand our responsibility as primarily ethically neutral and those that understand our 
responsibility as primarily ethical. Of the first set, many see an ethic arising out of other 
reasons and capacities for response but the ethic is not the primary motivation. Lester, 
Flavin and Postel in their 'Vision of a Sustainable World' paint a scenario of 2030 in 
which we have managed, with effort, to bring our societies and communities into line 
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with what the rest of the biosphere can sustain.29 The views set out below effectively 
describe the various paths by which we could come to such a scenario.  
  Self-interested arguments 
The prevailing political responses to the ecological emergency rest on the understanding 
that individuals, groups, communities or states only act in their own interests. In this 
scenario, it is taken as a given that whatever capacity to respond we have is governed by 
decisions we make which in turn are based on self-interested goals. Calculations are 
made to assess what 'eco-system services' are 'worth' economically and these are then 
weighed up against what are seen as competing interests of human populations: jobs, 
cultural traditions, and so on. 
It is possible that, if those goals are reductionist enough and if we continue on the 
trajectory they inevitably imply, we risk facing a version of what Derek Parfit has 
described as ‘the repugnant conclusion’, the species reduced to bare survival in a world 
stripped back to mechanistic functionality.30 Dale Jamieson points this out in his 
assessment of the discussions on climate change that purported to take good will and a 
common purpose as starting points:  
The problem with this approach is that it assumed good will and a common purpose on 
all sides. However, not everyone wanted global action on climate change. Most of the 
oil producing states were opposed, and so were many influential actors in the United 
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States who were motivated by ideology, self-interest, or the calculus of political 
advantage.31 
 
The political and economic consequences of continuing impact are pitted against the 
potential mitigation of these effects: more tangible present benefits trump the uncertain 
future. In any case, we who are alive now will benefit not one whit from acts that aim to 
secure the future and there is no guarantee that any of our progeny, if we have any, will 
benefit either.  
Still self-interested is the view that rejects the economic or political tallying of interests 
and moves instead towards a focus on the preservation of species and ecosystems for 
their emotional or therapeutic benefits. John Muir described the sequoia forests of 
California as 'living cathedrals' and argued that nowhere was it more possible to achieve a 
sense of peace than in the wild places.32 Thoreau and Emerson argued similarly for the 
preservation of wild (or semi-wild) places because Nature generates a sense of 
reverence.33 Humanity (or at least some of its more sensitised members) has the capacity 
to recognise and resonate with the inherent aesthetic, experience awe and humility at the 
magnificence and magnitude of unpeopled places, and understand its loss or destruction 
as short-sighted and tragic.  
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The balance of interests in arguments from these early advocates of wilderness or 
biodiversity preservation, the likes of Muir, Thoreau and later, Holmes Rolston III and 
others, imply that, while it is heart-breaking to lose the wild places, it is the human, 
transcendent soul that is mostly harmed by their loss. This is because humans alone have 
another dimension for understanding and responding to wild Nature. Reduced to its crude 
base, this kind of approach could be characterised as one that views our responsibility as 
generated by, and serving, human self-interest first (and any other interests only by 
extension). 
Rachel Carson moves the grounds for exercising our capacity to respond from the 
spiritual to the physiological. Her strongest appeal to halt the use of pesticides and stop 
the destruction of the complex interrelationships in biodiverse systems was that their 
continued use affected the physiological survival of human individuals. This was 
information we could respond to by changing our interventions in natural systems 
(primarily through banning certain pesticides). Carson's slant, like those of the other 
writers mentioned above, needs to be seen in the context of the concerns and pressures of 
particular historical and social conditions. After all, even Charles Darwin was reluctant to 
publicly express his religious beliefs (or lack of them) for fear of reprisal. It is possible, 
therefore, that the emphasis in these writers' works was skewed to reflect concerns that 
they felt their readers could most easily identify with and, given the context, these were, 
vastly predominately, human concerns.  
My approach to these writers - Leopold, Muir, Carson, Thoreau and Emerson – may 
appear at variance with the standard interpretation that they all gave precedence to non-
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human voices.34 Certainly, they were part of a movement to take account of non-human 
interests and to act with consideration for those interests, and this extended from a 
narrative that followed the tracks of the changing human relationship to the wild. From 
the hunter-gatherer's placating, awe- (or fear-) inspired worship of the 'spirit within' all 
things, the narrative told how the relationship metamorphosed into one of the alienated, 
industrialised, human subject thirsting, either for solace or inspiration, among the wild 
spaces, seeking to reconnect to the umbilicus to Mother Earth as the sustaining 'source'.  
Aldo Leopold questioned the benefits of increased human comfort at the vast cost to the 
non-human, and particularly to 'Wild Nature' and was, therefore, one of the first thinkers 
of the ‘global North’ to place human interests firmly within, and connected to, ecological 
interests.35 What we lost, when we gained material comfort, was of far greater importance 
than what we gained, since what we lost could never be recovered (the extinction of 
species) whereas what we had gained was temporary and dependent on continuing 
unsustainable loss.36 However, Leopold still characterised the loss to humans as being of 
a distinct and qualitatively different kind from any loss to any other creature, system or 
process, and so, in this sense at least, he still represents a self-interested approach.37 To 
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reiterate, human responsibility, in these narratives, was primarily a question of 
(enlightened) self-interest, and only by extension, the interests of habitats, other species, 
and so on. 
  Altruistic or ethical arguments 
Reframing a response to anthropogenic impact for reasons that go beyond self-interest 
has been the work of the field of environmental ethics. Trying to translate a concern for 
the non-human world into ethical terms has proved elusive, to say the least. Concerns 
expressed in pragmatic, aesthetic, emotional and therapeutic terms are relatively easy to 
conceive of. We can even see a rationale for extending a kind of honorary person-hood to 
other animals who exhibit recognisable responses to the infliction of pain or suffering, 
but to talk of a moral duty beyond this becomes increasingly diluted, and less 
convincing.38  
Central to the field of environmental ethics are questions about how we can conceive of 
our relationship with living (and even with non-living) non-human individuals and 
communities. The nub of the argument is that our relationship to (variously) nature, the 
environment or the rest of existence involves duties or responsibilities that parallel those 
we owe to other people. To understand what these duties might be, we are back to the 
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question of how humans fit into the rest of biophysical existence, and what this implies 
about our relationship with it.  
Environmental ethics is predicated on the position that human impact has created a 
critical situation, but also that at least some humans have an ability to respond and are 
therefore under some sort of obligation to act to reverse, or mitigate, what is going on. 
Robin Attfield, in his Paris paper, defines four positions which emerged more or less 
chronologically as perspectives from which to develop an environmental ethic.39 It must 
be said that each term describes a range of positions which more or less fall within each 
scope. The four are anthropocentrism, zoocentrism, (which could also be called 
sentientism or rationalism), biocentrism and ecocentrism. Without attempting to do 
justice to any, but merely in the spirit of contextualising Paul Taylor's biocentrism, they 
can each be understood as advocating a particular perspective from which to approach 
our ethical response to the environment, and, more specifically, to the problematic 
relationship we have with it (manifested as biodiversity loss, and so on). 
The arguments circle around what to include as qualifying characteristics for moral 
consideration. At each point on the spectrum, it is possible to identify a locus, whether 
that is the select set of human characteristics required to qualify for boarding Hardin's 
lifeboat, or the mirroring dewdrops in the net of Indra, where every point in the universe 
is a relevant centre of consideration, since all are interdependent.40 
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  An emerging consensus of the view of human responsibility 
All these views (apart from the last one mentioned) depend on the narrative that Taylor 
spells out in detail, where a particular category of beings (humans) are moral agents, in 
the sense of being self-directed individuals who can be held accountable for duties and 
responsibilities imposed on them by a cultural system they recognise.41 This category, 
moral agents, both can and ought to take responsibility for this emergency. 
If this narrative is an accurate reflection of the relationship, humans and the non-human 
world really are different categories. Humans are the sole protagonists able to take 
responsibility for their impact. Interestingly, if we look at the kinds of justification that 
have been used for self-interested, exploitative human interventions, they are, in exact 
parallel, those that posit two categories of existence: humans, who are intrinsically 
valuable, and can value, on the one hand, and the rest of existence, which may be 
instrumentally valuable, and cannot value, on the other.42  
This dichotomous vision arises partly a result of our evolved condition: an extravagant 
evolutionary process that has led, accidentally, to human self-conscious experience. The 
way we view ourselves is heavily influenced by our physical, biological condition: we 
live within our skins and our identity is bound up in this fact. However, at least as 
important in shaping how we see ourselves are the social and historical contexts that 
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create our sense of identity and, most relevantly here, the narrative we almost universally 
accept of ourselves as self-directed, autonomous, beings, with the capacity to respond, in 
some sense consciously, to what we encounter.  
Wendell Berry in 'The Landscape of Harmony' characterises, or perhaps caricatures, two 
extreme attitudes taken by humans in the perception of their relationship to nature. The 
first group we can call the nature lovers 'who sound as though they are entirely in favour 
of nature'. Here, Berry equates 'nature' with the biosphere: 
They believe, at least in principle, that the biosphere is an egalitarian system, in which 
all creatures, including humans, are equal in value and have an equal right to live and 
flourish.43 
 
In this rendering, humans are one single point in a matrix that includes all living 
existence on the planet and that is, potentially, one harmonious whole. The idea that 
humans, and all else, can 'flourish' in this matrix suggests that it is predominantly benign 
and it is this that Berry rightly takes the nature lovers to task for: 
At the other extreme are the nature conquerors, who have no patience with an old-
fashioned outdoor farm, let alone a wilderness. These people divide all reality into two 
parts: human good, which they define as profit, comfort and security; and everything 
else, which they understand as a stockpile of 'natural resources' or 'raw materials', 
which will sooner or later be transformed into human good.44 
 
Berry is aware that the polarised attitudes he mentions are largely the result of certain 
processes of acculturation. Where there has been a cultural facilitation towards 
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integrating the subjective and the objective, the relationships are treated as mirrors of one 
another.45 On the other hand, in contexts where the segregation of perspective means that 
there is no inherent recognition of a connection between one set of relationships and 
another, the resulting fragmentation has caused dissonance: there is no longer an accord 
between sets of relationships, or a recognition that each affects the other. As Muir says, 
'The world, we are told, was made especially for man – a presumption not supported by 
all the facts.'46 
In the context of contemporary understandings and explanations, an agnostic, physicalist 
view of how humans fit into the ecosphere is an appropriate starting point for reviewing 
the different perspectives outlined above.47 Given this starting point, I have chosen to use 
Taylor's work as a catalyst for this attempt to separate out a view that best reflects our 
current understanding of the human/nature relationship, particularly as this relates to our 
responsibility. Taylor contextualises his environmental ethic within an evolutionary 
understanding of the human condition.  
Attitude divergence in the context of the ecological emergency 
 (i) Anti-rationality, cognitive dissonance, existing bias 
Attempts to disentangle the ethical and practical problems presented by Taylor’s thesis 
unfortunately run into precisely the kind of difficulties that beset responses to the 
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ecological emergency, in particular, and environmental ethics more generally, in the first 
place. A key feature of these difficulties has been that of attitude divergence, and the 
entrenchment of the different, disparate views. 
J. Baird Callicott’s work on the triangulation of human, animal and environmental rights 
elicited an early instance of vigorous caricaturing when one respondent 'exploited 
[Callicott's extreme, and somewhat inexperienced, reading of 'the land ethic'] for 
polemical purposes.'48 Callicott was labelled an 'eco-fascist’, the first known instance of 
this epithet. He later recanted the extremism implied by his reading but the stage was set 
for what was to become a regular feature of any discussion about responses to 
anthropogenic impact, both in the philosophical world and beyond, into the political.  
To question that human capacities are at the apex of the evolutionary ladder is seen by 
hierarchists as little less than heresy.49 Attfield expresses his incomprehension that 
anyone could view the complex cognitive capacities of humans as anything but ‘higher’ 
processes which are, therefore, intrinsically more valuable than processes like 
photosynthesis.50 Policies and practices designed to rebalance human with non-human 
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interests are sometimes called 'human-hating'.51 On the other hand, those who resist calls 
for such a rebalancing are labelled, in their turn, 'anti-human'.52 
The tendency towards increasing divergence is particularly evident throughout debates on 
social and conventional media, between 'deniers' and 'warmists', representing a more 
general sense of ideological divisiveness.53 There is a parallel divergence in how we, in 
the global North, live (where and how material resources, from food to plastics are 
‘produced’, and where they go after we have finished with them), and the idea we have of 
how we live (shaped by the – largely unexamined – narratives that underpin our 
understanding of our condition).54 There is little convergence on how to frame the 
problem of anthropogenic impact, or even on whether or not a problem exists, but there is 
also little convergence on the narratives that underpin beliefs about what, if anything, 
should be done.  
In the sense that I will use it in this work, ideological thinking is the tendency to base 
moral or ethical principles (in this chapter, I use the words virtually interchangeably) on a 
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set of ideas that might have a political, or a religious, origin, and to use this as a 
framework for approaching and interpreting new evidence.55 Just as liberal ideology 
could incline its adherent towards evidence that supports stronger government 
intervention for public goods and social justice, so a more conservative (or, in American 
parlance, republican) stance will incline its proponent towards evidence that supports 
self-interest and the free market as forces that will lead to social benefits. In the context 
of the ecological emergency, it is easy to translate these narratives into those that 
underpin the embracing of evidence that more state intervention is necessary to control 
human impact, and those that consider relevant only evidence for less state intervention 
(and that, by extension, do not admit to the negative impact of human activity). The 
underpinning narratives play a key role in how evidence is assessed. 
(ii) Divergence in negotiations: the law of diminishing returns 
If the fundamental take we have on the human condition and human history is causing 
divergence in the theoretical field, the chances of any successful discussion and 
negotiation in practice is also bound to diminish. There is an increasing likelihood of 
fragmentation between groups adhering to different narratives, and it follows that this 
situation is likely to decrease opportunities for future convergence both on how to frame, 
and on how to respond to, the ecological emergency (if it is even conceived as such).  
                                                           
55
 As I said in footnote 4 in the Introduction, there is a case to be made for defending a distinction between 
‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ on, for instance, grounds of personal (moral) versus social (ethical) applicability. 
However, since I am going to propose that we dispense with an ethical approach, and show that there is no 
centre to a ‘moral’ agent, I will, from here on, largely follow the example of Hans-Georg Moeller in his 
usage in The Moral Fool (The Moral Fool: A Comparative Case for Amorality (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009). He points out that there are good grounds for defending this interchangeability of 
use.  
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
36 
 
We need to find a way to understand how human moral responsibility, and moral agency, 
operates in the context of the wider-than-human sphere, particularly when we perceive 
human impact as having created a crisis in that sphere. This requires us to reflect on 
whichever aspects of the narrative underpinning our beliefs about the human/nature 
relationship have remained unexamined. However, we also need to find a way to 
understand whether there is any way to overcome the divergence that arises in 
discussions of theories that posit grounds for an environmental ethic. Unless we do so, 
any finding will lack practical applicability.  
A context for Taylor's ‘respect for nature’ 
 (i) Moral agents, moral patients and moral considerability 
Taylor advocated a three-stage process in his account of biocentrism, moving from a 
recognition of an organism's inherent worth to its moral considerability and on to what 
moral agents owe that organism.  His book is an extended untangling of the concerns 
implicit in each step but he begins by demarcating clear boundaries between the entities 
and issues under consideration, and among these is the idea of where our responsibility 
lies: in our moral agency.56 
The idea of moral agency has remained relatively unexamined in the field of 
environmental ethics compared, for instance, to ideas of where to locate value, who to 
include in (moral or ethical) consideration, and so on.57 The idea that humans are moral 
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agents with at least some level of responsibility to at least some set of ‘moral patients’, is 
barely questioned and Taylor's account, while it is careful to delineate what is included 
by the term, is no exception.58 However, Taylor's account is persuasive for other reasons, 
and is therefore worth the effort of analysis. He clearly demonstrates the evolutionary 
relationship between the human species and all others, and hence, humanity's 
peripherality, at least from the perspective of biophysical evolution.59 He gives a careful 
account of the relationship between the well-being or, more broadly 'good', of an 
organism, and its teleological instinct to pursue this 'good'.60  
When Taylor is laying this out, he implies a distinct correlation between the recognition 
and acknowledgement of 'the good' of organisms and human agency. On the basis that 
organisms, like humans, pursue certain conditions that benefit them (their ‘goods’), then 
they, along with humans, are ‘ends in themselves’, teleological centres with goals. None 
of these centres need be aware that they are pursuing the goal of their 'good', as long as 
there are human moral agents on the scene to provide this recognition, and with the 
capacity to respond to the recognition. Importantly, none of these teleological centres is 
intrinsically more important than any other: all have evolved through the same process, 
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and their similarity to, or difference from, humanity, is immaterial when it comes to their 
worth. All have inherent worth equally, and Taylor’s theory is radically egalitarian as a 
result of this conclusion.  
For Taylor, we are able to take responsibility for our disruptive and destructive impact on 
other living systems, both for our own sakes, but more fundamentally, because it is 'the 
right thing to do'. ‘Moral agents’ are those kinds of beings (and only certain human 
beings fall into this category, as far as Taylor is concerned) that ‘can have duties and 
responsibilities’ and that can ‘be held accountable’ for what they do.61 Moral agents 
exercise these duties and responsibilities both towards themselves (other moral agents) 
and towards those they recognise as having inherent worth: moral patients.  
Moral patients fall into two main groups. Some humans and perhaps some other living 
organisms sometimes pursue their own goods conscious of the fact, while much of the 
time all these organisms do not (while asleep, for instance) and yet, those goals do not go 
away, even when the moral patients are unconscious of them. Depressed people, 
impoverished people, animals in captivity, and so on are sometimes internally or 
externally restrained from pursuing their own goods; nevertheless at least some of these 
will know that they have goods, even if they cannot manage to pursue them, or even if 
they deliberately pursue their own destruction. The second category of moral patients are 
those that pursue their own goods instinctively, or, perhaps one could even say, 
inherently, just because this is the kind of thing they are (this includes, therefore, all 
organisms that instinctively direct themselves towards sources of light, heat or nutrition, 
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and away from sources of pain, or threats of annihilation). This group never has any 
awareness that it is pursuing its 'good', but it does so, nonetheless. 
Moral considerability, in this context, is the exercise of deciding which set of patients to 
include in the moral realm. Taylor includes both. Others may decide to exclude one, or 
change the boundaries of both, based on a different set of foundational beliefs, or ideals, 
or a religious commitment. Cartesian dualism is the obvious alternative approach and 
Descartes sought to demonstrate conclusively that as long as organisms in pursuit of 
goals are unaware of such a pursuit, they simply exist and that is all. Therefore if moral 
agents decide that it would benefit humanity to dissect such an organism, there is nothing, 
morally, wrong with that. Other traditions, secular and religious, have views on how we 
ought to behave towards the non-human world, advocating a hierarchical approach. 
Almost all posit a moral agent, on the one hand, and the rest of existence, on the other. 
Traditional ethics has a clear boundary: humans alone are the subject of moral 
considerability. Where questions arise, these are around humans who fall into a grey area: 
embryos and foetuses, future people, people who are incapable of moral deliberation.62 
However, including all these kinds of people blurs the boundary: there is no relevant 
distinction between those who have nervous systems and are not human, and those who 
                                                           
62
 For a contextualised discussion of future humans, see Clark Wolf, ‘Environmental Justice and 
Intergenerational Debt’ in David Keller (ed.) Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Wiley Blackwell, 
2010) 545 – 550.  
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
40 
 
have less functional, or virtual, nervous systems, and are human, unless we revert to the 
claim that all humans, and only humans, are possessed of souls.63  
We can legitimately reject that claim, coming at this from a scientist perspective, on the 
basis that it cannot be falsified, and cannot be examined. That allows us to turn to a third 
problem for ethicists in deciding who or what to include in moral consideration. Systems, 
communities, or other holons are diverse and complex, and have no single evolutionary 
drive, unlike individual organisms. While it may make sense to move the locus of 
consideration from an individual human to an individual of another species, the difficulty 
with shifting consideration to entire systems is that there is no teleological centre on 
which to focus attention.  
Taylor's egalitarianism creates difficulties with the moral considerability of different and 
sometimes conflicting interests. An egalitarian ethic strives for the flourishing of all 
organisms equally, but this is in tension with the competitive nature of evolution, and 
even with human needs. The deliberate killing of individual organisms by humans for 
food or as entertainment is incompatible with Taylor’s environmental ethic but living as 
part of the natural world implies that we ought at least to allow for the possibility of 
exercising our capacity, as human animals, to ‘fit in’ with nature in this way.64  
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Taylor’s narrative of the moral considerability of ‘wild places’ could be interpreted from 
a conservative perspective as implying that privatisation of lands is the only way to 
guarantee the full moral consideration of the wild communities of organisms living 
there.65 However, it might also be possible to argue that only through state ownership can 
both human-to-human and human-to-non-human moral considerations be balanced.66 
Perhaps, however, only community ownership of land is consistent with the full moral 
considerability of wild members of that community.67 It is not clear, therefore, from 
Taylor’s account, that a common strategy for environmental protection could easily be 
found. However, it is clear that he views human moral agency as unique and special, 
although the basis for such uniqueness is not explicitly established.  
 (ii) Moral egotism 
These various interpretations of Taylor’s moral considerability in the context of different 
ideological approaches illustrate how the issue of moral responsibility diverges, 
depending on underlying narrative. In one respect, this turns on whether we believe that 
our most important basis for making decisions is self-interested or virtue-based, whether 
it requires an emotional engagement or can be entirely rational.68 In this section, I set out 
the various perspectives in order to locate Taylor's position on the spectrum.  
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During the 1960s, Garrett Hardin developed perhaps the most radically conservative 
response to what he saw as increasing pressure on biological systems for human survival. 
He couched his argument in ethical terms but with the proviso that ‘ecology, a system-
based view of the world, demands situational ethics’.69 For Hardin, the current situation 
was untenable: the focus on human rights-based ethics had favoured egalitarianism, but 
the short-term concerns of an egalitarian system would always ensure environmental 
degradation since it is based on the needs of those who are currently alive and the 
principle that they have a right to survival.  
Hardin, therefore, proposed an unequal distribution of wealth or privilege, so that those 
agents with more interest in preservation – those with more wealth, and therefore more to 
'pass on' – will better protect what is theirs, even if this is at the expense of the majority 
who will very likely suffer and perhaps even die as a result. At this end of the ethical 
spectrum, then, the circle of moral considerability is contracted to include only a favoured 
few humans and nothing else, but the motivation for this contraction is to protect not only 
the favoured human few but also, crucially (Hardin is a biologist, after all) the ‘whole 
world’.70  
Hardin's thesis, largely based on Malthusian population dynamics, was developed as a 
morally pragmatic response specifically to the problems of the ecological emergency. His 
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‘lifeboat ethic’ is a proposal that the only way human agents can meet our moral 
obligations towards ourselves, as a species, is by limiting the moral sphere.71 Since the 
human species is doomed to a mass reduction in numbers in any case, in Hardin's 
narrative, his focus is on minimising the suffering of all (including, crucially, the non-
human realm of living existence) by focusing all efforts for survival on those who have 
the highest chance of coming through the crisis. 
In parallel with his ‘tragedy of the commons’ argument, Hardin prefers that the 
distribution of means for survival be limited to those who occupy a current position of 
relative privilege or wealth (those in the United States, for instance, but not those in 
Somalia). Those who survive will be more likely to protect the goods and resources, 
including the evolved biodiversity, which has ensured their survival. The end result will 
be a more protected, more morally (because more socially) intact, population, even if this 
is achieved at the expense of the vast majority. 
Hardin’s argument is based on the classical Hobbesian narrative that human 
extravagance, greed or hunger is insatiable, and that natural human appetite, when 
coupled with an ethic that fails to acknowledge this appetite, will consume until it burns 
itself out destructively. The only morally feasible stance for such a creature is to exercise 
a ruthless plan of moral discrimination, embracing  those who happen to belong to one's 
own community, or group, regardless of whether they are more prepared than anyone else 
to recognise and restrain their natural capacity for limitless consumption, and excluding 
all else. Hardin’s aim in developing this ethic is laudable: his goal is to see the 
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preservation and protection of what he recognises as delicate and intricate webs of 
interdependence among organisms and the conditions that sustain them. However his 
method of selecting a group whose interests and concerns may well entirely contradict his 
own is faulty, at best.  
Hardin's training as a biologist implies that he recognises human enmeshment. His 
approach takes a traditional view of agency, however, and more, a clear attempt to cut off 
the recognition of interdependence with those who are not morally considerable. There is 
no discussion of the effects of such social exclusiveness on either the survivors, or on 
biosystems generally. Disenfranchisement has proved an expensive social strategy in the 
past and whatever level of impoverishment people are reduced to, there has never been a 
way of neatly excising an entire population.72 The practicality of this approach is 
therefore highly questionable, quite apart from the suffering that it would entail.  
Elinor Ostrom also questioned, and, using empirical research into actual practice, 
demolished, Hardin's argument that holding 'goods' in common (land, water, and so on) 
would always end in their tragic diminishment.73 Yet Hardin's view represents a widely 
held perspective and includes an attempt to discuss the unpalatable reality of human 
population increase (and an accompanying, exponential, increase in demand for material 
goods and benefits), a discussion that is not easy to dismiss.74 
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Part of the difficulty with Hardin's approach is that any justification for action on moral 
grounds that also justifies entirely self-centred action is not really, therefore, moral. 
Ronald Dworkin puts it like this: 
We aim to find some ethical standard—some conception of what it is to live well—
that will guide us in our interpretation of moral concepts. But there is an apparent 
obstacle. This strategy seems to suppose that we should understand our moral 
responsibilities in whatever way is best for us, but that goal seems contrary to the spirit 
of morality, because morality should not depend on any benefit that being moral might 
bring.75 
 
In contrast, Amartya Sen and Barry Commoner argue that there is no inherent difference 
between the value of one human life and the value of another. In the context of the 
ecological emergency, this demands an egalitarian ethic that is close to the Kantian 
notion of the inherent value of the life of every individual.76 Taylor's expansion locates 
him far from the narrow egotism that, paradoxically, nevertheless recognises that the 
survival of any recognisably civilised version of the human species relies on a 
functioning ecosystem. His approach is tempered only by his priority principles that form 
a weighting system to balance the different interests affected by each decision. 
The debate between the ‘selfish gene’ approach of Hardin, and the egalitarian ethic 
approach of Sen, Commoner et al., presages the concerns that occupied Taylor when he 
put forward his egalitarian, biocentric ethic. It illustrates the ideological divide between 
the broad inclusiveness of Hardin's concerns that motivate him to narrow who is morally 
considerable, and the more traditional concerns with social justice first, and 
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environmental justice arising as a secondary consideration. Taylor's attempt to sidestep 
this divide by prioritising the entire ecological community may not have convinced the 
pragmatists or the idealists, but it was a revolutionary way to design the problem.  
(iii) Narrow anthropocentrism to sentientism 
Basing moral principles on rational grounds has unexpected and sometimes undesirable 
consequences in practice.77 An egalitarian approach to ethics in general, and to 
environmental ethics in particular, hits other ideological walls, too. There is the lengthy 
debate between how current human (moral) agents might include potential future 
members of the species within this equation. Hardin argues that whatever we do to ensure 
survival indiscriminately for humans now will impact negatively on the future. Sen and 
Commoner argue the opposite: by improving conditions for present humans, future 
human and environmental problems will be more easily addressed. Healthier human 
populations now, treated more fairly, will be more likely to address population issues, the 
single highest risk factor for the future of both human and all living systems.78 
From an anthropocentric perspective, we are bound inevitably to witness the world from 
behind species-specific spectacles and our interests are primarily in what is good for us, 
first individually, then collectively. If we look after the world for moral reasons, these are 
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ultimately because we are protecting what provides for our own (and that is the ultimate) 
good. Therefore stewardship is the primary anthropocentric position, laid out by Aristotle 
(‘nature has made all things for man’) and extended through the various religious 
incarnations (the idea that ‘the environment, as God’s creation, must be respected’) to 
contemporary times.  
The problem with this extended anthropocentrism (expounded most clearly by Peter 
Singer in The Expanding Circle), is that it is still informed by a hierarchical view of the 
world.79 As Holmes Rolston III puts it, 'humans are of the utmost value in the sense that 
they are the ecosystem's most sophisticated product. They have the highest per capita 
intrinsic value of any life form supported by the system'.80 The problem lies in the 
circularity of the argument: to judge the worth of any other organism from the point of 
view of what is worthwhile to oneself merely confirms one’s own bias of what is 
valuable. Making ‘honorary persons’ of dolphins or chimpanzees on the basis that they 
have capacities that closely resemble those held by humans is still human-centric. Human 
functioning relies on various sets of capabilities but it makes no more sense to judge a 
bat's capacity to sing arias than it does a human's ability to fly through a cave in the dark 
and yet that is exactly what sentientism does. It is still an attempt to give prime concern 
to capacities and capabilities which are, by their very nature, anthropocentric.  
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Anthropocentrism is premised on a rational expansion of our selfishness to include 
reciprocity, figuring that if we give, we will in turn get. Yet the centre cannot hold, in this 
scenario, because, as Dworkin illustrated, morality should not depend on any benefit that 
being moral might bring.81 There is a moral vacuum at the heart of any ideological 
argument for founding an ethic on egoism. There must be independent reasons for 
reciprocating that do not depend on egoistic benefits or the claim that this is a moral 
stance collapses.  
It is not just the short-sightedness of the 'own best interests' approach that is the problem. 
Recent biological research suggests that the survival interests of every holon, whether a 
cell, a body, a society, a species, an ecosystem, or a whole living planet, must be 
balanced in the mutual consistency of the whole and all its parts.82 Egoistic morality is 
viable if tempered by the survival interests of local and global communities.83 The 
problem arises because we rely on there being a centre that is qualitatively unique, yet the 
only evidence for this is couched in an ideology that depends upon outmoded 
metaphysical metaphors of a largely Newtonian nature: the persistent reliance on 
body/soul, human/natural divisions in the general imagination. The grounds for claiming 
species superiority are somewhat undermined by the best scientific explanation we have 
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for our existence here: evolutionary theory. This theory makes it clear that the human 
species is a latecomer, and peripheral to living existence as a whole.  
 (iv) When sentience is no longer the key to value 
Viewing life as merely instrumental to human flourishing risks a reversion to religious-
style exploitation of living systems by the back door, as it were. There is clearly 
something Berkeleyan in the argument that value is only present when human valuers are 
in the room to do the valuing. Various thought experiments have been devised to refute 
this view and show how non-human living systems might be envisaged to have value, 
regardless of whether or not there was a human there to value them.  
‘The last man’ experiment by Richard Sylvan (Routley) suggested that if there was a last 
man, and a last tree, and the latter had the capacity for reproduction, it would be morally 
unjustifiable to chop it down, even if there would be no future humans to enjoy or benefit 
from it.84 Therefore, Sylvan concludes, value resides in living organisms, regardless of 
whether they know it or not, and it is not just a quality conferred by the human perceiver. 
This argument depends on an intuitionist notion of what is 'good' or valuable. However, 
those intuitions are grounded in the biological conditions that benefit organisms. Taylor’s 
grounds for shifting the centre were couched in reasoning that other organisms had 
conditions that benefit them, but this foreshadowing of a shift in focus from 
anthropocentrism is useful because it raises the possibility that value is 'out there', rather 
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than 'in here'. The proviso, from Taylor's point of view, is that value depends on what is 
in the interest of organisms, or, potentially, systems. This idea is extended in the next 
chapter in considering the possibility that systems have conditions that are good for them.  
Humans may be doomed to perceive existence through human eyes, but this does not 
imply that we are unable empathetically to imagine life from elsewhere. Rather than 
considering humans as the 'monarchs' of the evolutionary process, the acknowledgement 
of our evolutionary history entangles us. Human intelligence and capacity for creative, 
artistic and technological design enable us to relate to existence in a way no other 
organism can. Our pain and suffering become, in some sense, translatable into the pain 
and suffering of any organism that pursues avoidance of annihilation. Trees or other 
plants may have nothing we can recognise as conscious awareness. However, it is still 
obvious that destroying something that actively avoids annihilation is, in some sense at 
least, unjustifiable. 
Biocentrism 
Being human includes the capacity to step outside the ‘I’, to imagine life from elsewhere 
regardless of whether or not this capacity is exercised or explored in most cases. This is 
the capacity that must be exercised, however, if a biocentric view is to emerge. The 
stretch to imagine what life is like from another point of view does not, and cannot, 
require that we leave our own experience. Yet recognising that each form of life is driven 
by evolutionary necessity to avoid death for as long as possible, through autopoiesis, the 
process of self-organisation that defines living systems, is enough to give us an idea of 
what life is like from elsewhere. Living individuals are primed, evolutionarily, to 
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reproduce, if that is possible, just as we are (although cultural systems have made it 
possible to reinterpret this priming through, for instance, the urge to produce a piece of 
art or literature). Looking at conditions from the point of view of another living organism 
makes it possible to perceive the conditions that benefit, and those that harm, particular 
manifestations of living existence. From the biocentric point of view, all living organisms 
have conditions they value by virtue of having conditions that benefit them.  
The problems with biocentrism have already been touched upon: individual organisms 
are interdependent but also in competition; some individual organisms have lives so 
transient, in human terms, that they have barely come into existence before they are 
decomposing. Biocentric egalitarianism faces the same problems that egalitarian ethics 
faced earlier: moral repugnance as we reduce life to the bare functionality of systems or 
to indifferent interchange of billions of micro-organisms for a single elephant. Yet 
moving to include all life at least dethrones the claims to human superiority that underpin 
anthropocentrism. The idea of agency within this biocentric view rests on an evolutionary 
understanding of human existence and therefore the individualistic, atomistic 
understanding could well be revised to better take that into account. 
Ecocentrism 
Aldo Leopold and his student, J. Baird Callicott, decentred humans, and even individuals, 
locating value, instead, in relationships. Ecocentrism is the narrative in which the 
flourishing of the entire ecosystem comes into focus. The success or failure of the 
enterprise depends on seeing what that system needs for its self-maintenance (in 
ecocentric terms, the integrity of the community).  
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Ecocentrism faces the serious problem of showing how a relationship, rather than an 
entity (an individual or a species) can have value. Relationships, even within the oikos, or 
home, are not themselves centres, but interactions. Harley Cahen in 'Against the Moral 
Considerability of Ecosystems' asks: 
Are ecosystems morally considerable - that is, do we owe it to them to protect their 
'interests'? Many environmental ethicists, impressed by the way that individual 
nonsentient organisms such as plants tenaciously pursue their own biological goals, 
have concluded that we should extend moral considerability far enough to include 
such organisms. There is a pitfall in the ecosystem-to-organism analogy, however. We 
must distinguish a system's genuine goals from the incidental effects, or byproducts, of 
the behavior of that system's parts. Goals seem capable of giving rise to interests; 
byproducts do not. It is hard to see how whole ecosystems can be genuinely goal-
directed unless group selection occurs at the community level. Currently, mainstream 
ecological and evolutionary theory is individualistic. From such a theory it follows 
that the apparent goals of ecosystems are mere byproducts and, as such, cannot ground 
moral considerability.85 
 
Cahen is right: it is not possible to ground moral considerability in the relationships that 
emerge between different points of interest in the matrix of an ecosystem. However, this 
is not because particular relationships are not 'good' or indeed 'bad' for those points of 
interest. As I will argue in detail in the third chapter, talking of 'the good' of systems 
requires revision, just as talking about a 'centre' requires revision. Regardless of where 
the teleology of systems lies, it is still possible to talk of ‘the good’ of systems (in the 
same vein that Taylor talks of ‘the good’ of organisms). There is still a ground, although 
it is no longer a moral one, for considering what would benefit, or harm, systems, 
including ecosystems.  
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Biocentrism locates the centre quite clearly in each individual (something that only 
becomes problematic when I begin to question the integrity of the idea of individual 
identity). Ecocentrism is already in trouble: there is no centre of value to begin with. The 
integrity of the community implies that there is an end point (at which all is in balance 
and harmony) to which we can aim. This state is unachievable in the dynamism of 
activity through time when ecosystems are always dying in some respect and being born 
in some other, and Taylor makes it clear early on that he does not believe that the idea of 
balance is a useful paradigm:  
'… what has been called the ‘balance of nature’ can no longer be assumed as a kind of 
basic norm built into the order of the natural world. ‘The balance of nature’ as it was 
conceived in the nineteenth century both before and after Darwin, was taken to be 
evidence of overall design in the realm of living things. … Whatever elements of 
equilibrium and stability may hold among the species-populations of an ecosystem at 
a particular time, these must be seen as general features resulting from natural 
selection as it occurs among individuals competing in their attempts to survive and 
reproduce …'86 
 
In other words, rather than considering the evolving ecosphere as having an inherent 
stability, it is more accurate to consider it to be in a state of dynamic transience. Still, this 
system may be relatively less stable when compared to systems that lack any kind of 
autopoeisis or self-organisation. In similar vein, it is inaccurate to consider evolved 
systems as progressive, in the sense of proceeding towards higher states. Certainly 
evolution has developed in the direction of increasing complexity for a minority of 
systems, but mainly, evolution progresses by just going on through time. Both harmony 
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and evolutionary progress, therefore, are ideas that need revising if we are to understand 
both organisms and ecosystems, and therefore what kind of response we make to them. 
Having said all that, it needs to be acknowledged that both ecocentrism and biocentrism 
are progressive imaginaries in the sense that they take into account a more accurate 
understanding of evolutionary systems. They both hold that things other than humans can 
have particular conditions that are 'good' for them, even when those other living systems 
have no way of consciously processing information. You do not have to 'know' in the 
same way that human consciousness 'knows' what is good for you, if you are a tree: 
plants may respond sensitively to avoid drought, toxins, and whatever else is likely to 
cause their demise even if they do not 'know' in the human sense: they certainly grow 
more roots where there are more nutrients, grow more branches and leaves where there is 
sunlight, and so on, implying that something more than mere reaction is going on.87 
Conclusion 
I have sought to show that ideological thinking abounds in environmental ethics, not 
simply at the political level, but in the narratives that underlie the different theoretical 
approaches. At this more fundamental level, the ground on which responses are built is 
fragmented and divided on the basis of commitments to narratives that still contain 
unexamined elements. This has led to a divergence, and entrenchment, of attitudes that 
further delays or even blocks our capacity to develop convergent theories, and practices, 
in response to the ecological emergency. More recent moves to decentre moral 
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consideration from humans to a broader array of organisms, or even systems, have 
certainly opened up some of the previously unexamined themes of our narratives to 
scrutiny. Yet there are still features that we hold on to, in spite of our changing 
understanding of the human condition, including the narrative that human responsibility 
is something separate from physical action. In the next chapter, I will hone in on the 
aspects of Taylor's thesis that offer possibilities for a revision of this view to show that an 
ethically neutral understanding of the human context for responsibility can emerge. 
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Chapter Two: Paul Taylor’s ‘Respect for Nature’ as the framework for a response 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I worked to set the scene, to show how the field of environmental ethics 
still leaves unquestioned the idea that human responsibility for the ecological emergency is 
based on a (mental) decision to carry out a (physical) act. In a sense, therefore, this implies 
that the human capacity to respond, and therefore human moral agency, is independent of 
natural, probabilistic laws. This is the first key idea that I think requires revision if we are 
to come to a better understanding of our capacity for responsibility. The other ideas I want 
to revise are the notion that we require an ideal person (or agent) on the one hand, and an 
ideally harmonious relationship with other naturally evolved organisms, on the other.  
Through a close reading of key aspects of his thesis, I want to investigate in more detail 
these three aspects of Paul Taylor's ethic of ‘respect for nature’.88 I chose Taylor’s thesis as 
a framework for the kinds of revisions I think are necessary and sufficient for our response, 
since it is based on an evolutionary, physicalist explanation of the human condition. This 
premise has implications that, I will argue, require a much more radical reappraisal of the 
relationship between human responsibility, moral agency, idealism and ethics as the 
accepted narratives for responding to the ecological emergency.  
Taylor's contribution to the spectrum 
Taylor’s enquiry begins by locating the moral action and its viewpoint within the human 
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organism.89 That is, he offers two categorisations: moral agents are a subsection of the 
human species and moral agents are such because they alone decide how to live.90 Human 
responsibility (the capacity humans have to decide to respond according to an underlying 
set of beliefs or values), and therefore moral agency, is clearly related to the capacity 
intrinsic in Taylor’s idea of person-hood: the ability to self-reflect, to choose, and to act 
on that choice.  
Persons are all those, according to Taylor, who 'give direction to their lives on the basis of 
their own values'.91 Taylor’s moral agent has a considerable amount of liberty: she can 
choose what to value and she can choose what to do, based on what she values. Yet these 
values, worked out rationally, restrict her liberty considerably when she follows the 
rationale and acts accordingly. 
 (i) Reconsidering the relationship between human responsibility and moral 
consideration 
As I sketched out in the last chapter, the individuals towards whom the responsible moral 
agent acts, ‘moral patients', fall into two groups. There are other moral agents with 
whom, it is implied, there can be interaction, because they, too, have the capacity to 
deliberate, and with whom, explicitly, there can be a reciprocal relationship. Secondly, 
there are other living organisms, or communities of living organisms who, without 
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awareness, react to the action as it is taking place. In Taylor's scenario, moral agents are 
both free to choose how to act, but also, importantly, free to shift perspective and to 
imagine existence from any other living individual’s viewpoint. This means that moral 
agents can imagine what is beneficial or 'good for' both sets of moral patients, and even 
for living communities.92 To paraphrase Taylor, 'communities of life' have: 
… a kind of value that belongs to them inherently. Just as we would think it 
inappropriate to ask, What is a human being good for? Because such a question seems 
to assume that the value or worth of a person is merely a matter of being useful as a 
means to some end, so the question, what is a [living organism or community of living 
organisms] good for? is likewise considered inappropriate from the perspective of a 
biocentric outlook.93 
 
The capacity humans have for understanding evolutionary theory and viewing the living 
world in its own terms demands that humans, responding as moral agents, practice 
species impartiality: ‘no bias in favour of some over others is acceptable. This 
impartiality applies to the human species just as it does to the non-human species.'94 
Recognising that all living organisms are driven by forces that push them to avoid 
drought or toxins, for example and to grow towards, or flourish in conditions that 
enhance survivability, is a recognition of ‘the good’, or inherent worth, of other 
organisms. This capacity to reason that not just humans have inherent worth dissolves the 
human/not-human dichotomy that anthropocentrism relies on. It also makes it inevitable 
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that reasonable people, as moral agents, will follow the rationale that a recognition of ‘the 
good’ of other organisms implies: they will extend moral consideration to them (paving 
the way, in Taylor’s terms, for an ethic of respect).  
After all, living existence is not a passive backdrop providing resources for the benefit of 
active, self-conscious, deliberative moral agents. It is a kaleidoscope of teleological 
centres of value, pursuing often conflicting sets of ‘goods’, emerging from their 
evolutionary history.   
An anthropocentric approach recognises only one moral realm – the human – and other 
categories as morally relevant only instrumentally to human, moral agents. In contrast, 
Taylor proposes that we consider there to be no moral difference between humans, as 
organisms that can perceive themselves, and organisms with no capacity for self-
perception, or self-reflection. The former are aware that they have interests in things 
while the latter have things that are in their interest, though they do not know it, but both 
have conditions that benefit, or harm, them.95  
One complicating feature of this method of understanding moral considerability and its 
relationship with having interests, or ‘goods’, is that humans (and perhaps members of 
some other species) can also have an interest in something (say, eating particular foods, 
getting enough exercise, keeping secure from threats of violence, warmth and shelter, and 
so on) and nevertheless fail to pursue those interests. There is a difference, in this case, 
between pursuing interests that are in one’s interest, and interests that one is interested in, 
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but that are evidently harmful. Taylor characterises being able to distinguish this 
difference in terms of strength, or weakness, of (mental) will.96 You can either choose to 
follow through on your rational decisions, or you cannot.97 That is the exercise of moral 
agency, or not, in Taylor's terms, and it represents a view that is widely held, but largely 
unreflected upon. 
 (ii) Focussing on the three degrees of human impact 
The difference between Taylor's view and other theories of environmental ethics lies in 
the imagined relationship between human moral agents and those they act upon. Moral 
agency is a privilege for Taylor, a kind of 'noblesse oblige': yet this is not nobility borne 
of elevated status but of perspective. It is because human moral agents have the capacity 
to understand that all living organisms have ‘goods’ that they pursue, for the same 
(evolutionary, biological) reasons that humans have goods that they pursue, that this 
elicits the response to ‘respect nature’. Having human consciousness, and being able to 
‘see’ from other viewpoints, elicits a ‘moral concern’ for other organisms, not because 
being human marks a particular kind of existence out as being of higher value.  The 
capacity to 'see' from other viewpoints implies a capacity to understand how to respond 
appropriately to this information. An appropriate response depends upon the strength of 
character of the moral agent, but Taylor maintains that above all, this is an exercise in 
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authenticity, in integrating the response with the recognition.   
Exercising her agency is 'good for' the moral agent because it ensures that she fulfils the 
capacity she has to live ‘the kind of life one would place supreme value on if one were 
fully rational, autonomous, and enlightened.’98 However, she cannot fulfil the conditions 
for living this kind of life without considering not only human individuals as ends in 
themselves, but also all other organisms. She must consider each end as equally valid, 
since the evolutionary, biological branching that has given rise to their being where they 
are on the tree of living existence, has given rise to humans being where we are, by the 
same process. For Taylor, the distinction between moral agents and moral patients lies in 
the capacity of each to see, or understand, what they are, and know or recognise what 
conditions are good for them. Nevertheless, Taylor maintains that an ethic arising from 
this perspective only applies to 'moral patients': the community of living things. 
Taylor divides the biosphere into three realms of ethical consideration. There is the wild 
community of organisms that have evolved completely independently of human 
intervention (a shrinking percentage but, in Taylor's account, and given its fragility in the 
face of human impact, the central focus of his theory). Next, there is what Taylor terms 
'the bioculture', that aspect of the world which has been heavily influenced by human 
impact: farms, zoos, genetically modified organisms, golf courses and parks. Thirdly and 
finally there are traditional human to human ethical relationships. His focus in the 
original edition of Respect for Nature was firmly on the first, on what he called 'Nature', 
but what I might more specifically define as the evolved systems, including living 
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systems, of the planet that have not been impacted by human activity: 'Unless these 
dominant trends of our age are brought under control, we will see the natural environment 
of our planet turned into a vast artifact.'99  These three categories are not strictly 
separable, and that becomes evident when Taylor is discussing the implementation of his 
ethic. However, there are also problems with the notion that any region of the planet or of 
its living network is unaffected by human impact.  
Taylor's very importance lies, among other reasons, in his attempts to challenge the 
anthropocentric narratives that have allowed humans to justify their turning the natural 
environment into a vast artefact, a process that continues to this day.100 For Taylor, the 
problem lay in the hierarchical view of organisms – humans at the top of the evolutionary 
ladder – that is still pervasive, and led to the idea that humans, and only humans, are 
owed duties.101 Other, earlier attempts at challenging anthropocentrism met with 
difficulties of dilution (when the circle of considerability was expanded) or of definition 
(the conflation of different senses of ‘intrinsic value’, for instance).102 Taylor, by contrast, 
gave us a rigorous, step-by-step argument, that led from a recognition of the evolution of 
all living organisms, to the concept of ‘respect for nature’ by human moral agents, not as 
a logical, but as a rational, necessity (as a matter of ‘supervenience’, an idea I will return 
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to).  
(iii) Taylor’s compared with other biocentric approaches 
Taylor's biocentrism fits between that proposed by Robin Attfield, on the one hand, and 
James Sterba’s, on the other.103 To put it crudely, Attfield's biocentrism is utilitarian, and 
non-egalitarian, while Sterba's is pluralistic. Attfield is concerned to develop an all-
inclusive ethical code which would guide us in our responding not only to the ecological 
emergency but also to the problems we have in human relationships, problems such as 
injustice and unfairness in the distribution of wealth, violence and greed, population 
issues and the like. However, Attfield is also keen to emphasise that he sees human 
capacities as inherently superior to those of other organisms.  
Attfield is not alone in dismissing Taylor's biocentric egalitarianism as impracticable.104 
He also questions whether or not ‘respect for nature’ is really an ethic, because it fails to 
consider sufficiently the conditions of autonomous beings (persons) who require extra 
moral signification, and its priority principles do not flow from the egalitarianism on 
which it is based. He says, instead, that Sterba (a deontologist) in 'A Biocentrist Strikes 
Back' and Attfield himself, present viable arguments for biocentrism.  
Sterba’s concern is to show how a pluralistic ethic might be developed that is 
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situationally responsive, prioritising different values depending on the circumstance.105 
This is important because while Sterba, like Taylor, acknowledges that there is no 
inherent ground for prioritising human over other interests, working out how to prioritise 
interests in practice, based on the principled approach that both take, remains a problem 
for both thinkers. Sterba's attempt is perhaps more ambitious than Taylor’s, since he 
works to create an ethic that combines individualistic biocentrism and holistic 
ecocentrism, along with a reconciliation of environmental ethics with related fields. 
Taylor, on the other hand, fits his environmental ethic into an existing framework that 
contains human-to-human ethics, based on treating humans as ends-in-themselves. 
Returning briefly to Attfield’s approach, this could be open to the same kinds of 
criticisms that political emphases on universal rights meet: that they are in fact the 
impositions of a particular culturally embedded set of values and belief systems which 
ignore (generally the global South’s) histories and values.106 Thus, the approach smacks 
of imperialism. Alan Carter calls Attfield’s position ‘inegalitarian biocentrism', but 
Attfield maintains that he has simply returned the debate to the field where ethics is 
normally discussed and that he is not inegalitarian with respect to humanity.107 Yet 
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Attfield maintains that he remains a biocentrist, calling his position ‘biocentric 
consequentialism', in spite of his hierarchical view of living species.108 
The second approach, the one taken by Sterba, to develop a pluralistic ethic, risks the 
accusation that there are too many potential areas for conflict between principles that 
attempt to honour, on the one hand, human interests, and, those, on the other, non-human 
ones. There are, of course, millions of instances of such conflicts, but in one account of 
his ethic, Sterba gives the real-life example of Nepalese subsistence farmers making 
incursions into a national park (Chitwan National Park) and endangering, in the process, 
the survival of a number of threatened and endangered species, including the Bengal tiger 
and the one-horned rhinoceros.109 Sterba proposes that we ask other humans who are 
existing above subsistence level to provide for the Nepalese subsistence farmers in some 
way (he does not make clear how, exactly) and that guardians of the endangered species 
‘should use force against such rich people rather than against poor people.’110 Quite how 
this force might be exercised without further endangering the national park and its species 
is not at all explicit, and Sterba admits that he recognises the practical difficulties with 
getting rich people to ‘make the necessary transfers’ so that poor people are not ‘led to 
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prey on endangered species in order to survive.’111 
(iv) Taylor and the limits of reasoning for a workable ethic 
Taylor’s work to discover a principle-based ethic that is practical enough to allow for the 
prioritisation of some values in some circumstances, and others in different ones, was an 
attempt to overcome the shortcomings of both the alternatives. Unfortunately, Taylor’s 
delineation of an environmental ethic from one which applies to humans alone does not 
seem entirely justifiable, by his own reckoning: if we have and all other organisms have 
equal inherent worth, then we need to bring our ethical codes in line with that 
understanding. This means that we need to revise existing ethical codes so that they 
reflect a recognition that in fundamental and morally significant ways (because of our 
common evolutionary heritage) we are no better than, and deserve no more consideration 
than, other organisms. If we are significantly different (and Taylor maintains that human-
to-human ethics can coexist with his environmental ethic), then human interests need to 
be clearly segregated from those of other organisms, and they are not in Taylor's thesis, 
nor is it clear how they ever could be.  
Taylor evidently wanted to ensure that existing obligations based on our cultural 
development were honoured. Not to do so would be to threaten cultural stability and 
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integrity. For pragmatic reasons, then, rather than just for rational ones, it does, after all, 
make sense to have a human-to-human ethic and an environmental ethic that dovetail 
together in the relatively coherent way that Taylor proposes, but only if an ethical system 
is necessary in the first place, which, I will argue, it is not.  
Taylor’s concern in the 1986 version of his theory was to show that because all organisms 
that are alive have inherent worth (as opposed to having either of the two alternatives he 
considers, intrinsic value and intrinsic worth) they are not instruments of human good. It 
is the 'life force', as Sterba lightheartedly puts it in his essay, which gives certain 
conditions 'value' for individual living organisms.112 As I mentioned above, Taylor's ethic 
applies to the sphere of natural communities of living organisms that have evolved 
(largely) without human intervention. He fully recognises, and explicitly states, that this 
ethic has to dovetail with a human-to-human ethic, and his purpose is to develop grounds 
(his five ‘priority principles’) on which to perform this dovetailing. This means that there 
may be circumstances in which the ethic of respect for nature modifies the dominance of 
human considerations, given that humans, as organisms, are only as relevant as any other 
living individual of any other species.  
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Taylor’s biocentric approach is rooted firmly in evolutionary theory: humans are 
latecomers ‘... while we (Homo sapiens) cannot do without them (all other living things) 
they can do without us’.113 Given this, he sought to relocate an ethical approach in our 
evolutionary biology. The risk was that he might be committing the naturalistic fallacy: 
Is our biological nature at all relevant to the choices we must make as moral agents, 
and, if it is, in what ways is it relevant?114 
 
This very much echoes Taylor’s view of what is relevant in the choices we make as 
rational agents. The forces that drive us to survive (roughly equivalent to what Sterba 
terms 'the life force' in shorthand) are translated, through rationality, into a motivation to 
live at ‘optimal well-being’.115 ‘Our normative guides’ as to whether or not we are doing 
so are ‘survival and physical health’. Taylor admits that we are dependent upon 
‘contingencies and accidents, forces and processes’ and that this puts us in the same 
existential situation as all other organisms, except, crucially, in our ability to act as moral 
agents.116 Even though this gives us freedom that other living organisms lack, for Taylor, 
our agency has the potential to be constrained by the very capacity that it emerges from: 
our conscious awareness of our place in the world, including our ability to understand 
what this place is. For Taylor, this capacity to realise what kind of creatures we are, 
alongside our ability to understand the commonality this gives us with other living 
creatures, creates a context for one reasonable response: respect.  
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Taylor observes that we have ethical codes that we apply across the human board because 
we realise that all human individuals are an 'end in themselves'. This means that we 
respect individual humans’ efforts to pursue their own optimal well-being. If we then add 
to this the understanding that all other living individual organisms have conditions that 
they pursue, that are good for them, then for consistency's sake, we must agree to 
extending the respect that we show to the efforts made by all other organisms too. 
Respect is the only attitude we could adopt towards the biotic community that would be 
coherent with our existing rationale for human ethics.  
 (v) Taylor and moral realism 
Taylor observes early on in his work that we cannot 'read off' moral norms from a certain 
way of conceiving of the order of living things. We must engage, rather, in what he calls 
'ethical enquiry'. Morality is not 'out there', in other words: it is in what we do with the 
information 'in here'.117 
His reasoning that we can root ethics in our membership of the living community stems 
from the idea that we, like it, evolved and therefore are a part of that living community. 
As humans, we have the capacity to understand this, just as we have the capacity to 
organise our knowledge of the world into internally coherent arrangements, narratives 
that are self-consistent, and form a framework that shapes how we respond to our 
experience. Taylor's argument is that it is not this capacity (to understand, to organise or 
conceive a framework) that is primarily of value to humans, however. What our 
acknowledgement that we are members of the living community tells us is that what is of 
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value to us as humans is living - the same thing that is also of value to the rest of the 
biotic community, regardless of whether or not it knows it. 
It is because we belong within, and, therefore, are fundamentally of the same kind as, the 
rest of the living community that we owe it, and ourselves, Taylor's version of the golden 
rule: respect. If we conclude that treating individuals in human communities reasonably 
demands that we respect their right to pursue their own well-being, then, because non-
human communities also have well-being that they pursue, we owe it to them to show 
them the same kind (or its species-specific equivalent) of respect. Our moral agency is the 
tool that we use to work out a coherent position, in this context.  
Carlo Filice has pointed out that Taylor's position is very similar to Rawls' 'veil of 
ignorance' view: we could have taken any other route through the evolutionary maze and 
ended up as a buzzard or a bacterium.118 The fact that we ended up being human is 
contingent. The fact that we can reflect on our humanity and see it in context gives us the 
capacity to see how to live, including seeing what is right and wrong, based on the idea 
that we are only contingently where we are, individually or as a species. Acting morally is 
an extension of natural action, once we acknowledge that some conditions benefit, while 
others harm us, and that therefore that some conditions benefit, while others harm other 
living organisms too. Yet the contention that moral agency could arise from our 
evolutionary condition – that we could come to have a 'moral sense' because we are 
evolved, rational creatures who need to tell ourselves self-consistent stories – commits 
the naturalistic fallacy. It allows us to derive the 'ought' of respect from the 'is' of 
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evolution.  
We realise that we fit into the evolutionary picture as members of the biotic community, 
in the same way as other organisms. They, like us, have ‘goods’ of their own. Having a 
good of its own does not necessarily imply that we should extend moral consideration to 
any organism, however. For this to happen, Taylor introduces the idea of ‘supervenience’. 
It takes a factually informed, rational, reality-aware moral agent for the condition of 
moral considerability to arise. When this person is introduced, then the ‘good’ of any 
organism becomes a condition for inherent worth, and for ‘respect’.119  
David Hume famously pointed out that deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' is logically 
illegitimate since the realms to which the two concepts apply are separate: the first is 
prescriptive while the second is descriptive.120 However, Taylor's thesis avoids this 
problem by accounting for human, moral agency as something that arises out of, but is 
independent of, natural laws: moral agents can decide for themselves what decisions they 
are going to make about how to live, based on the strange alchemy of complex human-
evolved capacities that lift them beyond simple, probabilistic laws. Humans' abilities to 
reason and to integrate that reasoning with an understanding of how to live give them 
moral agency: they are natural, but they are also moral (agents).  
In addition to depending on an evolutionary account of the human condition in order to 
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develop his environmental ethic of respect, Taylor also relies heavily on the idea that we 
can make sense of 'the good' of organisms as grounds for respecting them. Oliver Curry 
has developed the most convincing defence of Taylor from George E. Moore's naturalistic 
fallacy. Moore’s ‘good’ is indefinable and irreducible. It is not interchangeable with 
pleasure or virtue or anything else. There is nowhere else to go with ‘good’ as a 
descriptor, and therefore to consider that it might be a natural property discoverable in the 
world is simply wrong (Moore is something of an intuitionist, in this account). Taylor’s 
understanding of ‘good’ is played out through the evolutionary forces that have made 
some conditions of benefit, while others are harmful, to living organisms. 'Good' is, 
therefore, in Taylor's account, what arises as a matter of interest for living organisms, 
even if they do not know it, or think about it. Some conditions are, therefore, naturally 
'good' for organism, regardless of whether or not there are moral agents around to 
discover what is good for a particular organism. This appears to conflict with Moore's 
idea of how we should think of 'good':  
Moore used 'natural' to refer to properties of the external world. He contrasted 'natural' 
with 'intuitive', which he used to refer to properties of the mind – including 'objects of 
thought' such as good. Hence when Moore claims that good is not a natural property, 
he is simply restating the point that good is an intuitive 'object of thought' and not an 
objective feature of the outside world... ‘121 
 
Curry points out that no one, anywhere, has demonstrated that the natural and the 
normative inhabit two entirely separate realms: there is nothing to show that a mental 
realm exists separately from a physical realm and therefore, nothing to demonstrate that a 
qualitative world of ideas, including the idea of 'good', could exist separately from the 
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physical world of quantifiable objects. In Taylor's terms; it is a moral agent's rationally-
informed reflection on the empirical situation of organisms that engenders the idea that 
we have moral obligations associated with recognising that some conditions are 'good for' 
organisms. 'Good', in a moral sense, therefore, does not arise out of the organisms 
themselves: it is a human agent's idea, demanding a human agent's response. In a way, 
then, we have to separate out two senses in which Taylor is using the term ‘good’: what is 
‘good for’ organisms only becomes morally relevant when it becomes an 'object of 
thought' for human moral agents.122   
 (vi) Teleology in Taylor 
Taylor is at pains to be clear that other organisms, not just humans, are goal-oriented 
creatures, pursuing or seeking out (variously and at different times) survival, reproduction 
and well-being. The image this gives rise to is of a metaphorical 'pull' towards some end, 
or goal. Yet evolutionary theory, which is also central to Taylor's narrative, provides us 
with the opposite kind of image: an image of blind, unconscious avoidances. Living 
organisms are far more driven by the many situations that they must escape - pain, 
negative stimuli like toxins, drought, the threat of annihilation - than they are drawn 
towards the few circumstances that ensure their continuance. 'What survives from one 
generation to the next is just what happens to work … what worked just happened to 
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happen and was preserved because it did'.123 Having a goal, being drawn towards a 
particular condition, implies a degree of awareness of ends and there is little, if any, 
evidence to show that most creatures have this kind of awareness.  
It is misleading, therefore, to think of teleology in Taylor as a set of conditions that an 
organism pursues because they are 'good for' the organism. A more accurate way of 
considering Taylor's idea that conditions are 'good for' organisms, and that therefore 
organisms are teleologically motivated, is to reverse the imagery and consider how (and 
even why) living organisms avoid the inevitable pull towards entropy that this narrative 
(the Big Bang theory within which evolutionary theory nests) implies.  
If conditions that are 'good for' organisms are those that allow them to avoid entropy, to 
avoid the chaotic breakdown of patterns of autopoeisis that characterise living individuals 
and communities, then we need to start asking how we can understand living creatures in 
terms that are consistent with other physical processes. If living creatures are not drawn 
towards, but avoiding some end, then it is worth asking what kind of characteristic 
features of living organisms are consistent with such avoidance, since these will be key to 
understanding better what conditions are 'good for' living communities.  
One of the main arguments used in debates about the 'naturalness' or otherwise of life 
(particularly human life) by those who point to supernatural causation, is the idea that the 
evolution of life runs counter to the second law of thermodynamics. By this logic, any 
organised system should immediately dissipate energy and reach a state of entropy. Yet 
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that is not what we see in the universe around us, or in other living organisms, or in 
ourselves. Proponents of intelligent design point this out as irrefutable proof that the 
system is being conducted by forces larger than natural, probabilistic laws: a god, or 
gods. Yet this is not the only possible explanation for this apparent anomaly, and 
examination of this feature of living things is very instructive in our attempts to see what 
conditions might be 'good for' living things in the reversed image of teleology that I have 
outlined.  
Evolutionary development is consistent with the development of patterns of existence in 
many systems in the universe. The dissipation of energy gradients from more energetic, 
more organised states to less energetic, less organised states, culminating in total chaos, is 
largely consistent with what we see unfolding around us. However, instead of a simple, 
direct correlation between time elapsing and systems collapsing, we see the graduation of 
energetic flows, including the creation and maintenance of structures that cohere, 
although the energy that they consist of is constantly dissipating, for many millennia. 
These structures include objects like stars and planets and, of course, living organisms 
and communities.  
The avoidance of non-existence that we see as characteristic of living organisms can be 
interpreted as a graduation of the solar flow of energy (since that is the particular, 
dominant source of energy flow for our planet) through as many dissipative structures as 
happen to have come into existence at any one time. The more complex biodiverse 
systems become, the more intricate the energy flows and therefore the more effective the 
global system of energetic dissipation becomes. This is Taylor's teleology couched in 
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physicalist terms. It is a point I will return to in some detail when considering how to 
understand conditions as 'good for' organisms, or communities of organisms, in chapter 
three.  
From reason to idealism: tracing Taylor's 'good', 'moral' and ‘worthy of respect' 
(i) Taylor’s ‘good’ 
Taylor's argument is that not just survival, but optimal well-being, is 'good' for organisms. 
He does not examine the question of why it requires reason to work out what is 'good' for 
humans when most other organisms pursue their 'goods' blindly and without thinking 
about it. Perhaps optimal well-being is a pre-rational, or even a non-rational goal to 
pursue, if, as I have suggested in the previous few paragraphs, there is some link between 
living organisms' pursuit of life, or avoidance of annihilation (for as long as possible, 
through, amongst other things, reproduction, as well as through survival attempts) and the 
second law of thermodynamics. Perhaps this pursuit is motivated by more general forces 
that are connected to, for instance, the particular energy dissipation systems on this 
planet, rather than the capacity for rationality.  
Taylor points out that evolution has no purpose. This brings us back to the question of the 
degree to which human agents are conscious choice-makers rationalising decisions that, 
in many cases, undermine their survivability, and the degree to which they act as living 
organisms and pre-rationally avoid conditions that threaten to annihilate them. Since it is 
our capacity to reflect rationally on what is 'good for' other organisms that allows us to 
include them in the sphere of our (moral) consideration, there is something singularly 
ironic about our doing this with the very same capacity that we use to justify actions that 
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steer us away from what is 'good for' us, individually (and, as I will later argue, as a 
species).  
Taylor relies on moral agents’ capacities for rationality as the foundation on which to 
build his ethic. People are both the only living organisms with the capacity to be moral 
agents, and the only living organisms with the capacity for rational reflection (Taylor 
recognises that this requires that we screen out some other perfectly good candidates, but 
since it is the response to a human-induced ecological emergency that is at issue here, it 
makes sense to focus on the human capacities to respond). Yet this very capacity to be 
conscious has also led to our making risky decisions that lead us towards, not away from, 
annihilation (from smoking, drinking and unsafe sex to pollution, deforestation and 
desertification). Biocentrism, doing what is in the interest of all members of the 
biosphere, is in the ironic position of extending a unique capacity to the consideration of 
other species that is rarely used in the consideration of its own.  
The ‘good’ of human agents, unlike the ‘good’ of other living organisms, has a self-
reflective character. It can include the pursuit of something extra, or even contrary, to the 
agent’s gain. Significantly, it shows that the capacity for an agent's awareness that a thing 
is right beyond its benefit to the agent is the source of her moral motivation.  
For Taylor, the evolved biological character of living existence creates the context for 
conditions that can harm or benefit all living organisms. Biological organisms have 
inherent worth on the grounds that they have these conditions - ‘goods’ - that are 
recognisable by conscious human agents. This recognition, which is also an 
acknowledgement of commonality, elicits a certain kind of response. I have sought to 
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show that this response is not something that already exists ‘in the world’: it is not an 
automatic reaction generated by the conditions we find ourselves in or the knowledge we 
get from the world. It is the creative reaction of a reflective organism, recognising and 
then responding to something in the world that it also recognises in itself. It is what we do 
with the information that is the response: how we process it is a measure of our capacity 
to exercise our potential for reasonable action, which is what moral action is, for Taylor.  
Developing an attitude of respect is, for Taylor, the sign of successful processing of our 
current state of knowledge. The attitude we develop involves acknowledging the full 
depth of our capacity to exercise consideration and extend reasoning so that our actions 
and our narrative match. Therefore for Taylor, respect for nature is a sign of authenticity: 
we both understand, and respond to that understanding.  
Rational deliberation about our own capacity for flourishing, and seeing that this is a 
capacity we have in common with any and all other living organisms, leads us to an 
attitude of respect. From our biological ‘goods’, we are educated to reason out our moral 
‘good’: respect for naturally evolved organisms, or, respect for nature, is the endpoint of 
this reasoning. With the hefty proviso that there is no direct conflict of interest, the 
attitude of respect for nature, manifested towards the existence of all current living 
entities, will govern all the decisions (and actions) of a reasonable person.  
The origin of this perception that a thing is right even if it is of no benefit to the agent is 
at the heart of Taylor’s philosophy: it stems from the rational process of connecting a 
biological, evolutionary sense of self with the biologically necessary conditions for 
survival, and linking those with the idea that this implies a teleological directionality to 
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organisms, an ideal way of being that moral agents can respond to. This, then, is Taylor’s 
account of moral agency: it is confined to persons, it is realised rationally and it is driven 
by a sense of common origin and purpose.  
 (ii) ‘Moral agents’ and idealism  
For agents, rationality is the key. It has a pivotal role to play in the ability of agents to 
develop opportunities and make choices towards a ‘life worth living’.124 Rationality can 
be developed, along with factual knowledge, and even autonomy, through both increased 
education and increased access to resources. For all other organisms, rationality is 
irrelevant in the pursuit of their good: what is in their interest is sought blindly, without 
prejudice or judgement; what is in moral agents’ interests, by contrast, is open to 
development, and the development is very much on a scale on which ‘best’ is at one 
extreme, dependent for its realisation on rationality, while 'worst' is at the other, 
dependent on moral weakness.  
Taylor's agents are expressly moral and this is what allows them to make ethical choices. 
Moral agents are deliberative and practical. They can think clearly about a moral 
problem, particularly when they have some guidelines, and they have reasoned things 
through, and they can carry that deliberation into effective action. If they do both - 
deliberate clearly, and act on the deliberation - then they can call themselves virtuous.125 
To be virtuous is to have deliberated on a rational basis for an ethic – in this case, an 
environmental ethic which focuses on the non-human, and non-humanly influenced, 
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natural environment or, to put it simply, Nature – and to act on that deliberation. Not to 
do so is to exhibit weakness of will:  
... a tendency for one to become confused or irrational due to the influence of one's 
non-moral interests, wants, needs and emotions.126 
Taylor’s account, so far, is that of virtue developing from a purely rational understanding 
and appreciation of humanity’s situation in the environmental, particularly the non-
human, living, environmental, sphere. From this basis, he concludes, in an echo of Kant:  
There are rules that must be followed by those who want to meet the requirements for 
giving due respect to persons as persons and there are parallel rules that must be 
followed if the actions and characters traits of moral agents are adequately to express 
respect for nature.127 
 
(iii) The ideal of being ‘worthy of respect’ 
If human moral agents are worthy of being considered as 'ends in themselves', then so are 
all living organisms. Taylor's careful untangling of the definitions of inherent worth, 
intrinsic worth and intrinsic value is worth pausing to examine at this point since this 
process of delineating precisely what it means to be worth consideration is at the heart of 
Taylor's effort to show that humans are not alone in being valuable. Therefore this 
process is at the heart of the shift from an anthropocentric to a non-anthropocentric ethic. 
Even though I will move to show that ethical neutrality is a preferable approach to the 
ecological emergency, without Taylor's careful work to clarify how to locate value, it 
would not be possible to make the revisions necessary. It underlies a process that I want 
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to focus on in the next chapter: the process of connecting the idea of conditions being 
'good for' a situation with the idea of a motivation to act on that knowledge.128 
Taylor defines intrinsic worth as something that is worth doing for its own sake as 
evaluated by a particular perceiver. Practicing medicine or even the job of executioner 
could be seen, from some perspectives, as worth doing both for the sake of the job (both 
activities could be considered of benefit to a particular group) and for its own sake (an 
executioner can take pride in the line of a cut, just as a surgeon can). Taylor differentiates 
intrinsic worth from intrinsic value through the locus of perception: a job can have 
intrinsic worth from the point of view of the person doing the job. To have intrinsic value, 
an object, a state of affairs or an organism would be widely considered to exemplify 
excellence, uniqueness or rarity. To have intrinsic value, the perceiver has to be external 
whereas to have intrinsic worth, the perceiver might be self-assessing a situation or 
activity.   
Organisms or objects are more likely to be taken into consideration and protected or 
looked after if they evoke the response that they are intrinsically valuable but that does 
not make them objects of moral concern. To be objects of moral concern, they must be 
considered as ends in themselves, beyond any utilitarian, aesthetic or emotional response 
they elicit. That is, they must have conditions that are 'good for' them and which they can 
pursue, at least potentially. A job that has intrinsic worth is not an object of moral concern 
because even though there can be a perceiver, a doer of the job, the job itself is morally 
neutral – a surgeon can murder just as well as an executioner, if he chooses to – and it is 
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only in considering the surgeon or the executioner as having inherent worth that we can 
begin to respond to them morally.  
Taylor’s division of the worthy from the valuable into these three categories challenges 
the view that has morality arising at the epicentre of what is good, or beneficial, for the 
individual, and spreading in ever-widening circles from there. Just because humans have 
a seemingly exclusive ability to measure their experience qualitatively, based on what 
they perceive as valuable because it is pleasurable, or beautiful, rare or unique, gives the 
experience no moral content.129 Something else has to happen to make it necessary to 
consider another: the other has to be worthwhile in its own right.  
 (iv) ‘Respect’ as an ideal for moral agents to aspire to 
Taylor's call is that respect for nature be an ultimate attitude for all moral agents based, as 
it is, on an impartial recognition of empirically verifiable facts, and not on intuitions or 
‘hunches’.130 This grounds respect more fundamentally, he says, than, for instance ‘love’, 
which is partial. Respect, on the other hand, when it is understood in Taylor’s sense, is, 
‘we ... believe... binding on all moral agents'.131  
This challenges the utilitarian ideal of pleasure as the ultimate source of good (and hence 
of suffering as the ultimate source of harm) and brings into focus the ideological divide 
between a moral sense that emerges from the idea of what is good or right for the 
individual, and the ideal that we can have laws or principles that are based on what we 
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know, objectively and rationally, about the world. Taylor’s philosophy is rooted in a 
belief that we can persuade ourselves to obey laws, codes or principles if we can only see 
the reasons clearly enough for doing so.  
Morality and norms are here contrasted by Taylor: respect takes priority because all other 
norms are reasons for actions which are neither general, universal (or universalisable), 
disinterested, approved (Kantian: willed to be universal) or supreme.132 Respect is the 
basis of person-to-person ethics, and it is also the basis of a biocentric ethic, an ethic that 
decentres human interests. Taylor's resolution of these two ethics is intricate and 
sophisticated but the question of whether or not it is coherent is the central motivating 
factor for the revisions I propose. 
In one sense, Taylor is expanding an existing (rule-based, Kantian-style) ethic which is 
anthropocentric and which applies only to the human species, to one which is biocentric 
and which applies to the parallel environment over which we have least influence: what 
he calls 'wild' nature. Therefore, for instance, he examines the existing, exploitative 
attitude with which nature is viewed at present and contrasts it with the implications for 
action of the attitude of respect for nature.133 His conclusion is that we have to look at 
underlying belief systems in order to recognise the framework within which either 
exploitative or respectful attitudes to nature develop.  
However, while demanding what is essentially a justifiable foundational shift, Taylor 
omits to account for the seminal role of emotion in the development of beliefs or 
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attitudes. This omission requires revision: without it, we are left with an idealised version 
of how human agents ought to act but a gap between the kinds of agents we are and the 
kinds of agents we would be if we were motivated by reason alone. Secondly, Taylor's 
limiting of the environmental ethic to wild nature is unduly conservative. With his 
proviso of five 'priority principles', there is no reason why he could not have included all 
spheres of human engagement, from person-to-person relationships, through the 
bioculture (that realm of the non-human world over which humans have already 
exercised considerable influence, from agriculture to animal experimentation), to the 
'wild' nature that is his actual focus.  
We may be able to escape our human, or even our individual, interestedness when 
considering moral relationships, but to ignore them entirely is to deny an element of our 
biological existence: our closest relationships, human and non-human, are amoral.134 To 
treat every living individual with equal status is an ideal few of us would desire to strive 
for.  
The challenge of Taylor’s thesis is that it demands that we question any ideological base 
from which to approach the ecological emergency. Taylor's approach is based on 
unimpeachable principles, principles that recognise the human as a part of the living 
community. Yet questions arise over the ethical basis of his approach, and we need to ask 
if an ethical basis for responding to the emergency is ever going to be valid.  
Either we return to Hardin’s approach and limit the moral circle to a chosen few, or we 
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question the validity of an ethical approach to the issue of the ecological emergency 
altogether. Hardin's approach, for all its consideration of the wider biological world, 
nevertheless amounts to little more than an advanced form of extended egoism, arbitrarily 
selecting a group to survive on the basis of their relative position of power (in or out of 
the lifeboat as a representation for being in or out of the nation state or race that happens 
to be in a position of power when the emergency begins to cause serious loss of life). 
There is very little reason to believe that such an approach is moral in any meaningful 
sense.  
To return to the issue of the affective, or emotional, dimension in ethical decision-
making, Taylor does point out that a particular feeling is elicited when a moral agent truly 
understands the implications of their capacity to empathetically imagine themselves in 
another's place.135 This is all very well when considering chimpanzees, pandas or 
elephants. It is less obvious that most agents will become disposed to ‘act for the relevant 
reasons’ when the organisms under consideration are viruses, beetles or worms.  
Including affect as a disposition deposes emotion from the intuitionist’s primal position, 
or even from the empathist or the utilitarian’s recognition of the fundamental role feeling 
plays in motivating actions. We can shift our standpoint and still act on principles we 
have reasoned out but the virtuous agent is the one motivated by reasonable beliefs about 
how they fit into existence, and able to focus long and hard enough to act on those 
beliefs. Being positively disposed towards other organisms might shore up the 
motivation, but it is an accompanying effect, and not the elicitation of the response: the 
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starting point is reason.   
The ethic Taylor offers is overtly idealistic, designed for a utopia where 'respect for 
nature is fully expressed in the character and conduct of all moral agents'.136 This implies 
a recognition that what he is asking is for human agents to act rationally all of the time. 
The reality is that human agents act emotionally, aesthetically, counter-rationally, 
intuitively, and on a number of other motivational bases, none of which are less 
motivational than ethics, most of the time. 
The biocentric outlook offers the potential for developing an attitude that better reflects 
our place in the world. Taylor’s insistence on egalitarianism offers an impartial, non-
biased standard for adjudicating between conflicting interests. However, individuals as 
the focus of value are impossibly diverse and numerous: we cannot take them all into 
account so the principle is unworkable. Not only that, but many individual lives are 
simply too transient to feature as a chronologically relevant factor in weighing up 
interests. The problem, then, of centring value on individual organisms, is the problem of 
the imagination which has only conceived of organisms which parallel the life-cycle of 
the human organism. In this sense, Taylor himself has become a victim of the surrounding 
culture of anthropocentric thinking.  
The standards demanded of moral agents by Taylor’s ethic are idealistic, and idealistic 
expectations create problems: if a social system is overly demanding, there will either be 
an acceptance of hypocrisy, in which case the system will be perceived as corrupt, or else 
there will be a sense that the system is inauthentic, in which case the system will be a 
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sham, an emperor with no clothes. In particularly unfortunate circumstances, the system 
will be enforced, creating oppression. Other ideologies that demand impossible standards, 
like absolute truth, or a state of constant submission, have faced these problems in the 
past and the problems have not been resolved except, perhaps, in the unsatisfactory case 
of repressive regimes.  
Despite these criticisms, Taylor's role in laying out a robust rationale for questioning 
anthropocentrism is admirable. Taylor's ethic, if acted upon, would not be likely to create 
an oppressive social system, at least to the extent that a faith-based system could. This is 
because Taylor's ethic is based on, and can be discussed on, rational grounds, whereas a 
faith-based system cannot.  
 (v) Ideal persons, ideal relationship  
For Taylor’s ethic to work, there needs to be a set of rules for how to respond practically 
to this secularised, rationalised understanding of our place in nature, and of our respect 
for living organisms and communities. We cannot simply react intuitively: there is too 
much partiality involved. Respect must be disinterested for it to form the basis of an 
ethic.137 
He sets these rules out as: no maleficence (no deliberate harm); no intervention (no 
unnecessary intrusion into the lives of others); fidelity (not to break a trust – this implies 
no more hunting, shooting or fishing, all of which involve deception) and restitutive 
justice, when an agent has broken a valid moral rule and by doing so has upset the 
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balance of justice between himself and a moral subject, and must make this balance 
good.138 These rules represent general moral virtues which are aspirational rather than 
attainable: ‘no one’s actual character ever fully exemplifies [them]’.139 The rule of justice, 
for instance, demands the virtue of fairness (in an echo of Rawls), while fidelity demands 
trustworthiness. Nonmaleficence requires considerateness and non-interference demands 
impartiality and regard, a feeling of antipathy towards intrusion.140 These rules, then, all 
form the groundwork for understanding how an attitude arising out of reason can form 
the basis of a moral agent's response. Respect, 'the ultimate attitude', is the reflective 
recognition that is elicited by any moral agent ‘in an ideal set of epistemic conditions … 
being factually informed, being rational, and having a fully developed capacity of reality-
awareness.’141 Respect itself is filtered through the medium of five principles.  
Two key problems Taylor faces with his rule-based conception of environmental ethics 
are the problem of rights, and the problem of conflict of interests. Rights, he says, are 
unnecessary: he dismisses them on the grounds that, while particular societies might (and 
sometimes ought to) grant living organisms legal rights, these are entirely relative to the 
mores and norms of the societies. Moral rights, on the other hand, while conceptually 
feasible (moral patients are as ‘entitled’ to the pursuit of their interests as are moral 
agents) fall foul of Occam’s razor: they add nothing to the existing obligations which 
moral agents already owe other living communities or organisms. Once they are held 
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‘worthy of respect’, the motivation to act ethically towards non-human organisms is 
already a strong enough duty to require nothing additional. The rules for engagement are 
laid out on the basis of a rationally-inspired attitude.  
When it comes to the second question, that of balancing interests, Taylor once again relies 
on a set of principles, or a schema, by which, he suggests, competing claims can be 
assessed. The five principles are: self-defense, proportionality, minimum wrong, 
distributive justice and restitutive justice and, as can be seen, there is an increasing level 
of intervention in each principle. Self-defense, for instance, involves the agent being 
under attack, and therefore, on the principle of reciprocity, a proportionate response is 
appropriate. This leads to the notion that the response must be equal and opposite, but 
that no extra force is used than is necessary to defend the individual agent or agents. The 
principle of minimum wrong implies that when moral agents’ non-essential interests 
require serving (for example, through the building of an oil terminal in an area otherwise 
relatively unaffected by the impact of people), then account must be taken of the amount 
of harm which will be done to the organisms in an environment that is, to date, relatively 
pristine. Every effort must be made to minimize this harm and the effect on individual 
organisms will count cumulatively (the more individuals harmed, the greater the breach 
of this principle).  
The final two principles involve a further analysis of what the invasion of moral agents 
into pristine environments means in terms of what is owed. Again, reciprocity is the 
easiest way of conceiving of these principles: distributive justice involves an equal 
balancing of the interests of moral agents and other living organisms, when essential 
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
90 
 
needs of both are in conflict (for instance, when people need to kill wild animals for 
food). Taylor manages to avoid the morally questionable directly reciprocal implication 
which springs immediately to mind: that is, if it is morally permissible for people to kill 
whales for food, for instance, why is it not permissible, in equally severe environmental 
conditions, for tigers to kill humans? Instead, he suggests four ways in which a balancing 
of interests might take place, including allowing agents to have a rotational access to wild 
areas, thus sometimes leaving them free of humans; leaving other areas entirely free of 
humans all the time; creating as much sensitivity as possible in the interventions that take 
place in wild areas; and sharing areas between humans and non-human, evolved 
communities in what he calls ‘common conservation’.  
Restitutive justice has become an important principle in European approaches to the 
tensions created by pressures on land use and access. The problem with attempts at re-
wilding, or attempts to put things back to the way they were before humans intervened, 
has been extensively explored.142 Robert Elliot’s conclusion is that the interruption of 
evolved systems with human synthetic systems, even if an attempt at reversal is made, 
still results in artifice. Taylor also admits that what has been lost requires ‘a special duty 
of compensation’ that brings about ‘an amount of good that is comparable … to the 
amount of evil to be compensated for’.143 
This approach, which is an attempt to restore a ‘balance of justice’, fails Eliot’s test to 
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take into account the impact of human agents per se, meaning that what has been lost – 
the continuous natural evolution of an ecosystem over millennia – can never be restored, 
only ‘faked’. It also introduces the idea of ‘evil’ which, as a quasi-religious concept and 
one Taylor has not used up to this point, strikes a jarring note in a naturalistic approach. 
Finally and most importantly, however, it is at this point that Taylor admits that the focus 
in restitutive justice needs to be ‘on the soundness and health of whole ecosystems and 
their biotic communities, rather than on the good of particular individuals’. Taylor has 
moved away from biocentric atomism even as he defends it, demonstrating the increasing 
difficulties he meets in maintaining individualism as a coherent position.144  
Conclusion 
Taylor’s biocentric approach is empirical and firmly physicalist, based on the premise 
that humans, as an evolved species, are just as interdependent, and in no way inherently 
more important, than other species. It acknowledges that a decentralisation and a 
deprioritisation of humans must take place in the context of anthropogenic impact on 
other species and communities of living organisms. In addition, it accounts for moral 
agency in terms of an additional capacity from that possessed by other organisms (the 
same capacity that entitles humans to term themselves 'persons') and concludes that this 
implies added responsibilities. The capacity to decide how to live entails a duty to 
encompass our understanding in our moral action.  
His outline of the origins of our morality implies that we evolved with this capacity for a 
moral sense. However, it is because we have the capacity for self-awareness, and for the 
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organising principle of rational thought, that we have the additional and associated 
capacity to develop as virtuous characters, enlightened by our ability to act impartially 
and consistently. This argument is weakened when he acknowledges that, in common 
with all living organisms and communities, we pursue conditions that are 'good for' us. 
What this omits is the acknowledgement that humans appear to pursue conditions that are 
in direct conflict with our 'goods', sometimes in full awareness, sometimes in ignorance. 
This leaves us with the conclusion that it is weakness of will that has left us where we 
are, in relation to the ecological emergency. Weakness of will only makes sense, however, 
in the context of an agency that is somehow supra-physical, and Taylor's own account 
disallows this. If we are to respond as effectively as we might, then we need to revise 
both our understanding of organisms, and our understanding of the primacy of ethics in 
response to the problems our impact has created.  
Taylor’s contention that individual living organisms alone are possessors of inherent 
worth begins to unravel when considered in the light of the very theoretical premise – 
evolutionary theory – that underpins his approach. Evolutionary theory makes it clear that 
organisms do not simply act as atomistic individuals but interact within both living and 
non-living relationships. Empirical evidence shows that individual organisms are, 
themselves, amalgams, in evolutionary terms at both the micro- and at the macroscopic 
level. Inter-reliance and interdependence are not just features of organisms; they define 
them. No organism acts in isolation. While it is also true that fierce competition for 
limited sources of available energy is a driving evolutionary force, the relational nature of 
organisms makes it meaningless to treat them as individual entities. This somewhat 
undermines an atomistic understanding of the worth of living organisms but I will attempt 
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to revise the idea considered from the perspective that organisms behave more like 
systems than they do atomistic individuals.  
Taylor's five principles demonstrate the problems with an approach that recognises that it 
is aiming for a utopia it can never realise. Agency is contextualised within systems that 
are imperfectible because unfinished, always in a state of flux, and therefore not able to 
come to a state of harmony. In revising Taylor’s thesis, I will consider agency itself as 
subject to this interdependence. Seeing agency from the perspective of beings that are 
interwoven within one another’s contextual space gives it an entirely different set of 
referents. Indeed it makes talking about agency in any traditional, and particularly in any 
dualistic sense, confusing. If agency is to have any clear meaning after this revision has 
been completed, it will have to be with some reference to systems themselves, rather than 
to individualism or to any dualistic understanding of some extra-physical entity, like 
mind.  
Taylor’s framework is useful because it gives a starting point from which to begin 
revising what kind of understanding of human agency might be possible given the 
physical conditions of our evolutionary circumstance. Its framework provides a structure 
for asking what it would mean to respond from within a different framework, one that 
was not wedded to a particular ideological commitment. Its strengths lie in its rational, 
scientifically orientated approach, since this is less ideologically committed than any 
narrative that relies on faith-based ideology. Its weaknesses lie in its atomism and, 
ultimately, tensions that develop between egalitarianism and prioritisation. 
In some important respects, Taylor does not go far enough in exploring this narrative. He 
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begins with the (Kantian) idea that individuals be considered ‘ends in themselves’. As a 
context, this provides a valuable antidote to the push to treat individuals as means, to be 
used as objects at the whim and behest of others, and the extension of this to the non-
human realm is an important step in re-framing our responsibilities. However, in the next 
chapter I will show how this aspect of his approach can be further extended. Firstly, it can 
reflect the idea that individuals are more complex and more interdependent than this 
atomistic account shows, and are therefore better considered as systems. The narrative of 
being enmeshed involves viewing the ecological emergency as an inseparable aspect of 
being human. It therefore allows us to re-envision our idea of agency and that gives us the 
potential to see ourselves in a different kind of relationship with the rest of existence than 
is available through any idealised account.  
Secondly, an enmeshed view allows us to acknowledge and accept our fallibility, and 
therefore to work from a more pragmatic basis than that proposed by Taylor. This is 
important if we are to have a workable ethic, and not simply another set of principles that 
are aspirational, rather than practicable. The final revision flows from the previous two: 
the relationship between humanity and its biophysical enmeshment is neither separable, 
nor ideal, so we need to find a different way of assessing what kinds of relationship we 
can focus on, given the much more radical interpretation of our capacity for agency, and 
therefore for responsibility. It is possible to consider systems as having ‘goods’ of their 
own, even though these are not inherent goods, do not imply inherent worth and indeed 
bypass the idea of morality altogether, since they rely on an understanding of the 
physical, probabilistic laws we are all subject to.  
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Chapter Three: Revising Taylor’s moral agency 
Introduction 
In the spectrum of responses I described, and, in particular, in the context of Taylor’s 
theory, I worked to show that some understandings of human responsibility are still 
unreflectively accepted. In particular, there are the three ideas that emerge in Taylor’s 
work, and that I have unpacked, in some detail, in the last chapter, and with which I take 
issue.  
Firstly, moral agency is taken as the underlying condition for a response.145 Taylor’s 
moral agent is an idealised version of a responsible human person: she is empirically 
informed and she can recognize any partiality in her response for what it is. I disagree 
that this is an accurate, or, in this context, a useful, picture of our human condition. 
Secondly, the elicitation of ‘respect for nature’ engenders a response that can only ever 
approach the ideal as the person who embodies the attitude of respect approaches the 
ideal (of being rational, factually informed and reality-aware). This puts the ideal 
response always out of reach (I think this criticism applies more broadly to theories in the 
field of environmental ethics, and I will seek to show that). Thirdly, the ideal relationship 
- a perfectly harmonious relationship between human, responsible moral agents and the 
wild, relatively unimpaired, natural world that is the focus of Taylor’s concern – is also 
only ever aspirational, for two reasons. Harmony in nature does not exist (Taylor is clear 
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about recognizing this) and the ideal of a harmonious relationship could only exist if 
there were an ideal person, and that does not exist. I will argue that, as with the second 
response, aiming for a relationship that can never be attained is problematic. An ethically 
neutral approach faces neither the second, nor the third problem, and it sits better with 
what we know about the human condition, so I will explore what an ethically neutral 
approach might look like. 
In essence, I am contending that Taylor’s biocentric approach (even in its more complex 
form as Taylor revised it later) is insufficiently radical to take into account all the 
implications of the principle premise – that we are evolved beings – that he uses as its 
foundation.146 Biocentrism relies on the kind of individualistic atomism that, I will seek 
to show, is no longer viable if we are ‘reality-aware’, in Taylor’s terms. If we take the 
ideas of evolutionary biology to their logical conclusion then we cannot claim to be 
unique in terms of our human agency, particularly not in the ‘free will’ sense that we 
generally take for granted. If we are enmeshed (and I will argue that we are), there is no 
‘one’ to do the valuing, or to form the basis for an ‘ideal’ moral agent, since enmeshment 
is inherently dynamic. Likewise, the idea that we could aim to have an ideal relationship 
with the environment (or rather our enmeshment, since, as I described earlier, the 
inside/outside divide that ‘environment’ implies is not a useful ontological division in this 
context) pushes our attempts into an unreachable future (and allows for all kinds of 
permissiveness along the way).  
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However, I will work to show that, even from a systems-based perspective, there is still 
an aspect of our cognitive capacity that we can exercise that better fits the definition of 
‘agency’ (and is morally neutral) than the moral agency Taylor defines. This means there 
is still a response that we can make, though this is not aspirational, since in this revised 
view we are not striving towards becoming ideal respondents, or seeking to respond in an 
ideal way. Thirdly, since our relationship cannot be one of harmony, for the two reasons 
given above, we do better to explore the ethically neutral relationship with our context 
(rather than just with Taylor’s ‘wild nature’). However, by exploring what we know 
about physical systems, we find there are still ways of discerning what is ‘good’ for the 
systems we are enmeshed in. Although these cannot be captured as principles, since they, 
too, are dynamic and interactive, there are enough clues from what we know about 
biophysical systems to provide us with some guidance on how to respond. Our response 
is not that of the ‘mental’ act preceding a ‘physical’ action. It is a realisation, which is a 
bio-physical meta-system that comes into play through the effort of direct attention.147  
These, therefore, are the possibilities I want to explore for a revision of Taylor’s 
understandings, based on the same biophysical premise that we are evolved, biological 
beings. I want to explore the consequences of taking what might follow from this premise 
to conclusions that are more far-reaching than Taylor’s reading implies because I think 
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this gives us a better foundation for proposing that we can respond to the ecological 
emergency, and that we can find the basis for a convergence in our response.148 
First, I spell out the criticisms each idea elicits from the perspective of internal coherence 
with one of Taylor's main premises: evolutionary theory. Then I use a systems-based 
approach to address the objections levelled against Taylor's ideas, and show how, in each 
case, this allows for a revised idea of human responsibility. Finally, I explore an 
alternative view of 'the good' of systems to show that there are ways we can know how to 
realise agency independent of an ethical response.149 
Stage one: a review of the criticisms 
(i) Reviewing Taylor’s individualism 
Taylor locates value (in the complex way I described in the previous chapter) in 
individual entities. He does this on the basis that evolution proceeds through gene 
mutation and natural selection, both of which occur at an individual level: 
According to biologists' current understanding of evolutionary ecology and population 
genetics, the structure of relationships among species-populations in a natural 
ecosystem, as well as the size, growth, rate, age distribution, and other characteristics 
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 I note, as have others before me, that Taylor's views changed since writing Respect for Nature and the 
revisions I make here merely extend the direction of this change further: 'Since writing Respect for Nature, 
some of my views have changed. Perhaps the most important one is that I no longer accept my strictly 
individualist account of what entities have inherent worth (and so are 'morally considerable'), have moral 
standing in their own right, or a proper moral subjects toward which we have direct duties.' From a letter to 
Professor Claudia Card, April 15, 1994, included in personal correspondence, June 2012. 
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 The inspiration for this idea came from multiple sources. One important one was Robert Elliot's 2008 
paper, 'Instrumental Value in Nature as a Basis for the Intrinsic Value of Nature as a Whole', 
Environmental Ethics 27 (1) (June 10): 43–56; other physicalist approaches to understanding energy 
dissipation within systems, including work by Scott Sampson, Ibrahim Dincer, Daniel Botkin and Stanley 
Salthe, details of which appear later in this chapter and in the bibliography. 
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of each population are determined by the workings of natural selection at the level of 
individual organisms'.150 
 
However, factually aware individuals with information about recent research in 
evolutionary biology know that living organisms do not, in fact, evolve independently or 
atomistically.151 Locating value in individual organisms encounters further difficulties 
when we consider the time scales of the existence of different organisms. It indicates that 
the implicit focus of Taylor’s concern was macro-organisms – from earthworms to 
whales – rather than micro-organisms, the importance of which in biological evolutionary 
terms is only now becoming apparent. There are further grounds for believing that macro-
organisms were Taylor’s implicit focus: countless species, particularly of micro-
organisms, have not yet been identified or classified by humans. Even those that have 
been identified interact in complex ways, making it difficult to know whether to classify 
them as individuals, or as interdependent parts of larger organisms. We cannot value 
them as individuals because they do not fit into the categories we normally use for 
classification. There are two revisions necessary to the individualistic account Taylor has 
given us: we need to review the idea of individualism, and we need to review the idea of 
a locus of value (since if individualism is not as widely applicable as we have formerly 
understood it to be, then locating value at the individual level is also not as widely 
applicable).  
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 Paul W Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environment Ethics (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 1986): 6. 
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 See, for instance, Daniel C. Fouke ‘Humans and the Soil’, Environmental Ethics, 33 (2011), 147–61. 
(esp.      p 155); Jerry A Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (New York:  
Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
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(ii) Reviewing the uniquely human, moral agent’s perspective 
Taylor locates responsibility for human impact in the mental decisions humans make as 
moral agents and he says that both human-centred and life-centred theories agree about 
‘which beings in the world are moral agents’.152 While I agree with Taylor that human 
impact is the source of the emergency, and that being human is unique in important ways, 
I would like to offer a revision of the idea that the human capacity to ‘exercise the 
necessary resolve and willpower to carry out … decisions’ takes place in the way that 
Taylor describes, and therefore I would like to offer a revision of the idea of human moral 
agency.153  
Part of the uniqueness of being human lies in our capacity to (mentally) imagine what it 
would be like if conditions were different. We may not know what it is like, in Nagel’s 
famous phrase, ‘to be a bat’ or anything else on a different evolutionary branch, but we 
have the capacity to imagine different future scenarios, and to empathise with other 
humans, and even to understand that other organisms and ecosystems ‘need’ particular 
conditions to survive.154 It is reasonable to conjecture that this kind of capacity arises as a 
result of our own evolutionary conditions: it happened that we developed different 
cognitive capacities, which are based on the physiological make-up of our brains, and 
other organs. Other organisms developed different sets of capacities: this happened to be 
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 Paul W Taylor, (op. cit.): 14. 
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 Thomas Nagel, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?  Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), 435–50. 
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one set that we developed, but it is not inherently different from those developed by 
others.  
Yet the narrative that accompanies our uniqueness is one that also tells of our superiority. 
The narrative is that human cognitive capacities (along with opposable thumbs) have 
directed the kind of impact that humans have had on other organisms and planetary 
systems. However, human cognitive capacities, in evolutionary biology terms, emerge as 
a result of our biophysical conditions, and give us no claim to superiority.155 The 
narratives that we tell ourselves about our relationship with other organisms and 
planetary systems shape how we understand this relationship.156 Our methods of 
communicating this understanding are amplified through the use of signs and symbols 
(religions are obvious ones), metaphors in language, and technology which speeds up and 
further disseminates commonly held understanding. The effect of this amplification is to 
further alter and potentially distort our understanding. Because we believe we are 
superior, this attitude feeds back into how we use our cognitive capacities (like empathy 
and imagination). We limit what we include, and what we respond to, which further 
drives the negative effect of our impact, as a species.  
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 Wendell Berry gives an explanation of this that is clear and precise in The Landscape of Harmony where 
he describes human impact in terms that could be construed as 'extravagance', in the sense of 'wandering 
from the path' of straightforward survival aims. Seen from this angle, human technological developments 
are increasingly over-sufficient for ensuring the continued survival and reproductive capacities of the 
species and this situation has gone on developing, in the way that evolutionary situations do, just because of 
the accidental success of the strategies (tool-making, forward thinking) that contributed to the process in the 
first place. We are mainly 'dependent upon reflexes, instincts, and appetites that we do not cause or intend', 
but humans also have the capacity to think, to plan, to imagine futures for themselves, to create 'this 
artifact, this human living' (Wendell Berry, The Landscape of Harmony (Five Seasons, 1987): 35. 
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 Simon P. James, ‘Finding - and Failing to Find - Meaning in Nature’, Environmental Values, 22 (2013), 
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For human moral agency to be a completely unique capacity, it would have to be of a 
different order from the capacities of other organisms. It would have to involve a process 
that was uniquely independent of the biophysical conditions we have evolved in. If 
human moral agency is not unique in this way, then what is happening, when we act, is 
just like what is happening when all other organisms act. We are responding to 
circumstance and the ideas of resolve and willpower as capacities that we impose 
independent of circumstance do not come into the equation at all.  
If this is the case, then human impact on other organisms and planetary systems has been 
unintentional, although part of the reason that such an extreme level of impact has arisen 
is as a direct result of the narratives we have told ourselves, and our consequent 
understanding, of our inherent superiority and independence. Our impact has also 
manifested itself in the way this sense of superiority allows us to withdraw our attention 
from particular facets of our relationships. To summarise what I have said so far in this 
section: we are biologically evolved, and so are our cognitive capacities, which means 
that they are not inherently superior to those of other organisms, since they were the 
result of a process of (blind and impartial) evolution that has no hierarchy. Yet we have 
told ourselves that we are inherently superior, and even that these capacities are unique 
and distinct, and give us independence from the biophysical conditions we have evolved 
in. This means there are two views to correct: our view of our superiority, and our view 
of our independence.  
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(iii) Reviewing the harmonious relationship 
Taylor makes it clear, as I mentioned in the last chapter, that stability, and therefore some 
end-state of harmony, is not a feature either of individuals or of ecosystems. It makes no 
sense, therefore, to strive for stability when considering the responsiveness of systems. 
The view of systems that I am taking for the purposes of this discussion is one based on a 
biophysical understanding of how systems operate. Effectively, this is an extension of 
Taylor’s understanding of organisms as having evolved. If organisms evolved, then they 
evolved in accordance with scientific laws. These laws are probabilistic, and falsifiable, 
therefore any explanation they facilitate is only theoretical. However, they are the best 
description we have for empirical evidence of what is taking place in the universe – they 
require the least complex explanation, they accord best with the evidence, and their 
falsifiability allows us to discard any theory we have if evidence disproves it. Biophysical 
systems are, in this sense, informational exchange systems, where relations between 
different sets of information (in the form, for instance, of ‘packets’ of energy – quarks – 
or at a larger scale, electrons and protons) are in dynamic interplay, moving (according to 
the second law) towards entropy (a state where there is less information to exchange, 
because less organization, and therefore more chaos).157  
James Ladyman describes the universe as being made up, not of things, but of 
mathematical relations. Scott Sampson, from a different perspective, talks of a relational 
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universe.158 There are not distinctly unique interchanges of energy or information. At the 
purely physical level, one can reduce this to a mathematical metaphor: the interchange is 
an equation, working itself out, but in doing so, it changes the balance of all other 
equations which then have to work themselves out, and so on. This process is effectively 
infinite (at least from a human point of view) and paints a picture of the universe into 
which our understanding of biophysical systems can be worked.159 We can think of this 
interchange as directional, using the ‘big bang’ metaphor: at earlier time, more 
concentrated exchanges take place, and these become progressively less concentrated. So, 
in a sense, there is a ‘flow’ to this systematic process.  
There is no ideal or harmonious relationship within these systems and the interchanges 
they involve are dynamic. However, the patterns of existence that maintain themselves 
for a certain length of time include biophysical systems and one notable feature of 
biophysical systems is their ability to develop this ‘whirlpool’-like character of systems 
still further by self-replicating, or reproducing, in order to maintain the pattern.  
In reviewing the ideas of the harmoniousness within systems, and the prospects for 
harmoniousness between humans and other systems (or more accurately, their 
enmeshment), a further point is that very often we cannot know, with any certainty, the 
results of anthropogenic impacts. The interrelationships are too complex, or not enough 
research has been done to establish the effects on the interrelationships of human activity. 
                                                           
158
 As discussed by James Ladyman in, for instance, in James Ladyman, James Lambert and Karoline 
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Responding from the context of being enmeshed is more complicated, and involves more 
unknowns, therefore, than if human responses could be calculated atomistically. 
Systematic enmeshment implies that if something acts, reacts or alters its trajectory, then 
the entire mesh shifts.  
Revising the ideas of harmonious relationships requires that we revise, first, the need for 
an ethical approach, since there is no inherency to ‘the good’ of systems in this broader 
interpretation. Second, we need to reassess what clues there might be in the conditions we 
find ourselves in for discerning what kind of responses accord with, and which ones 
interfere with or obstruct, the ‘flow’ to this systematic process.  
Squaring human peripherality with the pivotal nature of human 
responsibility 
Taylor's approach is based on the demand that we acknowledge our peripheral status as a 
species and on challenging the narrative of human superiority. I agree with Taylor on this 
count. Taylor recognises that humans are latecomers. He concludes that the human 
capacity for deliberative action confers responsibilities towards, rather than privileges 
over, other species. The problem with this is that our peripheral status is an aspect of this 
issue that cannot be translated into specifically ethical terms. The metaphorical 
distinction between centre and periphery implies a kind of conceptual inequality. 
Emphasising our peripherality while nevertheless acknowledging some kind of agency 
could lead to an inverted inegalitarianism in which human systems are sidelined in favour 
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of non-human systems.160 This position might satisfy a ‘deep green’ philosophy but it is 
imbalanced from most human perspectives. In revising, the relationship between centre 
and margin is no longer relevant in this way and the allocentric viewpoint it offers could 
resolve this tension.161 In other words, if the focus of our attention is on our relationships 
within our enmeshment, then we need not concern ourselves with our peripherality. We 
may be latecomers, but we are host to ancient microbes, our virally derived RNA links us 
back to some very early life-forms, and, of course, we are more than biological, we are 
also physical organisms.  
Taylor also faces the criticism that all non-anthropocentrists face, but that becomes much 
less of an issue if we adopt a position of ethical neutrality: the argument that there cannot 
be a centre of value outside a valuer. Holmes Rolston III, quoted in Simon James, uses 
the 'light in the refrigerator' analogy: 
'Rolston ... wants ... an account of what values would exist in the world, not as it 
appears from the viewpoint of the subject picturing such a world, but as it would 
appear independently of human experience.'162 
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 What I mean here is that to say that we are peripheral, because we are, evolutionarily, latecomers, could 
be interpreted (and for some, has been interpreted) as meaning that we ought to reduce our numbers to a 
very low level, relative to the current human world population, on the basis that our rights are subordinate 
(if rights are really universal and non-anthropocentric, in the sense implied by deep ecologists) to those 
who have been here longer (almost all other species apart from some micro-organisms, since very few 
known new species have evolved since the evolution of Homo sapiens). 
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 The use of the term 'allocentric' to describe a view point that is 'other-centred' I first came across in the 
work of Ronnie Hawkins, ‘Extending Plumwood’s Critique of Rationalism Through Imagery and 
Metaphor’, Ethics and the Environment, 14 (2009), 99–113; and ‘Introduction: Beyond Nature/Culture 
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This raises the difficulty (dealt with in some detail by James in the same paper) that arises 
in attempting to consider non-humans with respect, since if only humans have the 
capacity for valuing, they must necessarily be the only loci for which value can make 
sense. This brings us back to the debate about whether or not an ethical response is the 
most appropriate one to the ecological emergency. If we cannot value beyond what is 
valuable to humans (except instrumentally), then an ethical approach cannot give us a 
sufficiently solid grounding to respond robustly to the ecological emergency. Non-
anthropocentrism fails and we are back to an anthropocentric approach (which, so far, has 
failed also).  
A final important criticism of Taylor is that raised by Karann Durland: Taylor’s proposal 
lacks credible practicability.163 This needs to be dealt with as an issue of practice and 
therefore I will discuss it in the next chapter since it links the problem of thinking about 
the ecological emergency to the practical applicability of any systematic, intellectual 
approach. 
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From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
108 
 
Stage two: Revisions 
(i) Revising Taylor’s moral agency: revising individualism and revising 
responsibility 
  Revising individualism: enmeshment as a systems-based perspective164 
While Taylor’s assertion that evolution proceeds at the genetic level is a reasonable one, 
it begs a question both subjectively, for humans, and objectively, for the other organisms 
within Taylor’s sphere of consideration. The most general form of the question ('what am 
I?') is one that philosophers are prone to ask more frequently than most. The evolutionary 
answer ought to be that I am a primate, yet the biophysical answer is that 'I' am largely 
(over 65 percent) water.165 Of the remainder, around 15 percent dry weight is made up of 
mitochondria whose DNA has more in common with all other mitochondria found in the 
bodies of all other multicellular organisms than it does with the primate DNA with which 
I tend to associate my 'I'.166 This results in the absurd conclusion that 'I' am less than 20 
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 I give a fuller definition of what I mean by a systems-based approach in the third revision. However, it 
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percent 'me' and over 80 percent 'everything else'. It is just as absurd to claim that human 
evolutionary progress is made by the 20 percent 'I' am willing to admit as ‘me’ while 
everything else follows along in its wake like a bridal train.167 The fact of natural 
selection implies that the other 80 percent will have an enormous effect on the way that 
the 20 percent is realised, or expressed, or whether or not mutations take place.  
There is a new area of biology, Metagenomics, that seeks to explore the evolutionary 
interactions between multicellular organisms and the microbial communities that both 
colonise, parasitise and symbiotically evolve with them: 
The metagenome of these communities encodes physiological traits that humans have 
not had to evolve, including the ability to harvest nutrients and energy from food that 
would otherwise be lost because we lack the necessary digestive enzymes... Without 
understanding the inhabitants of the human microbiome and the mutualistic human-
microbial interactions that it supports, our portrait of human biology will remain 
incomplete.'168 
 
It is more accurate to describe evolution as a process of gene transfer that is complicated 
by the interactions between the various systems that go to make up multicellular 
organisms, single-celled organisms, and the surrounding conditions, than it is to describe 
it as gene transfer alone. If the complexity of the interrelationships between multicellular 
and microbial communities and organisms modifies gene transfer in humans, then it does 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Williams and Mary Evelyn Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for the Study of World 
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so in all multicellular organisms. The situation is more complicated still: microbial 
communities depend upon, interact with and modify the conditions for multicellular 
organisms, and vice versa. It is much more accurate, therefore, to consider both 
multicellular organisms, microbial communities and even the background conditions of 
temperature, hydration, geology, pressure and so on, as systems, than as entities.  
We need to make further revisions to an atomistic, individualistic approach when 
considering single celled organisms. Not only in evolutionary time, but in each instant of 
our existence, trillions of microbial cells overwhelm the number of human cells in a 
human body, making it more of a bipedal colony than an isolated individual. As scientists 
frequently observe, 'By numbers of cells, a human being has ten times as many bacteria 
as human cells.’169 In addition, even the so-called 'human genome' is disproportionately 
comprised of ancestrally viral fragments, 'fragments that were vital to evolution of all 
organisms.'170 
Single celled organisms, or microbes, do not behave as individual organisms, whether in 
their entwined relationship with multicellular organisms, or while acting in apparent 
independence in the soil.171 This implies that humans cannot claim even at the organic 
level to be boundaried individuals whose evolutionary trajectory relies solely on mutation 
of genetic material and natural selection. While it is reasonable to acknowledge the 
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importance of the role of individualistic genetic transference in evolutionary progress, it 
is unreasonably reductionist to extend an assumption of this importance to a 
consideration of how living organisms interact, and therefore to how we weigh up 
organisms’ interests.  
Given all this, we should be sceptical of an entirely atomistic approach. However useful it 
is to think of living organisms, including ourselves, as unique, boundaried entities, 
especially, for instance, when deciding who will cook dinner, in considering a human 
condition imaginary of the kind described in the last chapter, it is equally important to 
recall that we and they are also 'dissipative structures,' to use Ilya Prigogine’s term, 
maintaining a coherent integrity while energy and matter continues to exchange.172 
Organisms do not evolve in empty space but in relation to other organisms and the 
systems which contain them, and even in close co-evolution with those systems. We are 
ourselves examples of such co-evolution. We depend, absolutely and essentially, upon 
the microbial communities, as well as the non-organic, chemical interchanges, that make 
up the internal and external context of our existence. 
Revising responsibility 
It could be argued that when we change the level at which we reflect on our identity as 
entities, by considering ourselves as 'persons', for instance, then our ability to see 
ourselves as separate individuals within a world of other separate individuals makes 
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sense. To a degree, of course, it is practically necessary that we perceive ourselves in this 
way. However, when the stories that we use to make sense of our condition so distort our 
understanding of our relationship with the context that we are no longer able to recognise 
ourselves as a part of what is going on, then this perception of separation becomes an 
obstruction instead of a facilitation. 
The narratives themselves need to be revised, updated and questioned in the light of new 
information if we are to be able to respond more flexibly to the conditions of our 
enmeshment and not to some distortion that holds our gaze rigid. Our revision of the 
narrative will always lag behind our integration of the information we have about the 
context, but this is still preferable to not updating the narrative at all.173  
Morton’s word, ‘enmeshed’ and its different forms (enmeshment, ‘the mesh’, and so on) 
is a useful metaphor for the interrelationship between what we think of, traditionally, as 
'the human', on the one hand, and 'the environment' or 'the other' outside of 'us', on the 
other.’174 This way of perceiving how we interrelate leaves no room for separation of 
entity from the background 'hiss'. We are not exclusively, or even statistically 
significantly, 'human' in make-up and nor is there anything 'outside' this 'us' to which we 
can refer for measurement or scale. It is, therefore, only human cultural systems that 
create the context within which we measure.175 They demand a story about our 
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relationship with the world in order to find some way of drawing a line between 'us' and 
'them'. Without a story, there is no culture. Without culture, there is no 'human'.176 As 
Wendell Berry has it, we are not human until and unless we are encultured.177  
Another aspect of our systematic approach to our own survival, involves seeing ourselves 
as contextualised within culture. Berry wants to emphasise our naturalness, but this, too, 
has to be seen in the light of human enculturation:  
'We and our country create one another ... our land passes in and out of our bodies just 
as our bodies pass in and out of our land'.178  
 
Human enculturation creates the land but the land also creates human enculturation and 
the two are inseparably interrelated. Nature, and 'the land' as its representation, has 
become, in a sense, 'our artifact'.179 We can go further than Berry, though, because what 
creates the land is not just the 'we' of the human species, but a much broader set of 
interactions between multiple communities and systems within which we, and they, are 
enmeshed. From Berry's context of enculturation, we can extend the implications to wider 
and wider systems. 
This idea of interrelated creativity is hugely filtered, now, at the level of human 
enculturation, through synthesised artefacts. At the scale of our existence, neither those of 
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us who claim a stake in human culture, nor any of the less intimately involved systems, 
are now outside the human cultural net. In the sense that we have used these synthesised 
artefacts to probe internally and externally to the limits of the known universe, there is no 
longer any outside-human context.180 
Our enmeshment and the context of our perception is further complicated by prosthesis, 
or what could be described in more radical terms as our evolution into biophysical 
organisms dependent upon, but also, potentially, rendered vulnerable, or endangered by, 
technological artifice.181 An extreme view might remark that the soles of our feet use the 
prosthesis of shoes to deal with walking on potentially hazardous ground. More 
conventionally, and increasingly, prosthesis extends, prolongs or replaces the function of 
limbs or sensory perceptual devices (from artificial hips to spectacles and pacemakers). 
However, deliberately altering our experience is broader than these physiological 
adaptations through the use of synthesised artefacts.182 We ingest substances, legal or 
illegal, to alter our mood, and sometimes our perceptions, from coffee to Prozac to 
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 This is an extension of Morton’s remark in 'Ecology without the Present' (op. cit.), that 'there is no 
outside-human text': 231. I understand this to mean not that we know everything there is to know about the 
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cocaine, and sometimes these synthesised products artificially extend our lives by 
breathing for 'us', countering terminal illness, or even altering the rate of our decay. Yet 
we also breathe in and ingest the accidental by-products of bio-technological dependency, 
from fertilisers to effluent from factory farms. These internally or externally applied 
synthetic artefacts shift the balance between what we are as evolved organisms, and what 
we are, as human, synthetic systems. 
We have altered the make-up of ecosystems within which we are only distantly involved. 
Even before genetic engineering, artificial selection altered the evolutionary trajectories 
of targeted species and, by extension, of those (particularly single-celled organisms) that 
interacted most closely with them. Even those systems we have not targeted in any way 
are affected by the by-products of synthesis. We can find traces of human (encultured, 
synthetic) activity laid down and contained (as a thin layer of carbonated by-product) in 
the ice caps and on the ocean floors and in places no human has ever set foot or laid eyes 
upon.183 
Violence as a result of distortions in perception 
One other characteristic of our encultured systems is that they are, in many respects, 
extremely violent.184 I will return to a consideration of this characteristic when I consider 
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the practice implied by realisation as agency. For now, I want simply to point out that 
some human cultures have ritualistically noted, and even begged forgiveness for, some of 
the violent relationships we exist within (including killing to eat, warfare, clearing of land 
for planting and so on).185 While philosophers (and academics and thinkers from other 
disciplines) have questioned the effectiveness and the impact of such rituals, the 
unacknowledged violence that is so central to the twenty-first century's globalising 
consumer culture is markedly different in at least two respects from earlier manifestations 
of violence in human cultures, and from violence exhibited by other species. In the first 
place, it remains an opaque, barely examined feature of the current globalising, product-
heavy, consumer-creating system and in the second, the scale of the violence and the 
mindlessness, or lack of attention, with which it is carried out, is of a different order from 
violence or aggression in other times or in other species.186  
                                                                                                                                                                             
suffering.' (Timothy Morton, ‘Environmentalism’, in Romanticism: An Oxford Guide, ed. by Nicholas Roe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 696–707):705. Wendell Berry has also written about our 
aggressive nature: '... our history reveals that, stripped of the restraints, disciplines, and ameliorations of 
culture, humans are not 'natural', not 'thinking animals' or 'naked apes', but monsters – indiscriminate and 
insatiable killers and destroyers. We differ from other creatures partly in our susceptibility to monstrosity.' 
Berry, The Landscape of Harmony (op. cit.):40. There have, of course, been many other writers and 
thinkers who have observed and commented on the aggressive nature of humanity. My point in drawing 
attention to this is to question whether or not the ideas we have of our agency either exacerbate these 
aggressive tendencies, or mitigate them. Obviously, this is a deeply complex question but by slicing it 
differently will, I hope, reveal new insights. 
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 A point made specifically by Thomas Duddy in ‘Walking Respectfully Upon the Earth’, in From Ego to 
Eco (presented at the From Ego to Eco conference, Galway, 2011). 
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 I mean mindlessness, of course, in the context of the human capacity to be mindful, or notice, not in the 
sense that other species could be mindful or otherwise of their actions: some probably could, some certainly 
could not. 
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In the end, other systems will kill (exploit, destroy and pollute) the ones we depend upon, 
and us, ourselves.187 We cannot avoid our own end. Yet we have largely failed to grasp 
the extent to which our own destructiveness has created the conditions that threaten to 
undo the very fabric upon which our own continuance as human encultured beings 
depends.  
It is the tendency to withdraw attention that is really at the heart of this matter. The 
violence of humanly encultured systems looks directional, in the sense that there is an 
apparent level of purpose to it (war to gain land, exercising ideological control to gain 
power, intensive farming to increase profitability and production, factory worker 
exploitation for profit) and yet this purpose may be motivated by factors entirely outside 
human encultured control (fear, hunger, perceived lack of space or security, on the one 
hand; extravagance, the unintended consequences of synthesising artefacts, on the other). 
In the context of the culture that enmeshes us, attention, and the awareness to which such 
attention gives access, is directed away from questioning. Partly as a result of the 
narratives of independence and superiority that I mentioned earlier, we fail to question 
the manner in which factory farmed animals are bred, housed and killed. We do not pay 
attention to the profit-driven justification of factory worker conditions and associated 
pollution in countries in the South. We do not question the cultural addiction to cheap, 
non-renewable energy causing the destruction of irreplaceable habitats. We do not pay 
attention to the tacit arrangements for tax breaks and subsidies, legitimising the otherwise 
prohibited activities of oil and gas companies whose enormous profits are rarely 
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publicized. In allowing ourselves to tacitly accept the narratives of superiority and 
independence, even when we become aware of their hollow ring, our attention is 
distracted, or withdrawn, and the inherent violence of the Anthropocene continues.188 
The debate around whether or not human cultural activity is more or less violent than that 
of any other species or system, then, becomes a question of where, how and why the 
human system directs attention from the violence and, relatedly, the suffering that it 
generates. This is also, in effect, a question about the capacity we have, as perceivers 
within these systems, to redirect attention. We are not mechanistically determined by our 
enmeshment. We have, for instance, the capacity to realise the condition we are in. This 
realisation interacts with our enmeshment: it is a response that engenders other responses. 
We recognise that distraction and withdrawal from paying attention to what we are 
involved in renders us complicit.189 Therefore we begin to explore the possibilities, 
however limited, that paying attention offers.  
I cannot leave the issue of violence without alluding to the propensity of human systems 
to depend on war for their development. Since 1945, the capacity for violent destruction 
through nuclear bombing has radically increased. Morton observes: 
The bomb occupies the human. Plutonium 239 decays for twenty four thousand years. 
In twenty four thousand years, the following will be true: (1) No one will be 
meaningfully related to me in particular; (2) The slightest thing I do now will have 
grave consequences.190 
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 It looks as though being complicit has to mean that what we are doing is morally wrong. I will argue, 
later in this chapter, that this is not the case. Being complicit just means being involved in something that is 
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This idea that the slightest thing I do now will have grave consequences is true not just of 
bombs, of course. We are bound to be consumed in the end, but our hunger for energy, 
including nuclear energy and energy from non-renewable, carbon-based sources, has 
impacts that reverberate through unimaginable spans of time. The infinitesimal scale of 
human influence in universal terms may incline us to scoff at the idea that current acts 
have significant future bearings but, if we put Morton's words in the context that we do 
not act atomistically but as systems, we can see how a reverberating effect is possible: 
At this scale there is no me, no human even, worth talking about—yet what I do ‘now’ 
affects what happens ‘then’. Even more so, global warming is also disturbingly 
futural. I call its three main time scales the horrifying, the terrifying and the petrifying. 
There is a horrifying time scale of five hundred years (75 percent of global warming 
effects still happening); a terrifying one of thirty thousand years (25 percent still 
happening); and a petrifying one of one hundred thousand years (seven percent still 
happening).191 
 
However enormous and difficult to comprehend this level of impact is, however 
extraordinarily long-lasting, dwarfing the lifespan of the human species itself, the idea 
remains that what we do now influences any potential future systematically. 
Understanding this depends on revising how we consider biophysical systems as 
enmeshed within human systems, and the impact, upon these systems, of awareness.  
When we think of ourselves as separable from other organisms, then, this is largely a 
perceptual trick, an accidental accompaniment to the development of conscious 
awareness, a story that requires reflection and, periodically, revision. In addition, our 
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enmeshment means that we use, as reference points, the points that were used by previous 
generations and, as these became more dominated by dualistic thinking, the capacity to 
see ourselves as systems within systems became quiescent. We rest our sense of 
ourselves on the development of stories, myths and metaphors that have developed, 
historically, to explain changing experience. Platonistically, for instance, there is a realm 
of absolutes, only the shadows of which we can perceive, or, in Christian terms, there are 
hierarchies, the physical ones atop of which we straddle, bipedal, dominant. If our 
realisation of these relationships is subjective, then each point of self-aware perception is 
a possible generation point for the perceptive system to understand itself.192 Realisation 
as agency implies that the act of realisation creates a new narrative, an experience that 
then becomes a part of, and therefore interacts with, what is going on throughout the 
mesh. 
To consider organisms as systems is as much a social construct as any other culturally 
relative idea. After all, the idea depends upon a historical trajectory of ideas that came 
about as a result of the flourishing of the scientific method, and ultimately, as a result of 
how we understand evolutionary biology. We need not dismiss the model of evolution 
progressing through individual gene replication (or mutation) and natural selection. But a 
revision of this atomistic understanding is necessary if we are to construct a narrative that 
takes into account how intertwined human systems are with those within which they have 
evolved, and how organisms respond more like systems than like atomistic individuals. In 
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addition, now that we are recognisably in the Anthropocene, a significant proportion of 
our interactions are with human artefacts. This is changing the relationship between 
ourselves and the microbial and physical systems that inhabit and surround us and this, 
therefore, has to be incorporated in our story of ourselves. 
This is the first major revision of Taylor's narrative: we need to take into account the 
degree to which our enmeshment changes the boundaries of how we see our actions. 
Perceiving ourselves as enmeshed is a more empirically accurate metaphor for our 
condition. It implies that the separation of our agency into a category on its own needs re-
examining too. While it still makes sense for individual humans to consider ourselves as 
boundaried within our skins for the purposes of most of our day to day activities, it is 
equally valid, and empirically more accurate, to acknowledge that we interact more like 
systems than like atomistic individuals. More generally, living organisms are not 
necessarily or even workably separable from the systems within which they are 
enmeshed. Conceiving of ourselves as atomistic individuals is empirically valid on one 
level but we must also recognise the interdependency of individuals, and when 
considering the ecological emergency, it is vital that we acknowledge the degree to which 
our enmeshment creates our potential to respond. The problem of how to weigh up which 
systems to support, and how, remains.193  
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(ii) Revising the ‘moral’ ideal response; redrawing human agency as a 
cognitive capacity; acknowledging interdependence 
Revising Taylor’s moral agency: are we really moral? 
We are not the only organisms with at least some level of self-awareness. Other members 
of the family Hominidae, including, particularly, gorillas, chimpanzees and orangutans, 
show many parallel cognitive capacities, as do many other mammals, but also octopi, 
with their unique perceptual abilities and communications structures.194 The unique 
character of human self-awareness depends on our capacity to decide how to live, to 
decide on what is right and wrong, and to follow that through with action. This, at least, is 
what we have learned.195  
In some senses, we are bound to see from a single perspective. However, if individual 
organisms are not single organisms but complex systems, then they cannot exhibit the 
purely individualistic, teleological pursuit of ends that Taylor relies on to give them a 
locus of value. We are not moral agents in the way Taylor envisaged because we, too, are 
not individual organisms, but complex systems, pursuing ends at a variety of levels (and 
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sometimes for contradictory goals). In addition, human moral agency is not that different 
from the responses of other kinds of organisms (or systems), and calling it ‘moral’ is not 
justifiable.  
In revising Taylor's idea that humans have a unique kind of agency, namely moral 
agency, I want to reflect on why we consider human agency in general to be unique. My 
sense is that human agency is considered to be unique because we still labour under the 
illusion that humans make decisions about their lives in a way that other organisms do 
not. Taylor maintains that 'moral agents are such because they alone decide how to live'. 
This is an extremely strong and persistent view, but it relies on the highly questionable 
Cartesian narrative that the human will is some kind of supra physical entity that can 
control and direct physiological or physical matter from somewhere else. As I have just 
attempted to show, if we are entirely enmeshed, human systems are subject to natural 
laws and processes, and therefore any claim for a directional force that exists outside the 
mesh is unjustifiable. Instead, I suggest we consider what agency might mean if we take 
the point of view that we are indeed enmeshed, and that any ability to respond that 
humans have takes place in the context of interactive, dynamic systems, both intimate 
with, and at other levels of magnitude from, human enmeshment. 
For Taylor, respect is the attitude that living organisms, or communities of organisms, 
elicit from reasonable moral agents. The closer these moral agents come to the ideal of 
being fully factually informed, reality-aware, rational beings, the more likely they are to 
respond appropriately. Taylor’s moral agents, like moral agents in the environmental 
ethics literature in general, are unique in the animal world in that they can ‘engage in 
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moral deliberation’, ‘form judgments about right and wrong’, and so on.196 These are not 
the kinds of cognitive capacities that other organisms have. Yet if we allow that human 
moral agents have these unique capacities, we cannot, at the same time, claim that 
humans are just like everything else, unless we also claim that these capacities are no 
more or less special than a bat’s echolocation or a nightingale’s song. The logical 
extension of Taylor’s idea that humans are fundamentally a part of the evolved 
community is that there is nothing particularly special about being human. Yet the 
capacity for human moral agency is distinctly unique if it gives humans the ability to 
choose what to do, because this is distinctly not the case with echolocation or birdsong.  
However, if we are biologically evolved, along with everything else, then the claim that 
we have an ontologically different level of choice from everything else is a suspect claim. 
I maintain that we think we have the level of choice that would allow us to call ourselves 
‘moral agents’ because we have inherited an unreflective narrative about our own 
superiority. If we are just the same kind of thing as everything else that has evolved, and 
if we are as enmeshed as everything else, then it is very unlikely that we have evolved a 
capacity that gives us a wholly different kind of relationship to the decisions we make 
from other organisms. In other words, when we think we are responding voluntarily, 
much more often than not, we are actually reacting. This is a very complex process, and 
is often portrayed as being mechanistic, which it is not. It is not linear, either, or 
particularly predictable. However, it is as subject to probabilistic laws as everything else 
in the universe.  
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Therefore I think we can dispense with the idea of thinking of ourselves as ‘moral agents’ 
in the sense of freely deliberating beings who are either strong or weak-willed. Instead, I 
suggest that our uniqueness (and we are, certainly, unique in some respects) lies our 
cognitive capacity to self-reflect, to be self-aware, to be able to see ourselves in action 
(even if there is less we can do about it than we might previously have thought).  
I agree that understanding our condition elicits a response. I also agree with Taylor that 
‘respect’, as an attitude, is an appropriate response, and that it is elicited, in reasonable 
people, by an understanding of their evolutionary and current context. However, I do not 
agree with Taylor that the response is, or need be, a moral one. I do not think that we 
always choose how to respond: if there are other over-riding conditions, like torture, or 
even hunger and thirst, then we are very unlikely to respond with respect (although, as I 
will argue, the practice of realising our agency gives us a slightly better chance). Respect 
only arises if the conditions are right and we cannot say that those who develop a sense of 
respect are moral, while those who do not, are not. Morality does not come into it, if our 
enmeshment is as complete as a full reading of evolutionary biology must imply. There is 
something missing from this account, however. I alluded to self-reflection and self-
awareness. These are crucially important and unique phenomena and if this account is 
accurate, they, and not things like mental determination, or other supposedly ‘moral’ 
phenomena, are the source of our uniquely human agency.  
Plants do not sway in the breeze because they have decided to do so. By the same token, 
human activity is hugely directed by environmental conditions (temperature, access to 
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shelter and food, security and so forth).197 If plants sway, so, in some important senses, 
do humans. Plants, microbes, and other living systems maintain and regenerate an 
integrated organisation, responding in evolutionarily appropriate ways to the forces, 
breezes, and other conditions that make up their context. In this sense, plants, microbes 
and any other living system, exhibit agency - responding, repairing, regenerating as 
organisational structures – just as humans do.  
Redrawing human agency as a cognitive capacity; acknowledging 
interdependence 
If we transpose Taylor's original idea that 'the good of an individual non human organism 
[consists] in the full development of its biological powers', then we can see how 
teleological or goal-centred activity is a characteristic not only of human systems but of 
all living systems.198 This is the transposition of the Aristotelean sense of teleology as the 
actualisation of potentiality.199 In this account, all organisms have a potential (to grow, 
flourish, reproduce, protect and maintain themselves) towards which they aim 
(teleologically). From a systems-based perspective, this potential can be much more 
broadly interpreted as the inherent tendency of systems to dissipate energy. This happens 
in a particular, and well organised, way, however. Just as growth, reproduction, and so 
on, are organising processes, so the systematic distribution of energy is an organising, 
patterned process that graduates, rather than randomly increasing or decreasing, the flow 
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of energy towards entropy. The difference between human and other systems does not lie 
in their capacity to exercise this potential, but in their capacity to realise that they are 
exercising it.  
Daniel Fouke, in discussing microbial life, remarks that the soil itself can be validly 
viewed as a 'self-organising system which can be disrupted by changes to soil structure as 
well as soil biota'.200 This directional organisation is motivated by energetic forces:  
Soil fertility, pest and disease control, and other important ecological functions of soil 
systems originate from a flow of energy produced by photosynthesis in plants that 
converges with energy produced by decomposers of dead organic matter at higher 
trophic levels. The two energy pathways are also linked by the nutrient cycling of 
mycorrhizal fungi and nitrogen-fixing bacteria in symbiotic relations with the roots of 
plants.201 
 
Human encultured systems include extremely complex energy flows, including linguistic 
capacities that can be passed through time (like books) or through space (like satellite 
TV), and the communications, manufacturing, distribution and power processes that 
create and maintain them. We, as dynamic self-organising systems, characteristically 
exhibit self-awareness, both through the use of these artefacts, and through the exchanges 
of information that we broadcast and receive via their use. Yet, in considering ourselves 
as systems, we need to accept that our responsiveness, even at the cognitive level, takes 
place in the context of dynamic, interacting responses at the microscopic and at the 
macroscopic levels over which, in terms of agency, we have no control. 
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Soil underlies the boundary between organic and inorganic processes and understanding 
this brings to light the problem with perceiving systems as mechanisms. Such an 
approach fails to acknowledge this continuum between living and non-living systems. It 
does not allow for recognition of the complexity, sensitivity and reactivity of evolved 
systems. Systems are processes, full of uncertainties and probabilities that are not at all 
linear or mechanical in character. Human conscious responsiveness gives all the 
appearance of self-aware reaction to biophysical events but unless we deliberately draw 
our attention to the extent of our enmeshment, our agency is equivalent to a root's 
avoidance of nutrient-poor soil.  
The metaphor of a systems-based approach allows us to view ourselves as occupying the 
same conceptual space as the context within which we are enmeshed. More complex 
systems have exponentially more potential outcomes, but all evolved systems are 
inherently probabilistic, and therefore flexible. In revising the idea of what is exclusive 
about human agency, we can see that from the point of view of a highly complex system 
of interactions and responses that nevertheless still obey probabilistic natural laws, it is 
consistent with all other kinds of agency exhibited across biophysical systems.202 Human 
agency is both the highly complex, but nevertheless consistent, response system to events 
and conditions within larger dynamic and complex systems. However, there is another 
aspect to human agency. It is also the cognitive capacity that comes about, sometimes by 
chance, sometimes through the use of techniques like meditation, that is able to perceive 
at least some of these processes of response and reaction, as though from a perspective 
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beyond them, and so to see them in action, doing and seeing.203 Because this capacity 
takes place within the same biophysical arena, it is interactive: exercising this capacity 
alters the processes of other systems. This alteration is usually quite subtle but it is 
nevertheless highly significant, since it interacts throughout the system. This is significant 
because it is such a unique and profound effect. 
Human systems are driven, as all evolved systems are, to maintain themselves in the 
temporary vortices that give them what we see as their identity. As with all biophysical 
systems, it is their complexity that makes them effective systems of energy dissipation.204 
In revising the view of agency, I suggest we reverse the traditional teleological metaphor 
that Taylor uses, that describes human and non-human organisms as actualising their 
potentiality in Aristotelean terms. Taylor's use of the Aristotelean idea suggests that 'the 
good' of the organism is a future state towards which it is mysteriously pulled. This does 
not fit well with the evolutionary thesis. Instead of the image of systems being driven (or 
pulled) towards an end, or goal, we can see that systems are pushed by myriad minute 
processes, all of which are flexible reactions of activity dissipating and redistributing 
energy flows. The distinction is important because it accords better with a picture we 
have of energy dissipation from a narrow base at a higher concentration to a less 
concentrated, much broader set of potential outcomes. The criticism that human agency is 
'determined', from this perspective, is shown to be false, since the unique aspect of human 
agency is the capacity to reflect, or realise. In the context of the narratives we tell 
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ourselves, our capacity for realisation is also our capacity to alter the narratives and this, 
in turn, shifts how we relate. This allows us to see human agency, in the sense of 
realisation, as a meta-system, driven by the same conditions that drive all systems - 
energy dissipation - yet able to reflect and so (to a degree) alter them.  
In this revised sense, human agency is the capacity to self-reflect, to become aware of 
context and interrelationships, to explore and question metaphors, and so to shift 
relationships. Human cultural systems depend utterly on the fact that agency in the more 
general sense of response-reaction exists at every level, from the ability of plants to 
photosynthesize, to the capacity of some systems to live 10,000 years, to the ability of 
some species to produce 20 million offspring, or regenerate after being put in a blender. 
In this understanding, we are response processes because we are like, and even because 
we are reliant upon, other systems, not because we are the species, Homo sapiens. 
The difference between response processes across most other systems, and response 
processes in human systems is that the latter have the unusual additional capacity to 
reflect on the processes themselves. From a systems-based perspective, the human, 
encultured ability to avoid threats is general agency, not agency as realisation. However, 
the capacity for human systems to perceive themselves is agency as realisation, and this 
capacity gives us the (limited) potential to choose how to respond which sets it apart from 
other kinds of agency.  
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(iii) Revising Taylor’s aspirational harmonious relationship: responding with 
ethical neutrality; revising ‘the good’ of systems 
Responding with ethical neutrality 
In Christian and other faith narratives, if we fail to respond to the demands of the practice 
of the faith, we call ourselves sinners. There is an acknowledged gap between principle 
and practice, between what we aim for, and what we do. By the same token, in Taylor's 
development of the idea that an ethical response is necessary, a gap develops between the 
elicited response and the duty that it imposes.205 This gap poses difficulties even in its 
own terms since it means we can never achieve the ideal status of complete compliance: 
we are bound to fail to fulfill the code of ethics because it is too stringent to adhere to. 
Therefore, ethical codes create the conditions for hypocrisy: even the most ardent 
practitioner is going to falter, and this means that there will be some who justify their 
actions on the basis that they could not succeed. We have seen many examples of this, 
from recent scandals in Catholic institutions, to forced ‘marriages’ of young girls to 
Sunni soldiers on the battlefield.  
However, in the terms I am proposing, those of an evolved enmeshment, our responses 
emerge from the context of our conditions, and not as a result of our degree of 
compliance to ethical codes. We can reflect on this response, and this can alter it. The 
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narratives that we absorb also shape how we view our relationship with other organisms 
and planetary systems, and this, too, shapes and alters how we respond. However, this is 
not an ethical response.  
As an aside, but in further support of this approach, imposing an environmental ethic on a 
cohort of discussants who hold different sets of ideological beliefs, whose narratives 
about the human-nature relationship vary and conflict, causes divergence. The narrative it 
implies is a direct challenge to existing narratives, and this causes further entrenchment in 
viewpoints, and obstructs opportunities for discussion and negotiation that could lead to 
the possibility of a convergent response. Therefore I suggest that we explore the 
possibilities for putting aside ethical demands in considering how to respond to the 
ecological emergency and instead, that we examine further the response I have suggested 
we do have the capacity to exercise: the response of becoming more aware of, or 
realising, our condition.206 
Taylor’s reasoning, from the point of view of seeing the human condition in the context 
of evolutionary biology, is an effective starting point, as is his general idea that humans 
are not alone in responding to conditions that benefit or harm them. However, to then 
demand that we act with respect for nature as an ethical demand creates an 
insurmountable – and unnecessary – gap between theory and practice.  
The problem with an ethical approach multiplies, though, because it contains within it the 
potential not for a universally applicable set of guidelines, but for conflict. This is 
                                                           
206
 See Hans-Georg Moeller, The Moral Fool, (Columbia University Press, 2009): '...foundational ethical 
statements are not factual but, so to speak, ideal.’: 3. 
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
133 
 
because ethical guidelines, as opposed, say, to agreed rules in sport, or even to laws, are 
dependent on underlying ideological commitments that are carried, usually with deep 
emotional commitment, as a matter of personal identity rather than simply as a matter of 
fact.207 Basing a response to the ecological emergency on an ethical demand to respect 
nature is like adding another layer of potentially contentious conditions to an already 
over-burdened framework. This is not unique to Taylor's ethic but is true of any ethical 
response to the ecological emergency, since an ethical response is based on a defined set 
of values and beliefs. An ethically neutral response may face other problems, because it 
requires that people reflect upon existing values and beliefs. However, by avoiding the 
divisiveness of direct confrontation between opposing sets of beliefs and values, it offers 
more potential for a convergent response to emerge.  
There is another, equally important, argument for not responding to the ecological crisis 
with an ethical demand, and that relates to the systems-based approach I alluded to 
earlier. As I show when I revise Taylor’s idea of atomistic organisms, the divisions he 
attempts to uphold have all disintegrated around us. Human and Nature, like organisms 
and systems, are not two separate realms and neither are humans unnatural. What human 
systems lack in failing to respond effectively to the ecological emergency is not 
authenticity but awareness, reflectiveness or, to put it more precisely still, realisation. 
Realisation, the idea of both coming to an awareness of a state of affairs and creating or 
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'making real' some additional state, is quite different from moral agency: it is a non-
ethical quality.  
Realisation, rather than aspiration, in relationship 
If we allow ourselves to view uniquely human agency in the way I have just described, 
we begin to notice how our activity responds and is responded to in its enmeshment. Not 
only do we become more sensitive to the feedback processes we are inevitably involved 
in, but the very process of noticing shifts how we relate, both physiologically, and in the 
kind of attitude we have to our interrelationships. The systems respond to each other and 
we can see that, while it would be ambitious to believe this system of reflectiveness could 
disentangle itself from the system entirely (to exist, a reflection, after all, must be a 
reflection of something), the reflection itself is not passive. It offers the possibility of 
actively engaging with other systems, shifting the relationships between them and 
becoming a force, in itself, for altering the trajectory. It also generates a shift in the 
framework so the narrative that we use to describe our relationship to the context we are 
in shifts and this alters our attitude and responses to the relationship.  
One example of this is in how we talk about our relationship with other biophysical 
systems. From viruses to tsunamis, we talk as though the universe was against us. Yet, on 
reflection, what our language reveals is how keenly we still hanker for a directional 
agency 'out there', even a malignant one, rather than accepting the much more probable 
scenario that these forces are entirely indifferent to human systems. Within a revised 
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narrative, therefore, there are neither forces that are ‘for’ us, or ‘against’ us.208 However, 
there are forces that allow energy to dissipate and matter to cycle, and there are also 
conditions that create interference, or resistance to these energy flows and matter cycles. 
So, in a sense, there are still conditions that are good for, and conditions that are less 
beneficial, or even harmful to, the flow of energy. We might easily find ourselves calling 
those conditions 'good for' or 'bad for', if, in the context of the system, they benefit or 
impede processes of energetic flow.  
As soon as we realise the kind of agency we have, we exercise it and it becomes an active 
process. Because it is a biophysical system itself, it interacts with all the biophysical 
relationships we are involved in and each is shifted on its trajectory, minutely or 
profoundly. Each realisation is an opportunity for more possibilities for beneficial 
exchanges to arise although there are degrees of attention and full realisation requires 
tremendous effort. This is not the effort of willpower, but the effort of keeping attention 
on all the interactions one is involved in which requires that trauma, thirst, hunger and 
other conditions are incorporated and acknowledged but do not overcome this state of 
watchfulness. Such an effort requires practice, though from the first realisation, the 
interactions within the system alter and there are more options for new interactions to 
take place. 
The impact of this (as far as we know) uniquely human capacity is potentially as 
profound as the capacity to synthesise matter into arrangements that can no longer 
interchange information or energy. Different traditions view this capacity in different 
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ways. The Daoists considered that the ability to self-reflect leads to all kinds of problems. 
Knowledge of this capacity, combined with failure to exercise it, is irresponsible, yet it is 
hard work to keep attention on what is going on. Exercising this capacity without  
humility, or compassion, is also, potentially problematic and may simply create scorn or 
indifference. I will explain below how an attitude of compassion and humility is elicited 
by this process. However, the fuller one’s awareness of one’s condition is, the easier it is 
to see that one is neither as worthy of reward (hence humility) nor as culpable (hence 
compassion) as one is led to believe by the narratives of independence and superiority.  
We are far more subject to the circumstances we find ourselves in than traditional agency 
allows, and compassion arises when we realise that all systems respond interdependently, 
including others that, like us, can suffer. While humans are interdependent with 
everything else, they are also peripheral. Other, older systems like bacteria and microbes 
have been maintaining the dissipation of solar energy and cycling matter for long 
millennia before the creatures that would become human evolved lungs. When we 
understand and appreciate this, we see that other systems do not rely on us nearly as 
much as we rely on them. A reasonable response to this realisation is a sense of humility, 
and empathetic resonance (perhaps as gratitude, or at least appreciation) for older, wider 
ecosystems, which create the foundations of what allows our existence.  
This may make us less inclined to let our attention be as easily distracted by that other 
uniquely human capacity, the artificial synthesis of material that rigidly fixes energy into 
conditions that cannot easily interchange information or participate in regulated 
dissipation. In stepping back from our enmeshment within artificial systems, our 
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awareness extends beyond them, back to the deeper interrelationship with the systems 
that steward our existence. 
This position could be criticised as anthropocentrism by the back door: after all, a good 
reason to pay attention to how we behave within systems that steward us is so that our 
responses allow the latter to keep maintaining us.209 But there are other reasons why this 
approach is worth taking that do not benefit the human species at all. Central to this 
approach is the recognition that the human species will not exist indefinitely. Even taking 
into account the possibility that we are potentially threatening our own existence now, 
there is a longer view. Taking this approach is a response that allows us, where possible, 
to mitigate some of the more destructive features introduced by anthropogenic impact, 
but that will long outlast our species.  
Revising ‘the good’ of systems 
Scott Sampson proposes that we imagine the flow of energy through time as a vast river, 
within which whirlpools are created, representing patterns of existence that maintain 
themselves for a particular length of time.210 These whirlpools are concentrations of 
energy that conform to a certain pattern and then dissipate back into the river of energy 
flowing all around them. Examples of these whirlpools include such vast and, from our 
perspective, long-lived systems as stars, galaxies or constellations, but they also include 
much smaller, more temporally minute systems, like living systems, or even molecules or 
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quarks. These concentrations of energy involve the exchange of information, in a 
Poincarean sense.211  
From the universe as a system, we can pan in to focus on the biophysical systems of the 
planet. Taylor's 'good' of planetary organisms was something he developed to show that 
more than humans have inherent worth. To have a 'good', an organism has to have 
conditions that can be to its benefit. In this sense, a wheelbarrow or a tractor cannot be 
benefited or harmed, only damaged.212 However, a close reading of Taylor suggests that 
his analysis of 'the good' of organisms is, in the end, instrumental.213 For instance, 'the 
good' of plants includes water, but water is, therefore, only instrumentally good for plants 
if the end of plants is to continue to survive and reproduce. Survival and reproduction is 
also only a 'good for' plants if they serve some other structurally related end.   
Taylor's conclusion is that since we would not ask what a human being is 'good for' and 
yet we would agree that humans actively pursue goals, we must accord the same level of 
worth to other organisms, since they act in parallel fashion. However, from a systems-
based perspective, it is perfectly legitimate to ask what humans are 'good for' since we are 
envisaging them as relational rather than as atomistic. If we are not entities in this way, 
then we are not 'ends', at least not individually. In a similar way, if we are not evolving 
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towards some 'higher' state, then there is no ideal towards which our lives are directed. So 
our sense of being moral agents acting to realise some ideal is no longer justified.  
Autopoeisis is a phenomenon exhibited by all systems that self-organise, and in 
particular, by living systems. In revising what we might understand by 'the good' of 
systems it is worth reviewing Peter Singer's idea that, in order to be valid contenders for 
moral consideration, organisms or systems must have 'intention': 
'Once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants are not conscious and cannot engage in 
any intentional 'behaviour', it is clear that all this language is metaphorical; one might 
just as well say that a river is pursuing its own good and striving to reach the sea, or 
that the 'good' of a guided missile is to blow itself up along with its target ... there is no 
good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical processes that govern 
the growth and decay of living things than we have for those that govern non-living 
things.’214 
 
Taylor maintains that the difference is between those things (organisms, or living 
systems) that actively pursue conditions that benefit them, and non-living systems (like 
rivers) that do not actively pursue those conditions.215 From a systems-based perspective, 
we can revise both differentiations. Processes that are pursued automatically and without 
awareness have no capacity to shift the system's trajectory whereas processes that can 
reflect upon the system do.   
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The relationship between this capacity for awareness, or realisation as agency, and the 
directional flow of the universe, is easier to establish now that we have left aside any 
attempt to locate moral value in the system. We can begin to consider what it might mean 
to say that some kinds of activity are 'good for' systems, and in what sense this could be 
true, without the distracting search for value. This, in turn, will give us an idea of how our 
understanding is itself a realisation, and therefore interacts with the information we 
manage to collect.  
Viewed from a physicalist perspective, our experiences are dynamic, relational 
information exchanges. We are able to perceive the experiences both as someone 
involved in them, and as an observer. We can see ourselves as relationships, therefore, 
but we can also see ourselves as interacting with those relationships through our 
attention. This idea is useful for visualising the directional flow we can facilitate or 
obstruct by drawing our attention to conditions, or withdrawing our attention from 
them.216 
As Sampson points out, the boundaries between the whirlpools and the river are highly 
permeable although, of course, we experience them as significant. Skin, for example, is a 
permeable membrane, constantly exchanging matter with the external environment and 
yet it marks the boundary between the systems that are concentrated around the genetic 
activity that maps and sustains each organic structure and the wider systems that feed into 
and dissipate energy from this patterned form. Particularly at microscopic scales, it is 
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difficult to determine with any precision where the organism ends and the external world 
begins. As Sampson puts it:  
Even apparently dense and unyielding things, like rocks, trees, bones and mountains, 
turn out to be fluid at atomic levels and/or on geologic timescales, their internal make-
up shifts like river currents.217 
 
Biodiverse systems are some of the richest, most complex examples of energy dissipation 
systems that we have yet come across. This implies that the energetic exchanges that 
occur in richly biodiverse systems increase the dissipation of energy more effectively 
than their poorer, simpler counterparts. This matters to human systems because such 
complex systems reduce the solar gradient by 'filtering' energy through the various 
systems, extracting as much energy as possible to dissipate, leading to a relatively 
graduated, and therefore relatively more stable, system of informational exchanges. This 
is the picture of the world, from an energetic point of view, that humans evolved in.  
Energy flows are directional, therefore anything that facilitates the tendency to dissipate 
energy through systems is 'good for' that flow in the instrumental sense that it maintains 
it, although ultimately entropy is not ‘good for’ anything. This does not imply that a 
simple arithmetic increase in entropy is ‘good for’ us, but since biodiverse systems 
maintain the graduated flow of energy, they are ‘good for’ human systems. So, if we have 
an interest in our own survival (and most of us do) we also have an interest in 
maintaining, restoring or mitigating the damage to biodiverse systems.  
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Biodiversity is a vanishingly rare occurrence, as far as we can discover so far, but the 
evolution of biodiverse systems has been a chance affair. It may be argued, therefore, that 
any system that graduates energetic flow will be good for us but the fact is that we 
evolved in the very specific context of the milieu of biodiversity that sustains us, and 
synthesising a system that imitates what we have evolved in, ‘faking’ evolution, cannot 
capture the complexity, sensitivity or sophistication of the interactions that evolved 
systems exhibit. Evolved systems are self-supporting, in the sense that all biodiverse 
systems benefit from the graduating presence of all other biodiverse systems. On a 
universal scale, this dissipation is neither beneficial nor harmful. But it is ‘good for’ us, in 
the sense that it forms the foundation for our survival as a culturally sophisticated species 
and that underpins any other ‘good’ we might decide to value.  
From the best descriptions we have of how the universe operates at the moment, the idea 
that energy is dissipated through systems is widely accepted. Biodiverse richness is 'good 
for' more than humans, therefore. It is good for energetic dissipation within the context of 
life on the planet, as a whole. This gives us grounds for considering not just what is ‘good 
for’ human flourishing. To hold energy in states that cannot participate in the flow of 
energetic dissipation is to hold them outside the exchange of information and flow of 
cycles of matter that allow graduated dissipation to proceed. All the systems within which 
we are enmeshed are actively dissipating energy ‘in order to’ return to the relative inertia 
of non-living existence.218 It is in this dissipation that we are maintained. 
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Humanly synthesised artifices cannot participate in energetic exchange of information 
because the molecular structures are locked in non-participative forms (like plastics, or 
synthesised radioactive isotopes). Likewise, our increasing inroads into habitats destroy 
evolved and richly biodiverse systems and replace them with systems that are much less 
diverse (monocultures) or that do not symbiote (cities, where individual trees are planted 
as decoration but fragmented from the ecosystem they would have evolved with).219 This 
creates gaps in the graduation of energetic flow and steepens dissipation, causing other 
knock-on effects, like systematic collapse. Simpler biophysical systems are much more 
vulnerable to sharp changes in conditions than richly complex, biodiverse ones, but even 
richly complex systems are unlikely to be able to sustain themselves if the gradient of 
energy dissipation becomes too steep. 
If we recognise that the systems within which we are enmeshed have conditions that are 
'good for' them, instrumentally, because they allow energetic dissipation, then we have 
the beginnings of a response-base from which to direct our agency as realisation. But we 
still need to establish whether or not agency as realisation can be directed. We may be 
able to become aware, to some extent, of the vast web of interconnections within which 
we are enmeshed. We may even be able to hold that awareness, and develop an attitude 
of compassion and humility in the face of the vast whirlpools of energy that create and 
sustain us. But we cannot be sure that any awareness we bring to the state we find 
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ourselves in will alter the trajectory of our existence to better either our own systems, and 
chances of survival, or the systems that maintain us, and theirs.  
Realisation as directional 
In revising Taylor's idea of agency, I have shown that it is possible to see agency as a 
process of realisation, as the exercise of a capacity for self-awareness, and to consider the 
possibilities that arise when this realisation, which is itself a system, feeds back through 
other systems. It seems clear from what I have shown so far that being able to exercise 
agency is still possible, and indeed desirable, as a system that interplays with and 
influences other systems.  
Human perceptions come to a perspective on existence as a result of myriad physical 
interactions and influences, but also through cultural narratives that are filtered by the 
particular, dynamic conditions of each person. Sometimes, identity can be tightly bound 
up with a particular cultural narrative (when, for instance, it is accepted without 
reflection, or when there are particularly strong motivations for the identification). When 
this is the case, any discussion about the narrative is also a discussion about an individual 
or group identity and this can be seen as threatening or undermining. This is the core 
problem of attitudinal divergence.  
If we can see ourselves as a part of biophysical and cultural systems, systems over which 
we have no control except through the process of realisation, we come to a somewhat 
different sense of identity. The idea we develop of ourselves is less tied to a particular 
commitment to a cultural narrative. We can also see that much of the sense of moral 
agency that we might have had, much of the sense of being responsible for a set of 
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actions, or of being a victim of another set of actions, no longer makes sense. Instead, we 
begin to recognise that we were responding within context, without having paid close 
attention, and therefore without meaningful responsibility. This is not to let us off the 
hook: we have the capacity to respond by paying close attention and seeing what 
opportunities emerge, and in order to mitigate anthropogenic impact, that has been 
massively destructive, we need to exercise this capacity. But blame or guilt are not 
appropriate or useful to motivate a response.  
In this picture, there is no ideal which will allow us to rest or stop having to make the 
effort to respond to the situation, to realise that our agency is this act of paying attention 
to see what options emerge. Each state we find ourselves in is dynamic, changing and in 
all senses impermanent, as the biophysical description I outlined earlier relates. To aim 
for a particular state is to imply that it is possible to hold one position indefinitely, and 
that contradicts a fundamental condition of this perspective. As I said earlier, it is better 
to picture ourselves as being pushed, as biophysical systems, to avoid the steep gradients 
of energetic flow that imply the collapse of systems, species, or individual death. We are 
not being pulled, teleologically, towards the top of an evolutionary ladder. However 
wonderful it would be to enter the perfect state, to aim to do so is to divide the frame of 
reference into this now and some other then. On the contrary, what we respond to, as 
human systems, realising as agents, is always an unfinished dynamic. 
Many cultural narratives, including the dualistic narrative that underpins much of 
globalising culture, reject the idea that this imperfect, dynamic state is all there is. Yet by 
adopting the approach to agency I have described, this is the most obvious conclusion: we 
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are in a dynamic state because biophysical systems are dynamic, transient, and 
impermanent.220 Taylor himself clearly rejected the idea that the natural world was a 
harmonious place, and that therefore humans could mimic nature in order to live in 
harmony with it. He stated that modern biology has shown that in evolved communities 
of living systems, no state of harmony exists, since all are always in a state of flux, or 
change.221 Taylor did, however, posit an ideal state towards which humans could strive, 
while recognising and acknowledging that this state was unrealisable. In revising 
Taylor’s thesis, I think we can respond to the ecological emergency much more 
effectively if we put aside these attempts to strive for an ideal state and focus, instead, on 
making the effort to realise what state we are in and how we can better allow the gradual 
flow through our relationships. 
In revising how we imagine ‘the good’ of systems, I am rejecting the idea that we need to 
locate value within any entity. I am suggesting that there is no ideal state towards which 
we can aim, and no atomistic entity to posit value, so we can only get guidance on how to 
respond by paying attention, and then discerning whether or not systems (including 
ourselves) obstruct or facilitate the graduated dissipation of energy, and what options are 
available to us to mitigate any obstruction.222 
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Comparisons with Asian traditions of thought 
 
This process parallels the work of many non-dualistic philosophies, in which we are able 
to see how the particular bias, attractions and aversions of our current perspective come 
about as a result of the conditions we find ourselves in and the conditions that have 
brought us to this point. The process of awareness is also the process of realising, a 
system that allows us to reflect, impartially, as it were, on all the engagements we are 
involved in.223 
There is a difficulty with language that arises in this attempt to describe a self becoming 
aware that it is not, after all, a self. The non-dualistic idea that we can 'forget the self' as a 
specific perceptual location is notoriously difficult to describe without using esoteric 
language or imagery.224 Yet agency as realisation is precisely this activity of stepping 
back from the relationships and interactions we are all involved in and being able to see 
them, and ourselves within them, as transitional and dynamic rather than as fixed 
identities.  
The more deeply this process is engaged in, the more a motivation develops to maintain, 
as far as possible and whenever possible, openness to the insight that this perspective 
gives. Attention to the autonomous processes, including those of the body, the breath and, 
of course, any sensations and experiences, including cognitive experience, creates an 
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understanding of the connections and interdependence, the 'sameness', of the internal and 
external, or the self and the other. This capacity for reflection is not cognitive, in the 
sense of intellectual, but is the raw experience of the network of enmeshment and it 
generates both beneficial and relaxing sensations, and so offers its own reward, but also 
empathy as a result of the revelation of interconnectedness. This empathetic sense is not 
limited to (but includes) the understanding and appreciation of the involvement of all 
other organisms, human and non-human, in this vast web.  
This is the motivation to pay close attention to systems of engagement that we have, 
through cultural narratives that obscure them, or through our own personal trajectories, 
ignored or denied. The broadest, most prevalent and urgent of these is the ecological 
emergency.  
Leah Kalmanson in 'The Messiah and the Boddhisattva' points out that Eihei Dōgen's 
Shōbōgenzō gives guidance on how this process can provide a motivation to respond to 
critical situations.225 Rather than simply making people feel good about themselves, the 
practice of meditative awareness has the feature of generating inspiration to pay more 
attention and so shift engagement within relationships that are not 'good for' systems. 
Realisation as agency gives us the capacity to shift our attention within, and thus how we 
engage with, systems and relationships themselves, so it offers, potentially, a profound 
and powerful way of responding. 
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This approach contrasts markedly with a call to moral action. The field of environmental 
ethics developed out of a narrative that proposed that a moral response was necessary to 
generate sufficient impetus in the face of the environmental crisis. Personal moral 
obligations, translated into ethical social codes for action in the tradition of Rawls, Kant, 
Bentham and others were seen as a counter to alternative, non-ethical approaches. The 
alternatives to ethics, from economics to aesthetics, were condemned for being likely to 
lead to fear, exclusion or violence in the short term, or to the longer term damage to 
society resulting from greed for profit, regardless of the human or environmental costs.226 
Taylor and others founded their ethics on narratives that suggested our capacity to 
respond depended on developing a strong moral will. I agree with Taylor that the 
response we need to generate requires tremendous effort. But this effort is not willpower 
but the effort of becoming completely aware of what is going on, in and around us.  
It is increasingly difficult to see how any ethical strategy has improved our response to 
the ecological crisis. Ethical approaches to contentious issues (ecological destruction, 
migration, land rights, and so on) have, time after time, created, instead of unity, 
increasing fragmentation, polarisation, acrimony and even conflict among the different 
groups involved.227 Even within groups that have similar concerns (religious 
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organisations, political communities, scientists) the ideological and ethical positions 
quickly create discord quite contrary to their avowed intentions.228 Basing the response to 
the ecological emergency on ideas of how things ought to be actually closes off the 
possibility of responding authentically to the situation as it is.229 
An ethically neutral approach to the emergency would generate a very different 
scenario.230  In asking participants to step back from, and fully realise their commitments 
to a particular set of values as the prime mover in debate and discussion, a deliberate 
attempt could be made to pay attention to an assessment of the impacts of various 
activities without recourse to justification or evaluation. Drawing attention to the 
historical, cultural and other local and distant factors that shape the commitments 
themselves would provide another useful way of stepping back and engaging with an 
observational process rather than a process that depends on where one is located in the 
mesh.  
Attention to the findings of empirically conducted research, like research into the history 
of evolution, will result in the attitudes of compassion and humility and these, in turn, 
will allow the relational flow of information to become more graduated, less abrupt. In 
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the context of how attitudes become entrenched, this kind of elicited response makes it 
easier to imagine engaging in discussions and negotiations, and searching for 
convergence in views. The problem remains, of course, that not all those who can, do 
make the effort to realise their enmeshment, which raises the question of what to do about 
those who are unprepared to step back in this way.  
One major difference between the two approaches is that, in Taylor's original approach, 
and in deontological approaches generally, being morally weak is deplorable, a position 
from which each individual must lift themselves or lose their status as moral agent. In the 
scenario of a systems-based approach, those who make no effort are unable to realise 
themselves: they remain blind to their condition. Those who do realise their agency also 
realise the relationships they have with these others, and this means that they extend their 
awareness to those relationships, doing what they can, through the process of paying 
attention, to graduate the flow of energy through these relationships. This might mean 
disentangling from the relationships (for instance, by divesting any holdings in 
companies that refuse to recognise or acknowledge how they contribute to anthropogenic 
destructive impact). Or it might mean drawing attention to obstructions to this graduated 
flow (through, for instance, paying close attention to the kind of language and 
mannerisms used in interactions, seeing how communication is facilitated by this close 
attention). However, it makes no sense to blame others for their lack of awareness or to 
resent them for their denial or refusal to pay attention: they are part of the system that is 
being realised and they are not separable, entirely, from whoever is doing the realising.  
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In realising that each individual perception of the situation comes about as a result of 
events that are almost entirely beyond the control of the individual, any judgment of 
another's perception is inappropriate. It may still be appropriate to defend oneself, or to 
evade any attack from a person or group that is unwilling or unable to realise their own 
agency, but engaging in reciprocal violence just generates more systems of engagement 
with violence. In this larger sense of 'self', it is violence against the self.  
Realisation as agency requires effort, because paying attention requires effort. 
Maintaining an attitude of compassion and humility is also effortful: it is remarkably easy 
to forget and to take credit for events that were due to activities over which we had no 
control whatsoever. Nevertheless, collecting data, undertaking research, gathering 
falsifiable information and other associated activities are all acts that require us to pay 
close attention, as are many artistic, literary, cultural and other more obvious activities 
like traditional meditation practices that engage full awareness. These activities do not 
involve coercion, proselytising or the use of force. They are ideologically and ethically 
neutral. And yet the way that they reflect on unfolding situations gives them importance 
in the ecological emergency since they create a way of engagement that is itself a system 
of realisation.  
(iv) Addressing criticisms 
In revising Taylor's ethic, I have already mentioned Richard Watson's argument that if 
humans are natural and there is nothing we can do that can be deemed unnatural, then 
there is no point in attempting to alter the trajectory of human evolution, even if this 
means our own destruction. This argument is widely cited in different forms in 
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discussions about the ecological emergency, and I have attempted to show how a 
systems-based account of agency as realisation counters this argument. Since the capacity 
to realise is itself a natural system, it feeds back into the processes and systems within 
which it is enmeshed. Our capacity to realise is an evolutionary fact. Our realisation (in 
the sense of understanding) that we have this capacity may be a matter of luck or 
chance.231 When the capacity is realised (in the sense of brought into being), it requires an 
effort to maintain awareness of the trajectory of our interactions, to look for emergent 
options to alter our engagement. 
The 'naturalism' argument is also sometimes used to promote the idea that humans should 
not change ecological systems (excluding, presumably, any 'natural' actions we might 
take). Yet this position falls in on itself when we acknowledge that the process we are 
involved in is akin to one of 'waking up' to where we are within the mesh of systems. We 
are not alien systems who must somehow minimise our interactions with other evolved 
systems. In this narrative, humans have evolved in the context of evolution of life on 
Earth. Watson accused Arne Naess of inconsistency in this context, since he argued that 
Naess implies natural states only occur when an ecosystem is left untouched by 
humans.232  I hope I have shown through pointing to Morton's work that this narrative 
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cannot be sustained in a system that recognises how intimately human systems have 
evolved within systems in general. 
Taylor uses the arguments from naturalism - that humans were an evolved species, for 
instance - to conclude that humans have moral duties towards (wild) nature. He concludes 
that it is a matter of 'supervenience' that we adopt an attitude of respect for nature on the 
basis of a rational understanding of 'the good' of organisms.233 In the revised approach I 
am arguing for, we need not depend upon our agency being moral in order to respond 
effectively to the emergency. However, in a sense, the scenario I have proposed is still 
vulnerable to the accusation that human subjects, even if we are systems, are still treated 
differently from other evolved systems. Realisation as agency can only come about in the 
context of systems that have evolved the capacity for self-reflection and these, as far as 
we know, are necessarily human. It is no coincidence, however, that they are the same 
systems that have created the artificial syntheses that caused the Anthropocene. We have 
the capacity to respond to the emergency, but we also had the cognitive and physiological 
capacity, including the capacity to frame our understanding of ourselves as superior and 
independent, that created the emergency in the first place.  
This position could be criticised as anthropocentric – we are still responding for our own 
benefit, and realisation as agency has additional benefits, including generating a sense of 
deep interconnectedness that is profoundly moving - yet I have attempted to show that the 
division between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches cannot apply in a 
systems-based narrative. The only sense in which humans are of a different order from 
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other systems is in the degree to which they have this capacity to pay more attention than 
they are currently paying to the impact of their actions. This difference does not give 
humans superior powers. It only means that we have the capacity, at least potentially, to 
mitigate anthropogenic impact. 
The idea that, as perceivers, we are moving and transitory brings me to the criticism 
raised by Roger King in his contribution to Light and Smith's Space, Place and 
Environmental Ethics.234  King says that biocentrism - and this extends to the 
allocentrism I have proposed here - has an 'epistemological' difficulty. He quotes Donna 
Haraway, who says that it is, 'a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere 
equally'.235 This implies that viewing the process objectively rests on a trick of relativity: 
how could a human, encultured perspective ever know what counts for anything but 
human encultured systems?: 
Relativists are in the paradoxical position of being able to value all normative 
positions equally only by erasing their own positions. Were the relativists to take their 
own moral or epistemological beliefs seriously, these beliefs would begin to structure 
their evaluations of competing beliefs and the relativist strategy would evaporate.236 
 
This criticism can be met by the contention that humans are perfectly capable, indeed, 
have evolved with the specific capacity, to 'step outside' the perspective of an organism 
boundaried by a skin and anticipate interactions and responses of organisms and systems 
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from different perspectives. Warwick Fox illustrates this capacity when he discusses 
'weak' versus 'strong' anthropocentrism.237 We cannot leave the context of being human, 
but this does not mean we cannot consider the systems from various perspectives of their 
enmeshment.238 Indeed, the evolutionary drive that allowed the development of 
imagination and curiosity is at the root of this capacity to explore the workings of systems 
quite outside our own immediate experience. 
A further difficulty pointed out by King is Taylor's division of the biosphere into three 
(moral) realms which, King maintains, creates an 'ethical gap between the domesticated 
and the wild landscape, the landscape altered by the human presence and the one left 
unmodified by human beings'.239 King is right: this kind of division is untenable if we 
imagine ourselves as human systems enmeshed within systems that impact upon one 
another intimately and inseparably. So is the third division that Taylor considers relevant, 
that between 'wild' nature and domesticated nature (what he calls, 'the bioculture'). Just 
because humans have had intense and relatively permanent impacts on systems that they 
have used to their gain, from golf courses to chimpanzees in laboratories, from farm 
animals to forestry plantations, dealing with these systems as though they were immune 
from consideration using the same idea of 'the good' of systems is unjustified. All the 
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systems we are enmeshed in feed back into one another and therefore there is no realm 
that we can consider entirely independently of any other. 
Ross Wolfe suggests that human cultural systems require that we bring the whole of 
nature within the realm of human culture.240 In a sense, the human project has necessarily 
carved out an energetic space to increase the flow of energy towards humans. Our 
narratives reinforce our justification for this process of enculturation and we are 
somewhat trapped by the cultural conditions in how we view this process. However, to 
suggest that the human project dominates and absorbs all other systems is to ignore our 
dependence upon those systems for our own survival. To seek to justify our absorption of 
all other evolutionary processes into our own is to create a kind of ideological facism, 
with all the instability that such a system implies. Instead, we need to broaden our 
understanding of our condition and that includes the realisation that what is good for us is 
what we normally consider the background, but that actually makes up, and contains what 
we are.  
We are in the Anthropocene, and it is inevitable that our species alters and adjusts the 
energetic flow, as all do. We are enmeshed within events and therefore perceptually 
transient. The systems that maintain us are more complex, more sophisticated, more 
unfathomable but also broader than Wolfe’s narrative implies. The Anthropocene, and 
indeed human perception, has and will shape the directional flow of events within these 
peripheral spheres we inhabit, but it requires an effort of focus to see and, in the narrow 
sense available, choose how we interact. Our only agency is in our capacity to realise, 
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and this has more to do with consciously stepping back to see ourselves as perceptual, 
active, enmeshed organisms, and eliciting an attitude of compassion and humility than 
with directing the show.  
When I talked about human systems and naturalism earlier, what I wanted to bring to 
light was the idea that human capacities for realisation are not exercised without effort. 
There are strong similarities between the effort required to pay attention to our 
enmeshment, and therefore to exercise agency as realisation, and Dōgen's call for 
effortful focus.  
Contemporary human artefacts have been synthesised within a narrative that paints 
agency as dualistic, a process that is imposed from some realm of 'mind' or 'will'. The 
idea of agency as realisation offers the potential for to reimagine synthesising artefacts 
that allow the graduation of energetic dissipation. By allowing cultural systems and 
artefacts to function as participants, and not as segregated items, we may be able to 
realise that the interactions can be as good for the systems that maintain us as they can be 
for us, as humans within the mesh. In Confucianism, the agent is also the observer and 
her actions are not at her own discretion. The idea of agency as realisation closely echoes 
this. Actions are called for by a realisation of the relationship between the perceiver and 
the situation. This involves paying close attention to what is going in order to see what 
options are available that we have, so far, not considered. 
James Lovelock has asserted, plausibly, that the human species has come to this 
particular (unsustainable) relationship with the ecosphere as a matter of blind course, not 
because we set out to create systems that would eventually damage our own 
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flourishing.241 If we make the effort to become aware of the situation of our enmeshment, 
then we also develop the capacity to exercise the system of realisation as agency, in 
particular in how we relate to the ecological emergency.  
The practice of this kind of agency is the subject of the next chapter. Morton's suggestion 
that we see our situation as ironic is useful since it highlights our ability to detach 
ourselves from the perspective from which, perforce, we view the situation.242 The danger 
of irony is that it can become cynical and limiting unless it is tempered by compassion. 
The metaphorical idea of a flow of energy in dissipative whirlpools fits with the idea of 
attitudes that facilitate this flow, so compassion as a facilitator for enlarging our sphere of 
consideration, rather than fear, anger, hatred or cynicism, all of which tend to cause the 
limits of consideration to shrink, is a better attitude for facilitation of this flow.  
Likewise, in this metaphorical sense, patterns of judgment and resentment are as non-
participatory as patterns of molecular synthesis that do not allow for information 
exchange. Since this is metaphorical language in any case, it is easy to see how one might 
talk of states that do not allow participation or dialogue to be energetic 'traps', while states 
that allow for transience and dynamism to flow can be seen as allowing more energetic 
dissipation to take place. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that this imaginary extends 
the metaphorical implications of energetic flow, since realisation as agency works like 
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any other structurally real system, creating possibilities for information exchange and, 
teleologically, seeking its own state of entropy. 
In this chapter, I have sought to revise Taylor's idea of moral agency in the context of a 
systems-based, physicalist understanding of how humans fit. In the next chapter, I want 
to explore the practical implications of this revised theory: how could it reform our 
approach to the ecological emergency? What might we be able to do differently, if we 
take this approach, and how realistic is it to advocate such a radical shift in perspective in 
an area that is dominated by, alternatively, pragmatic and ideologically-driven 
considerations? 
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Chapter Four: The practical implications of responding to the ecological emergency 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the practical implications of realisation as agency, and realising 'the 
good' of systems, in the context of the ecological emergency. To make it easier to 
understand how this revised idea of human responsibility, and ‘the good’ of systems, 
might be translated into practice, I have divided the practical implications into three 
areas.  
There is the practice of clarifying what the ecological emergency consists in, and, since 
this is primarily what we withdraw our attention from, the process of exposing or 
uncovering those relationships that exacerbate the emergency. This involves both a 
review and revision of our use of language and metaphor, as well as making the effort to 
explore our relationships to the biophysical and human processes that sustain us. This 
shifts how we relate to the context and may allow us to explore different options in 
response to what we have become aware of.243  
The second area is how we practice. The idea of being able to see ourselves in context 
does not liberate us from context, but it opens up an array of possibilities for how we 
respond. Primarily, this means that we have opportunities to choose, in an ethically 
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neutral way (for the reasons I have already described) what response mitigates suffering 
(or, to put it another way, facilitates the flow). I will use examples to show how this 
relates to the idea of a graduated ‘flow’ of energy that I discussed in the last chapter, and 
to ‘the good’ of systems. Secondarily, and more tentatively, it may mean we have 
opportunities to address attitudinal divergence and entrenchment.  
If some of the opportunities that emerge from clarifying our relationship to the ecological 
emergency include opportunities to discuss this clarification with others, we may be able 
to explore the process of altering how they relate to their enmeshment. This could lead to 
being able to discuss relationships that others have withdrawn attention from, and so lead 
to a broader discussion of what possibilities and opportunities for altering these 
relationships are available. I say that this is a tentative possibility, because, as I said in the 
last chapter, many people identify with their beliefs and values, which contain the 
narratives they use to make sense of the world. It is hard to imagine that they could 
question what they rely on for a sense of identity without raising concerns that this will 
undermine their sense of themselves. Many organisations are heavily invested in these 
narratives and to disentangle from them raises fears of a threat to their very existence. To 
explore this, I will use two examples.  
Being able to experience our context as an explicit web of relationships gives us the 
opportunity to focus on the relationships, including how we practice (our manner, the 
language we use, and so on) rather than on outcome.244  Therefore, paradoxically, despite 
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the urgent need for a comprehensive and radical change in our response, I will argue that 
we face the challenge of focusing only on the way in which we respond – our manner, the 
words we use, our attitude – rather than on any goal or end.  
The third area relates to the second, and is central to how we practice. It is an exploration 
of what it means to exercise humility and compassion while we are realising our agency. I 
conclude that this practice contributes to mitigating the ecological emergency by helping 
us explore what we can do, if we are not independent and superior beings, within the 
much more limited scope of options available. This inevitably implies that I am 
pessimistic about our outlook. Humility is one way of expressing this pessimism: it is an 
accurate attitudinal response to our condition. However, compassion is also an accurate 
attitude to adopt and it gives us the motivation to engage in whatever mitigation is 
available to us. During the discussion of these areas of practice, I will explore and 
compare some ideas from the physicalist approach with those from the non-dualist 
traditions of Dōgen Zen and Daoism.  
 (i) Realisation as agency in clarifying the context 
  Personal practice 
The first area for practice is personal. It is through reflecting on our own context that we 
clarify what the ecological emergency consists of, in terms of the relationships we are 
involved in ourselves. However, since we are involved in relationships at so many levels, 
it might be useful to begin by considering how clarification could take place, using the 
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premise that we are biophysical systems. Therefore I will begin by exploring how we 
might clarify, to ourselves, the way that data and information on our biophysical status, 
and on the biological and physical status of the systems we are involved in, is interpreted 
at present. What can we do to reflect on this process, if we understand our agency to lie in 
our capacity to understand, to experience, and in doing so, to create additional options for 
response? I will then illustrate how personal practice might manifest itself in two example 
situations. 
A reiteration: the flow of energy and the ‘good’ of systems 
I want to reiterate, briefly, what I said in the last chapter, to clarify the relationship 
between natural laws as probabilities, the flow of energy, and ‘the good’ of systems. I 
take it that we can agree to accept basic physical laws as probabilistic descriptions of the 
activity in the universe, and among these is the second law of thermodynamics. 
Biophysical systems can be described according to these laws. They involve a structural 
relationship between the predominant form of energy for the planet (solar energy, 
although of course I recognise that there are subsidiary forms of energy available) and the 
capacity that biophysical systems have to dissipate that energy (maintaining and 
regenerating themselves in the process). Biophysical systems absorb and circulate 
(mainly) solar energy, and dissipate it as effectively as possible (thus obeying the second 
law). This process means that the solar flow of energy is graduated through the activity 
of biophysical processes. Another way of putting this might be to say that the sun’s 
energy is filtered through biophysical systems.  
The more complex the biophysical structural relationships are, qualitatively (in terms of 
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complex organisation in organisms and ecosystems) and quantitatively (in terms of 
numbers, including of micro-organisms), the more graduated the flow of energy can be. I 
do not agree with those theorists who say that biophysical systems are progressing 
towards complexity: this is, I think, one of the errors that has arisen as a result of our 
hierarchical thinking, and tendency to see humans, as complex organisms, at the top of 
the evolutionary pile. Instead, it is worth thinking of biodiversity as progressing through 
time (and thus the relationships between different organisms becoming more complex) 
but not necessarily leading to more complexity in individual organisms or species (or, if 
so, more in the sense that evolution branches out in different exploratory paths, than in 
the sense of progress as improvement).  
Processes that interfere with the graduated flow of energy are those that steepen the 
energetic gradient. If there is less biodiverse complexity, or vast destruction of 
ecosystems through agriculture, monocultures, mining, and so on, the gradient will be 
steepened, and the process of energy dissipation will become more unstable, less 
graduated. Alternatively, if there is obstruction to the process (through introducing 
synthesised artefacts (plastics), for instance, or through the production of radioactive 
isotopes that cannot break down or become part of the energetic cycle) then the 
informational energy (for instance, electron exchanges in molecules) that is locked into 
these artifices cannot participate in this graduated flow.  This steepening, or obstruction, 
of the graduated dissipation of energy is ‘bad for’ biophysical systems. The converse – 
the increase in biodiversity and complex interrelations between biodiverse systems – is 
‘good for’ these systems. If human agency as realisation can respond to this knowledge 
(and understanding this is a response) then we have a way of adjudicating what activity to 
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support, and what to disengage from, to the extent that disengagement is possible.  
What this means for personal practice: paying attention to metaphors 
The predominant authorities amassing data on the ecological emergency belong to the 
scientific community.245 Summaries of this data are interpreted through conceptual 
models, since conceptual models precede and shape scientific ones.246 Scientific language 
still regularly relies on mechanistic metaphors and a quantitative reductionism, and this 
indicates a dependency on conceptual frameworks that no longer reflect more accurate 
explanations of the conditions we find ourselves in.247 The claim that scientific data, and 
in particular, how that data is presented, is ideologically neutral, is false, then, unless we 
can also become aware of, and make explicit, the values and beliefs that underlie the 
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 The IPCC predominantly collects and assesses scientific papers summarising data on climate change, for 
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 This point is raised at various points in discussions on the Azimuth project blog, particularly more 
recently: http://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/what-does-the-new-ipcc-report-say-about-
climate-change-part-1/. 
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 See David Bolinsky talking about his creation of the film Visualizing the Wonder of a Living Cell 
<http://www.ted.com/talks/david_bolinsky_animates_a_cell.html> : 'these micromachines power how a 
cell moves.. they power our hearts, they power our minds…' [3.55m ff 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJyUtbn0O5Y&feature=youtube_gdata_player]. The idea that any 
position, even the most rigorously scientific, is shaped by a set of foundational beliefs that cannot be 
proved, is the basis of the important philosophical concept of scepticism. Karl Popper illustrated this when 
he pointed out that for a hypothesis to be considered, it needed to accord with observational evidence, be 
the simplest possible explanation, explain a wide range of phenomena, be predictive, and, most pertinently 
from the sceptic’s view, be falsifiable. Culminating in the radical scepticism of Descartes (1596-1650), the 
term ‘scepticism’ is used to justify much of the denialism of anthropogenic impact, particularly on climate.  
As Friedrich Nietzsche famously proclaimed, ‘… facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists 
of interpretations.’ Will to Power, 481 [(1906) trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Viking, 1967]. 
However, some interpretations resonate well with the feedback we get from the world, while others, like 
the interpretation that 2+2=6, do not. 
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various scientific interpretations of data.248 
Questioning, through language and metaphor, how we talk about our interrelationship 
within systems, deliberately choosing and creating language that allow us to envisage 
systems as organic, dynamic, and probabilistic rather than predictable, isolated and 
mechanistic, alters how we interact. We can do this through questioning terminology in 
discussion and debate, in both scientific and in political or even activist circles, where the 
search for an unimpeachable consensus has slowed the response to the impact our species 
is having. We can also do this through the use of artistic and literary responses, through 
education and the opening up of more channels of communication between humanities 
and the disciplines of mathematics, economics and the sciences.  
We can question some of the paradigms used in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, 
business and politics, opening the stage for a broader debate about the terminology used 
to conceptualise the relationships we have with the systems that sustain us, and the 
systems we create to exploit them. This is one way of paying attention to, and discovering 
other possible responses to, these relationships. Some human systems have drawn (and 
continue to draw) attention away from these interconnections that imply violence within 
systems.249 Therefore the act of bringing our attention back to the language we use to 
describe our interactions includes highlighting this avoidance, and developing ways of 
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describing our relationships in language that is consistent with a clearer appraisal of what 
is going on. An obvious example of this is the use, in the military world, of terminology 
like, ‘collateral damage’ to describe the extraneous, accidental or by-effect killing of non-
military people by bombs or gunfire. In industries where there is the opportunity to make 
enormous profits by exploiting natural resources, particularly in the petrochemical 
industry, drawing attention to the use of terminology that distracts from or disguises non-
compliance with corporate responsibility indices, for example, can open up the 
possibilities for articulating an insight into how these processes of avoidance allow 
violence to thrive.250  
Much work has already been done to reframe the ecological emergency as an issue that 
was caused by, but that now envelops, us. Morton's metaphorical descriptions are 
particularly creative in this respect, from the use of the idea of hyper-objects, to links he 
makes between consumerism and the nineteenth century notion of consumption (the 
disease, as well as the act of devouring).251 His work challenges us to reinvent how we 
think and speak about our relationships within the mesh, and this confirms that realisation 
arises as a meta-system we can elicit through juxtapositions that confront, rather than 
reassure, our existing belief systems. Developing a clear picture of how energy is 
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dissipated, and linking this with how living systems support and maintain themselves, is 
likely to enhance any efforts made from a philosophical perspective on legitimising a 
process of mitigation of the effects of the Anthropocene, both for ourselves and for the 
planetary systems in the future.252 
What this means for personal practice: paying attention to narratives 
Our ability to interpret data is further distorted by the tendency to conceptualise an ideal 
'other' state, a state of perfect relationship with the world. This creates a gap between the 
reality and the ideal. This kind of ethical dichotomy is, as I have attempted to illustrate 
already in the last chapter, problematic. It is implicitly impossible (or unverifiable) to 
achieve an ideal relationship, whether in the specific case of Taylor’s aspirational ideal 
for a harmonious relationship between humans and wild nature (that he recognised cannot 
be realised) or in the broader tendency of religious, political or social ideologies to aspire 
to a utopia, or an ideal, here, or in a future life.  
Almost anything can be justified in the name of a better future. Hitler justified the murder 
of millions on the basis that he was protecting the identity and values of a particular 
culture and people. The ideal future he foresaw had that at its core. Religious ideologues 
like Sunni fundamentalists or various homophobic interpreters of the Bible believe 
strongly that their actions, however brutal or violent, are ‘the will of God’, and will bring 
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about, here or in heaven, a brighter future (at least for other believers). These may be 
extreme examples (although, unfortunately, they are rather more prevalent than we might 
like to acknowledge) but more moderate versions of ideological narratives underpin much 
of the interpretative work on scientific data.  
Here, then, we have an opportunity to exercise our agency in the way that I described in 
the last chapter. This involves, first, seeing the context and conditions of our own 
interpretive frameworks. We can reflect that we are inseparable from, and yet that we can 
bring to conscious awareness, the conditions, and the context, that both frames and 
creates our awareness. This process deepens our understanding of our context but also 
creates the opportunity to consider how we are responding, and what alternative options 
(if any) might better allow energy to flow or matter to cycle through the context.  
This may sound paradoxical, since we are both within the context, and with the capacity 
to observe the context. In a trivial sense, we exercise this kind of capacity all the time, 
from moment we question the values and beliefs of those who have educated us in what 
to believe. Agency as realisation is a more comprehensive exercise of this capacity. Yet 
we are not so much questioning, as bringing to conscious awareness, the conceptual 
frameworks through which we are interpreting information. In a sense, this allows us to 
‘step back’ from the interpretations and see what has framed them (and, therefore, 
whether or not they are open to other kinds of interpretation).  
Data is bound to be interpreted one way or another. Facta are, by definition, ‘made’, or 
created through the frameworks of interpretation. However, some interpretive 
frameworks rely more heavily on ideological commitments than others do. Those that are 
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most consistent with the scientific method are likely to give more accurate interpretations 
than those that are interpreted to fit some other pre-existing ideological commitment.253 
We must also explicitly understand that every scientist, economist or politician brings 
their own conceptual framework to the interpretation of data, just as we do. This is the 
first step we can take: we can recognise our context, recognise how our own 
interpretations arise as a consequence of this context, find out, and take into account the 
interpretive framework used to read off the data, and then decide what the data means. An 
example or two might help.  
First, then, let us consider our interpretation of data relating to climate change. Much of 
the data is contradictory or confusing, yet the overwhelming consensus is that there is a 
serious impact, through military, agricultural, domestic and industrial emissions, on the 
global atmosphere, causing climatic changes. If our agency consists in our capacity to 
reflect on this (rather than in our capacity to make a mental determination, and translate 
that into physical action), then all we can do (although I hope to demonstrate that this is 
potentially a great deal) is consider our own framework, and the framework through 
which the data has been interpreted. Only then are we in a position to decide whether or 
not to accept the body of evidence. After this, we can see how incorporating this 
understanding shifts our own perceptual framework. We might become more aware of 
our personal activity, and of how this contributes to this global phenomenon. This might 
include bringing our attention to our work and lifestyle habits, to the interrelationships 
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that these depend on, to leisure, travel and even eating habits. We may well find that 
many of these are tightly bound up with our identity, in which case, we can begin to 
uncover some of the narratives that lie beneath our convictions that we must eat meat, or 
drink gin, fly to Malta, or work for Shell. This uncovering may allow us to question some 
of these convictions and become more aware of opportunities to shift our relationships.  
The process is hard work, in the sense that this level of reflection requires that we pay 
close attention to context, and to uncovering our tacit acceptance of relationships that, on 
reflection we can see are not ‘good’ for systems, and that is an effort. It seems grindingly 
slow as a response: unpicking our attachment to narratives that adhere us to particular 
habits, addictions, or ways of living. However, because we are acting within a system, the 
impact of even a moment’s reflection can be quite profound and far reaching. 
Our enmeshment is absolute: we are never outside the mesh. It is only through our 
capacity to realise that we have any agency. We cannot bring these alterations into being 
as a general principle, and nor should we feel that we have to. Our realisation includes 
recognising being interdependent with the system we arise within. This involves 
developing a habit of making case by case decisions, rather than applying any principle, 
based on an understanding that each set of conditions arises uniquely and we have the 
capacity to respond uniquely. In dealing with each condition in this way, we respond 
more sensitively to one another as relationships.254  
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Realisation and the ‘self’ 
One clear conceptual frame of reference is the idea we have of a separable 'self'. In 
shifting our frame of reference to the structural relationships of our enmeshment, we 
begin to see the identity that we normally consider 'the self' to be open to dissolution, a 
fluid experience within the context. When we are responding in the way I have just 
described (reflecting, for instance, on our historical and social context) we are identifying 
less with the reference points that create a particular view of our conditions, and more 
with the creativity and understanding that realisation brings.  
It is as though we are watching ourselves, and in doing so, another layer of possibilities 
emerges. An image that is widely used in other literatures is that of the mirror, but we are 
not passive in the face of a mirror: it allows us to see, and to alter, to some degree, what 
we see. Of course, what we alter is very limited, in this image, but if we consider the 
image more dynamically, as a reflection on our activity and not just of the surface of our 
skin, we can see that the potential for alteration is deeper.    
One thing that becomes clear in reflecting upon our experience in this way is that we tend 
to withdraw our attention from aspects of our experience, largely as a result of the 
historical and social context, and, as I have mentioned before, the narratives that underpin 
how we frame this context. Partly, perhaps, this withdrawal is an understandable reaction 
to the difficulty with facing our own imminent annihilation. The threat to identity is based 
on the narrative that identity is fixed, and this in turn creates desires and cravings to fill 
the space behind the boundary. The hunger for consumption further fuels and generates 
this illusion, and even the frames we use to describe the competitive drive are designed to 
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justify the process of sucking in as much energy as possible in order to strengthen one 
identity, at the cost of another. And yet this narrative, and the framework it filters 
interpretations through, is muddying. In practice, Graham Parkes says, 'it's possible to 
become aware of this distortion [created by our desires and cravings] and clarify our 
experience.'255 
Experiencing ourselves as fuelled by systems that create and sustain our identity, we can 
see that any urge to become more authentically ourselves by consuming more is going to 
reflect more on what is consumed than on the creation of a more authentic self.256 Our 
identity depends not on any inherent separable self but on the myriad combination of 
conditions that have gone into shaping our existence. Instead of being interested only in 
the protection of a single self, or even of our own community, or of our own species, we 
realise that we, like them, are the culmination of impermanent forces that develop and 
dissipate. We therefore become more inclined to show an interest in, and explore the 
possible options that arise from focusing on, those forces that create and sustain us, rather 
than being caught up in the illusion that stoking a fire secures it as a solid, individuated, 
identity.   
Cross cultural comparisons: Dōgen Zen 
In the Dōgen Zen tradition of thought, the practice of realisation is itself the embodiment 
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of 'buddha nature'.257  A moment of realisation brings into being the manifestation of the 
Buddha, of an awake and compassionate understanding of the interdependence of this 
awakening with all else, and of the capacity to release the bondage of suffering which is 
also the bondage of attachment, or conditioning.  
As I have said before, recognising systematic enmeshment at the cultural, biological and 
physical level elicits a sense of compassion and humility. However, compassion and 
humility are elicited only if we make an effort also to recognise that our awareness is an 
emergent capacity, arising from what we are enmeshed in, and never free of it.  
There are more differences between the physicalist and the Asian tradition approaches 
than there are parallels so it pays to tread carefully when attempting integration. Texts 
that describe the practices and experience of non-dualism from the point of view of the 
Dōgen Zen tradition developed out of a soteriological approach and there is, inevitably, a 
religious, mystical, and faith-based aspect to this that is absent from the secular, scientific 
approach. Yet, as I have just described, the physicalist approach elicits compassion as a 
response to the realisation of enmeshment, and it does so in a way that is remarkably 
consistent with the ideas and imagery of Dōgen. To focus in this way requires effort, but 
not effort of the mental, willed kind. Paying attention is not an attempt to direct the 
action, but to reflect on what the action is. This is expressed in Zen literature using the 
imagery of ‘pointing at the moon’, or to the illusions of relative movement between 
external objects and ourselves, when really movement is much more complex and 
dynamic and includes and involves our own changes in perception.  
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This relates to our view of the ecological emergency as a process of emergence that is not 
external to us, but includes and involves the illusion that we can direct and influence the 
world from without, without it fundamentally altering ourselves. It relates to the other 
illusions that the ecological emergency is nothing to do with us, or that it is everything to 
do with us but that there is nothing we can do about it. In exploring and understanding 
our deep involvement, both because we are intertwined, and because we have relied on 
narratives and imagery in which we are superior and independent, we can stop identifying 
with those narratives. This, too, strongly parallels the Zen process of disentangling from 
the idea we have of a separate ‘self’.258 
From the perspective of  Dōgen's Bendowa, the self as a perspective is examined in great 
detail.259 The view of Seneka, the traditional view that gave us the narrative of Atman, 
contrasts with the shifting, relational anatman or 'no self' of Dōgen. Dōgen's no self is 
never one thing, in one place.260 It has no atomistic identity whatsoever, but is, instead, 
entirely made up of the conditions that come into being. The human capacity for self-
reflection is one of these conditions but it, too, is temporarily bound, shifting and 
impermanent. This alternative view is described by Jason Wirth when talking of Dōgen: 
 The Buddha famously dismantles Sāti’s adherence to a fixed self by exposing all of 
the relations co-dependently working together that underlie the self. 
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Pratītyasamutpāda, dependent co-origination, demonstrates that the independent, free 
standing self is nothing but abstraction that if taken to heart causes turmoil. The self is 
dependent on its relations just as there is no absolute fire, but rather only fire that is 
dependent upon what it burns—“a fire that burns dependent on a log is reckoned as a 
‘log-fire’; a fire that burns dependent on kindling is reckoned as a ‘kindling-fire’.261 
 
We can see that the image points to the condition itself, a condition that depends entirely 
on the practical effort we make as individuals to maintain ourselves in a state of 
realisation of our context. Realising our context is a recognition that we are not separable 
from that context, but this realisation also allows us to acknowledge that there are 
conditions that remain ‘good for’ the biophysical systems from which we emerge, 
regardless of our particular situation.  
(ii) Realisation as agency beyond the self: how we practice 
This practice makes us less inclined to depend, for our identity, on a commitment to a 
particular set of ideological beliefs or values. We can extend what we identify with until 
there is no need hold on to anything that separates us from larger sets of 
interrelationships. The ‘perceptual envelope’, to paraphrase Aldous Huxley, into which 
we fit objects, our self, and others to give them coherence for our understanding and 
interactions, is real, but utterly dependent on context. Realising in this way is an 
experiment with shifting focus between the coherent state of individuals, groups, species 
or even systems, and what we think of as the ‘self’, until we become fully engaged in 
paying attention. This includes paying attention to how we ask questions, to what 
phraseology we use to speak to people, even to how we move and breathe. In the context 
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of the ecological emergency, another example might be useful here.  
In exercising our agency as realisation in this way, we can find that opportunities arise to 
consider the relationships we have (with work, food, energy, or even other people). Any 
consideration can only be effective if we have reflected carefully on our own relationship 
with what we eat, what our attitude is to travel, and so on. We rely on energy systems that 
destroy and exploit the irreplaceable systems on which we depend.262 Acknowledging this 
means acknowledging that we can turn our attention to exploring possibilities for 
developing energy and other systems that mitigate our impact, or allow us to restore 
damage or destruction. This does not avoid, but rather embraces the fact of our 
involvement and enmeshment but it alters the framework of our discussion. 
If we raise these issues without an awareness of our own involvement, we will find 
ourselves and our interlocutor locked into divergent positions. However, we can raise the 
issue as a relationship that we can pay attention to, rather than making pejorative 
statements. We can do by becoming aware of, and ‘stepping back’ from, any sense of 
criticism or judgement (admittedly, a ferociously difficult task, although practicing 
mindful engagement does make it easier). Finally, we can explore alternatives through 
exploring our relationship, and facilitating an exploration of the relationships that those 
we befriend are involved in.  
In a broader, less personal context, we may find paying close attention alters how we ask 
about, or point out, gaps in the focus of research, or in the underlying narratives that 
obstruct the possibilities for a research culture that explores what is ‘good for’ systems, 
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regardless of any obvious or immediate financial benefit. In this way, we can highlight 
the manner in which data is gathered (considering the impacts of dredging the ocean 
floor, rather than diving, to collect research material, for instance), or what models are 
used (considering the difference between data gathered from dead organisms, and that 
gathered from living organisms in habitats where they evolved). Yet this will only be 
effective if the manner of our approach becomes the focus, rather than any end or goal.  
In structural realist terms, this practice of realising as agency is fundamentally egalitarian: 
anyone can express this facility of paying attention, or realising, through their manner of 
commentary and observation. Adopting this manner is not exclusive to a few expert 
practitioners and it does not necessarily require special training (although the intellectual 
exegesis of this approach requires careful exposition that does need to be taught).  
Moeller suggests that in an ethically neutral system (like Daoism) it is sometimes 
inevitable, and unavoidable, that conflicts emerge, and even that these evolve into war. 
Daoism’s way is to meet such confrontational activity with defense and evasion. War is 
wasteful, and therefore to complete a conflict as swiftly as possible is also a Daoist 
principle. While we need to make every effort to avoid war and its ‘terrible waste of 
energies’, dealing with conflict as effectively as possible requires consideration: ‘A 
successful campaign would have the enemy overextend himself. With his energies 
exhausted, his armies would collapse.’263 
Again, it is important to recognise that this approach is morally neutral. There is, from an 
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impartial point of view, nothing ‘righteous’ about our anger: we just experience it that 
way. We are not on the side of right. We are not on any ‘side’ in recognising that our 
agency lies in our capacity to realise (understand and create a meta-system for eliciting 
alternative responses). We are just as much a part of the system as everyone and 
everything else, including those who are exploiting it for short-term gain. It may be 
difficult to accept that those relationships, too, are a part of the system we are involved in, 
and therefore, in a sense, make up ‘us’. However, in this broader understanding of 
identity, the conclusion is unavoidable. Acknowledging it engenders a more realistic 
sense of ourselves: we include even the relationships that create the ecological 
emergency. This acknowledgement elicits humility and avoids the stink of smug self-
satisfaction that can arise in those who consider themselves 'enlightened'.264   
How we practice in relation to realising what is 'good' for systems 
A physicalist approach allows us to acknowledge the directionality, and therefore the 
'good', of systems, and yet to distinguish this from any moral, or ethical, good. We can 
see that there is no claim to ethical superiority attached to the ability to distinguish 
between what is good for systems in this way, and what obstructs them or causes their 
collapse.265 
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One such set of systems that could be a focus of our practical response is the 
interrelationship between micro-organisms and macro-organisms. Our knowledge of this 
interrelationship is still in its infancy. Research into human systems is reasonably well 
established, but research into how micro-organisms relate to one another, and how these 
systems relate to macro-systems, is still a relatively new field within which new 
discoveries, including the discovery of new species, is still possible. Developing 
connections between this field of research and humanities-based studies of how human 
systems operate would benefit our understanding of enmeshment and allow a more open 
debate about what we need to do to realise more fully, in the active, creative sense, the 
relationships between us as macro-organisms and us as hosts or co-identities with these 
communities of micro-organisms. It is in changing the narrative that we open to the 
possibility of changing how we relate to these systems, to how we see ourselves, as 
systems, and to where we acknowledge, and exercise, our agency.  
 
Another, related, practice could involve the restoration and re-appreciation of systems 
that have been degraded, but that are still partially connected to their evolutionary history. 
We could invest less energy in exploitation of those areas of the planet that remain 
relatively pristine, and more in understanding, through research, the possibility of 
generating energy or products through emulating systems, through 'biomimicry', for 
instance, and through 'cradle to cradle' technologies.266 In drawing attention to these 
possibilities, we need to realise that our agency is this capacity to continuously reflect 
upon, and to be a reflection of, context and perspective, and therefore, that we are not 
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seeking to develop universalisable principles from these activities.267  
 
To summarise this section: being able to move beyond a conditioned sense of self 
requires an effort to focus much more on how we participate in all the biophysical 
relationships we are involved in. This gives a context to understanding and exploring how 
human systems might thrive within and in conjunction with these other systems. Just as 
important is the understanding that the context includes a time when the human species 
has ceased to flourish, and when the conditions under which we thrive no longer exist. 
Understanding the ‘good’ in this context means realising what we need to do to mitigate 
our impact, through creating less that is permanent and damaging to other systems, in 
direct contrast to the material consumerism we are currently enmeshed within.  
We can pay attention to whether or not we are prepared to make the effort to realise in 
this way, individually or as a species. We can ask ourselves whether or not we are 
prepared to educate ourselves to the extent that we question the prioritisation of current 
profitable enterprises (like extraction and burning of fossil fuels) over the thriving of 
multiple systems that will increase the probability of benefits for human and other 
systems now and in the future. This is paying attention to the ‘good’ of systems, to the 
narratives, analogies, metaphors and imagery used to defend the status quo, and where 
possible, to pointing out any tendency within these narratives to obfuscate, confuse or 
otherwise distract attention from features that obstruct the stochastic flow of energy 
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through systems. This ground for acting to facilitate ‘the good’ of systems is not based on 
self-realisation in the manner talked of by Naess, Fox or Leopold. The ‘Self Realisation!’ 
of Naess is of a transcendental self, a structure inherent in, but also hovering beyond, the 
physical universe. Realisation as agency is, by contrast, a biophysical system that is 
emergent, not transcendent, although it has the peculiar property of a metasystem in that 
it interacts back through its enmeshment. Because it is impermanent, dynamic and 
interactive, its importance lies in bringing systems in to focus, and that involves how we 
exercise this capacity for self-awareness. 
Cross cultural comparisons: Dōgen Zen 
In this sense, the physicalist approach is comparable with the approach described in the 
Dōgen Zen tradition of thought. Its descriptions of practice contain elements that parallel 
the physicalist approach. What we realise, while commenting on, or observing the areas 
we have withdrawn attention from, is both the actualisation of a system and the 
expression of a practice that is available to all:  
Although this inconceivable dharma is abundant in each person, it is not actualized 
without practice, and it is not experienced without realisation. When you realise it, it 
fills your hand - how could it be limited to one or many?268 
 
Dharma has many meanings, including both teaching, on the one hand, but also, on the 
other, practicing, or behaving, in accord with the way that the universe is already 
unfolding, interdependently. Observation and commentary are both ways of making 
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explicit this unfolding (including any notable obstructions or interferences) but they are 
also implicit examples of this unfolding and therefore they co-create whatever is 
emerging.  
The Dōgen Zen approach understands us to be the same context as all humans throughout 
the ages: the kinds of urgent problems and issues we face are entwined with our 
humanity. However, the ecological emergency has shifted the relationship between 
human systems and other evolved systems on the planet and so in a sense, the context is 
insisting on our attention in a completely different manner. If we can respond by 
questioning the systematic distraction of our attention, and begin to explore alternative 
means of production and consumption that involve less suffering, we are simply 
continuing to raise questions that have faced our species since it developed the capacity 
for self-reflection. The global scale of the impact of our avoidance of these issues is 
becoming apparent but our primary response remains the active attention we pay to how 
we respond.269 
Where there is clear evidence that some directional flows are more beneficial than others, 
we can draw attention to this. However, the work of realisation is not to concern itself 
with end, but to focus on the way in which we see and the way in which we respond, and 
therefore what matters much more than success or failure to achieve a final outcome is 
the process, or the way, of realisation, itself. Dōgen points up the relationship between 
how we understand, how we talk about, and how we respond to what creates our 
conditions: 
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If you doubt mountains' walking, you do not know your own talking; it is not that you 
do not walk, but that you do not know or understand your own walking. Green 
mountains are neither sentient nor insentient. You are neither sentient nor insentient.270 
 
Mountains are not apart from the systems, including the gaseous, climatic, weather 
systems, the solid soil-based, cellular, geological systems or the liquid, water, oil, and 
circulation systems that we inhabit and that sustain us. We are maintained by and 
contained in systems that are both much larger and much smaller than any idea of 
sentience could make sense of: to consider humans as exclusively sentient or other 
systems as exclusively insentient is inaccurate. Bringing more attention to the 
interconnected nature of human systems with systems upon which we rely, including 
undertaking and disseminating research into the relationships we have with macro-
systems (the atmosphere, the climate) and micro-systems (soil, microbes) is fundamental 
to understanding and responding to 'the good' of systems.   
Parkes refutes the idea that the impermanence of existence excuses us from contributing 
to its destruction.271 The opposite is true: recognising the impermanent, energy-
dissipating nature of our own existence and of the existence we are enmeshed in gives us 
an idea of how to assess what is 'good for' and what is 'bad for' the systems we are 
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enmeshed within. Creating more permanent structures is detrimental to impermanence.  
The vast majority of biodiverse systems have evolved independently of human cultural 
systems. Yet Morton's point about our being enmeshed extends to biodiversity, which is 
enculturated, in the sense that we perceive it, through human systems that encompass our 
entire understanding of the universe. It is also enculturated in the sense that the impacts 
we have had on systems that sustain us, and even on wider sets of systems, will long 
outlive us.  
However, our bio-physical enmeshment is also stranger, and in Morton’s sense, wilder 
and more alien, than we can imagine. It is encultured only at the level of language, and 
our language still needs to adapt to the sense in which we are within reactions, and wider 
forces, that are beyond our capacity for acculturation. Human systems are within bio-
physical systems, in the way a fish is within, and dependent upon, water. Dōgen's 
'Mountains and Waters as Sutra' (Sansuikyō) provides a good analogy for this process of 
'seeing' the medium we exist within.272 If we are to use our capacity as realising agents to 
any effect, then we must recognise, acknowledge, appreciate, and thus become motivated 
to realise this understanding, including practicing keeping focused on the urgency of our 
response:  
You should be resolved not to waste time and refrain from doing meaningless things. 
You should spend your time carrying out what is worth doing. Among the things you 
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should do, what is the most important?273 
 
'What is important' is what is 'good for' the systems we are enmeshed within, and 
resolving what to do involves being able to keep focused on how we are relating within 
those systems. By-products of consumerism parallel by-products of unrealised action: 
when we stop watching, we become involved in interactions that fuel the emergency.  
Responding to attitude divergence 
 
Michael Zimmerman points out that Continental philosophers in the phenomenological 
tradition developed their responses to the growing awareness of anthropogenic impact 
from quite different contexts to philosophers from the analytic tradition of Anglo-
American philosophy.274 The former were likely to experience ecosystems as, for 
instance, parklands, or even as well cropped trees in Parisian boulevards, while 
environmental ethicists raised in the pioneering traditions in Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States came up with a very different picture of how ecosystems and human 
systems interact. Carole Pateman in her work on 'The Settler Contract' makes it clear that 
intimacy with place among Aboriginal people in Australia was completely obscured and 
ignored by laws, including the notorious terra nullius ('empty land') laws that British 
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colonisers used to justify their ownership claims (and other acts of violence to the 
people).275 
This may appear to be an extreme example of not being able to see from another 
perspective, and yet in the context of debates on the ecological emergency (whether from 
the point of view of sceptics, or between different groups and individuals who consider 
that we are in some level of emergency) the adherence to a particular perspective is just 
as fierce. Just as Zimmerman points out that it was hard for the two groups he mentions 
even to understand one another, so we can extend this to the difficulties faced by those 
committed to different views on this debate.276 
The disparateness of views, the lack of understanding that exists in debates on the 
ecological emergency, tends to emerge from conflicts in the prioritisation of different sets 
of values. The continental philosophers tend (according to Zimmerman) to prioritise 
social over ecological interests, while the Anglo-American tradition tends to prioritise, or 
at least lend its focus to, the Wild, wilderness, or the Natural over the consideration of 
human interests.277  
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Realising our agency does not involve disentangling ourselves from context. It involves 
recognising that biophysical systems shift under the (biophysical) process of self-
observation, that how these shifts happen depends entirely on the manner of observation, 
including the attitude with which observation takes place. We can either realise, and thus 
potentially graduate, the dissipation of energy through systems, or our attention, or more 
likely our lack of it, can obstruct or increase it.  
Elucidating a process of graduated informational exchange implies paying attention so 
that, when the tendency for divergence increases, we can see how our own contribution 
exacerbates or mitigates the process. Watching how interactions fuel or block existing 
attachments reveals what interests are being maintained and what narratives are being 
reiterated. It becomes possible to pay attention to what is behind the narrative and, by 
drawing attention to this in the manner described above, to develop a neutral space 
through which our understanding can develop.  
We can see that even our own understanding wavers and is not consistently 
unconditioned. We cannot help our hypocrisy and therefore neither can others. Knowing 
what to do is no guarantee that we or they will make the requisite effort. Holding 
ourselves in a state of awareness is hard work. We are also variously enmeshed, 
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sometimes more tightly bound by conditions than at other times.278 Sometimes our only 
recourse is irony: we would like to act to realise 'the good' of systems, but our 
enmeshment is such that we cannot loosen the patterns of response. The realisation arises 
that it is the manner of our observation that creates any potential to loosen our 
engagement.  
  A local example 
The capacity to realise obviously does not give us instant, miraculous power to control 
attitudinal divergence. Yet, the act of focussing attention in the way I have suggested 
allows participants in any discussion to bring to consciousness their own commitments, to 
examine possibilities for reflection, particularly on what is tacitly accepted as part of their 
own ideological context. This parallels two very different, but importantly related, ideas: 
Warwick Fox's account of 'responsive cohesion' and Rawls's idea of 'reflective 
equilibrium'.279 Following Fox's ideas in their earlier (1990) conception, the idea of 
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agency as realisation is similar to 'an expression of the spontaneous unfolding 
(development, maturing) of the self', although this idea goes beyond Fox's, since 
realisation creates a system of interconnections that other systems then respond to.280 
Like Rawls' idea, the process of realisation reflects back on, and causes readjustments 
within, the belief systems (among other systems) that are reflected upon. However, unlike 
Rawlsian 'reflective equilibrium', there is no balance point to which to return, only a 
further unfolding of the system that emerges to reorientate the relationships, including 
divergent relationships within which it is enmeshed. Yet the same kind of effect takes 
place: by encompassing and adjusting to new informational exchanges, in each case, 
systems respond and a better 'flow' of information between systems is established. 
Reflecting on narratives that propose a strict boundary between ourselves and the context 
within which we are enmeshed, and observing that these do not cohere well with the best 
accounts we have of our enmeshment, is central to the foundation of our responses.281  
On practical terms we could imagine a scenario where those with strongly divergent 
views on a particular issue related to the ecological emergency, for instance, the Corrib 
gas controversy, were asked to come to a meeting to discuss the possibilities for 
convergence in their views.282 As with more relational issues, there would be particular 
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personal histories and experiences to form a backdrop to any individual’s attitude, 
including, perhaps, the experience of intimidation or empowerment, marginalisation or 
inclusion, financial advantage or disadvantage, and so on. From the point of view of 
agency as realisation, the process of discussion would need to begin with an 
acknowledgement of this, and with a broad contextualisation of the ideological 
commitments of the discussants.  
There could then be an illustration of the techniques of experiencing one’s enmeshment, 
and of realisation as agency as a way of participating in a more impartial context for 
viewing the attitudes. It would be in this context that one could introduce any further 
areas for consideration, including, perhaps, the ‘good’ of systems affected by the project 
itself. This discussion would then take place with the acknowledgement of existing 
commitments, but using techniques to allow the participants to recognise, acknowledge, 
and create an observational distance between those commitments and the current area of 
consideration.  
Rather than what is ‘good’ for systems simply replacing or over-riding existing 
commitments, this technique provides a way of making much clearer how convergence 
between existing commitments and the ‘good’ of systems can take place, even between 
those who are committed to opposing ideologies. This differs from many current political 
negotiating strategies that recommend a great deal of secrecy: this technique is an 
opportunity to be clear and open about one’s commitments and experience. It differs from 
ethical approaches since it has no aim or end in mind: it is an opportunity to practice how 
to engage in discussion, rather than a search for a solution. Considering the ‘good’ of 
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systems may imply a focus on an end to this process, but in recognising that systems 
themselves are dynamic, unpredictable and impermanent, there is far less focus on 
achieving a ‘harmonious’ outcome, and far more on exploring a better understanding of 
the systems involved. The ‘good’ of systems is also not separate from personal as well as 
inter-personal and other non-human activity, as the process shows. 
This process can jolt us out of an acceptance that others are responsible for negotiations 
and decision-making on our behalf. It could mean allowing policy- and strategy-makers 
to have less control over individual lives, since the facilitation of the kinds of discussion 
the above example represents need not take place in venues or under the sanction of any 
legitimising authorities. In a sense, therefore, the realisation of our agency is a radical, 
and gently anarchic, process. We come to understand the profundity of our own 
responsibility. Even a moment of realisation has resonant effects, and taking 
responsibility for where, and how, we direct attention, has cumulative effects.  
Changing our attitude towards our enmeshment includes shifting focus from 
‘overcoming’ or ‘balancing’ with nature, but also with one another, including with the 
authorities that make decisions in our names. It involves seeing human systems and 
individuals as being within these larger systems but also as being able to respond within 
them using this powerful technique.283 Paying attention in this way is an extension of the 
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Buddhist idea of 'waking up' to our experience, or of Lovelock's metaphor that we 
become aware of what we have done only by paying close attention to what we could 
have done differently, and so to what we could do differently now.284  
There is a marked contrast between this paying attention as a practice in response, and the 
justification for more robust activism that is advocated for by a cohort of ecophilosophers 
coming at the issue from a dualistic, 'them' versus 'us' perspective.285  The practice of 
paying attention is essential in combating this tendency to simply mirror the very attitude 
and conditions that have created the problems in the first place. Indulging in a power-
struggle of ideas only feeds into the very systems we have been attempting to ease 
ourselves out of.   
There are situations in which a consensus view develops as a result of independently and 
objectively assessed data collection. We can clearly see that accepting the validity of such 
a consensus is an appropriate response. However, even such recognition does not 
legitimise or justify confrontational activism or a sense of moral superiority at having 
‘got it right’.  
The imagery of a practice-based response to attitude divergence through paying attention 
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to the manner of our response has strong parallels among Asian traditions of thought. 
However, these ideas resist penetration by analytical approaches. If they are to offer an 
alternative to current habits of thought and guide us from the precipitous threat to the 
graduated flows we rely on, there needs to be extensive work on drawing out what a 
physicalist approach can learn from them.  
Where we can usefully engage with Asian traditions of thought is in looking at 
relationships from angles that are non-standard and that resist the 'domineering norm'.286 
Some of the non-standard perspectives presented by Dōgen give rise to a more profound 
consideration of relationships than the dominant conventions of the global North. 'Study 
not only that you become a mother when your child is born, but also that you become a 
child', Dōgen observes.287 The point of separation between mother and child is not clear 
but is better conceived of both as a continuum and as a relationship that creates its mirror 
image: 'At the moment of giving birth to a child, is the mother separate from the child?'288 
In the same vein, we are not entirely separable from the divergent, or opposing, view. Our 
resistance maintains it. It only dissolves when we manage to avoid responding in mirror 
fashion. 
Non-dualist Asian traditions of thought also recognise that a particular situation is neither 
right nor wrong. The standpoint of the observer, the particular conditions of their 
enmeshment, will dictate how they see the situation, but more than this, the capacity to 
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encompass observations in a broader awareness will release them from the obligations of 
responding with evaluative judgements. Moeller describes a passage from the Zhuangzi 
in which he illustrates this: 
...if assuming a standpoint from which it is right you see it as right, not one of the 
myriad things is not right; if assuming a standpoint from which it is wrong you see it 
as wrong, not one of the myriad things is not wrong.289 
 
From the Asian tradition of thought, it is not the individual 'I' but the situation that 'wakes 
up to' or 'realises' itself through our coming to observe it and this is central as a practice: 
When even for a moment you sit upright in samadhi expressing the buddha mudra in 
the three activities (body, speech and thought), the whole world of phenomena 
becomes the buddha mudra and the entire sky turns into enlightenment.290 
 
It is difficult to imagine awareness without a locus, yet being aware of one's involvement 
connects the physicalist's idea of enmeshment with the Zen idea of awareness that brings 
itself to light through an individual's efforts. This individual is able to see themselves and 
their awareness as having the same kind of impermanence as that implicit 
interconnectedness within which they are enmeshed. This is a further link between the 
physicalist approach and that of the Asian non-dualist tradition.  
Watching brings to light obstructions to the flow of impermanence.291 Among these 
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obstructions are rigid sets of dogma that are accepted unreflectively. Adopting a sceptic's 
questioning attitude to any ethical corpus allows us to disengage from blind acceptance, 
to be open to the possibility that the codes we inherit may require adaption or even 
dissolution in the face of the changing conditions that are emerging. Some Asian 
traditions of thought, particularly those of the Sōtō Zen school, and the Daoists, allow this 
to be the case. Dōgen’s approach, in particular, reminds us that, rather than being 
concerned with how our acts fit into an overarching set of principles, ‘our every action 
can be (is already) its own end.'292 Instead of the dualistic idea, represented in Christianity 
by the schism between Martha, the humble domestic practitioner, and Mary, the 
spiritually aware listener, Dōgen calls for a recognition that ‘preparing food, washing 
clothes, and so forth’ are not ‘mere chores, necessary evils to be tolerated or passed on to 
someone else’.293 Rather, they are ‘the supreme activities of the buddhas and 
patriarchs.’294 
Rather than this implying that we respect and practice the rites and traditions of non-
dualistic approaches, this is an opportunity to engage mindfully at every moment. Rites 
that formalise mindful awareness of practice reflect a respect for tradition, a linking back 
to lineages that are culturally and intellectually significant. However, the practice of 
realisation as agency is a way of stepping back, and observing that what is important in 
these rites and rituals is the development of awareness in all somatic engagement. 
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Just sitting 
 
Our focus must switch to the way in which we, as energetic dissipation systems, graduate 
the flow, rather than to any outcome or endpoint for the process.295 For a few, the idea of 
stepping back might suggest a retreat from the norms and conventions of mainstream 
society (through, for instance, a withdrawal to an abode in the mountains). Yet this 
privilege is not an option for most practitioners, and Dōgen is quite clear that, just as 
realisation is expressed in the practice of the everyday, so it is experienced in the 
relationships, intimate or reluctant, we are currently enmeshed in. The capacity to open to 
realisation has to take place in the context of cold calls, current family duties and 
demands, storm surges, and drought. Realisation as agency recognises that these systems, 
too, bind our perspective unless we make the effort to mentally step back and observe our 
engagement. Unexercised agency sharpens the gradient of dissipation.  
The practice of stepping back, particularly in the context of divergence in attitudes where 
it is most damaging, is very challenging. The practice, however, is straightforward. 
Taking a step back and seeing what realisation might mean in the relationship with the 
systems we are involved in includes maintaining detachment while bringing attention to, 
discussing, and negotiating all aspects of systems. This means a comprehensive 
appreciation, from the technological (the relationships between resource extraction, 
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labour, pollution, transport and energy use) to the biodiverse (land use, agricultural 
systems, food and consumer choices).  
Stepping back also means realising that mountains exist with integrity and rivers follow 
their courses, not randomly, but as an expression of myriad forces. We can learn much 
more by minimising unnecessary interference, and developing our capacity to observe, 
and learn, than we can by imposing mechanised solutions that purport to be 'good for' us, 
but usually only serve certain interests.296  
To address attitude divergence, it is necessary to agree to a set of rules of engagement that 
need not be ethical, but will include a strong incentive to comply. These could include 
some detail of the manner of engagement. The only sanction to constant breaking of the 
rules would be the withdrawal of engagement of those who were keeping the rules and 
the defence of any activity that had been agreed by those who kept the rules.297  
Any imposition, however benign, cannot allow informational exchanges that give space 
for eliciting a response. Therefore any rules would have to be agreed on through 
discussion and negotiation under agreed conditions and would include the idea that no 
ideological argument would count as a valid ground for persuasion. Only attention to 
scientific findings, to research into processes that are 'good for' systems, and to practices 
that allow a greater participation in the informational exchanges, or in the practice of 
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paying close attention, would do.  
This practice of setting aside is central to the practice of agency as realisation, just as it is 
central to Dōgen's practice of 'just sitting' or 'practice-realisation'. Dōgen uses the 
paradoxical idea that walking backward should not obstruct walking forward.298 This idea 
that we can step back from the situation as a practical response, and this will allow the 
situation to continue in its directional flow, is a clear illustration of how the possibility of 
reorientating the relationship both with one another, and with wider systems, arises. 
Instead of viewing the other as something involving an opposing view, we can begin to 
see how we create the relationships within which we are enmeshed. This opens us to 
choice, to the opportunity to commit ourselves, not to action, but to the practice of 
realisation.299 
Agency as realisation is precisely the practice of drawing attention to the hidden or 
obscured obstructions within systems, without creating more tension through the manner 
in which these observations are framed. We can engender discussion among political and 
business individuals to elicit a realisation in relation to their own attitudes and beliefs, 
and offer opportunities to them to practice realisation themselves in a broader context. We 
can be pessimistic about the prospects for a solution to the problems as an antidote to the 
blind optimism, wishful or even magical thinking and spin that are so prevalent in 
cultural narratives. We can challenge situations of radical ignorance, particularly among 
the most privileged citizens on the planet. Science deniers are part of this group but so are 
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so many who do nothing even though they accept the science. 
Reviewing ideas of graduated dissipation within human economic systems includes 
recognising the obstructions and vulnerability to collapse within (relatively) unfettered 
capitalist systems. The notion of constrained dissipation applies to this area too. Incomes 
or resource equivalence of $40,000 per annum per capita, for instance, could allow a 
comfortable income in all countries and reduce the insupportable impact of high earners 
on ecosystems.300 The problems with imposing limitations on income, or indeed on 
providing everyone with a basic income, are many and well discussed elsewhere, but they 
have some interesting implications that are relevant to, and connected with, the ideas of 
graduating the flow of energy through systems.301 
We can raise, and raise again, the problems with the massive subsidies for carbon-based 
fuels. We can point out that the relative cost of energy only favours carbon because of 
these massive subsidies. We can discuss the potential that shifting subsidies to new 
infrastructure would actually create jobs and profit. But we are likely to meet a brick wall 
if those we are talking with have vested interests in the status quo. Discussion, and 
continuing attempts to elicit an empirical response to the realisation that we really are in 
the midst of an ecological emergency, is the only slim hope we have for avoiding the 
steepening gradient.  
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It is difficult to imagine anyone wanting to swap their lifestyle voluntarily for one that 
puts them lower on the income scale than they are at the moment. This can be particularly 
true of people who have recently, within their own or their parents’ living memory, 
experienced ‘want’. Yet we are living within systems that have become more violent in 
response to our violence. This very much echoes the idea that ‘Green mountains are 
always walking, and Eastern mountains travel on waters’, that systems are always 
moving and will always more in relation to other systems, including the systems within 
which we are enmeshed, and the systems move more quickly now, by our not paying 
attention, or when we ignore our interdependence with them, than when we realise this.  
 (iii) Compassion and humility in response to attitude divergence 
 
Compassion, according to the OED, is 'the feeling or emotion, when a person is moved 
by the suffering or distress of another.' It is not pity, which is the recognition of another’s 
suffering without the complete empathetic appreciation that compassion implies. The 
compassion that develops as a result of being able to see the entanglement of systems, 
including ourselves, arises as much out of an intuitive sense of appreciation of our 
capacity to perceive, and experience that perception, as it does in empathetic response. 
Appreciation, of course, is neither negative nor positive, neither joyful nor sad: it is 
simply the deep awareness of a set of conditions, but that ought not be underestimated as 
an experience.  
The development in our cultural narrative of deliberate ignorance of our interdependence 
has meant we have voyaged blindly into the steepening gradients that now urgently 
demand our attention. If we can accept that there is no intentionality within the systems, 
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then we can accept that none of us either mean, nor do we not mean, to create this 
emergence. Agency as realisation contains the prospects for an attitude of compassion to 
develop out of this understanding of our enmeshment. The demands of this level of 
thinking are almost overwhelming and we must certainly realise that there is a tendency 
to withdraw from such a process simply because it threatens to absorb the entire capacity 
for thought and action.302 T. S. Eliot's famous line, 'humankind cannot bear very much 
reality' says much the same thing. Yet realisation as agency indicates that we have a basis 
for extending this compassion so that we can meet any tendency to be overcome by the 
flood of eloquence from one quarter, or stymied into paralysis by another.303 
Developing a narrative that acknowledges and appreciates the correlational impacts of 
our activities is vital, since we can ill afford to rest under the illusion that we will manage 
continuing anthropogenic impact using narratives of human superiority and 
independence, nor will the emergency spontaneously decrease or self-correct. Yet agency 
as realisation is a frail and fragile capacity, dependent on our ability to hold our attention 
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steadily at points we are uncomfortable with confronting, and it is necessarily always in 
process, never complete or perfected. Therefore the focus must be on the practice itself, 
personally and publicly, as both a particular way of doing, and continuous effort at 
developing skill.  
However, when we return to Dōgen and even to the Daoist texts, we can draw some 
comfort from their recognition that we are only ever in the process of realisation, never at 
a point of completion. Dōgen wrote most memorably about this when he wrote 
instructions for monks on the intimate activities of eating, cooking, brushing teeth or 
defecating.304 None of these activities go away. The realities of living and dying are the 
focus of attention, not some escape to a utopia where we are spiritually and physically 
purified. 
Our focus is on finding a place for each activity we are involved in and then settling it in 
its place so that it is neither dominant nor dormant, indulged nor ignored. This measured 
approach to action is a good analogy for the process of solar energy dissipation, during 
which the solar gradient is reduced through complex systems that neither trap nor block 
informational exchanges, nor send them spiralling into chaos.  
Many of the systems within which we are enmeshed are violent precisely because 
dominant narratives restrict what is included in compassionate consideration. Extending 
compassion towards those systems is a recognition of our appreciation not just of 
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sentience, but of some degree of organisation.305 Appreciation for the tendency of 
systems that graduate energetic dissipation most effectively (highly complex ecosystems, 
as well as well-ordered and well integrated human systems that 'fit' into their contexts) is 
an extension of this intuitive sense. Since more highly organised systems rely more 
heavily on symbiotic relationships than on competitive ones (although both are present) 
there may be an argument for suggesting that we are inclined, as evolved organisms, to 
appreciate these kinds of systems more. This is one area where further empirical research 
would benefit our understanding.  
One approach to anthropogenic impact from scientists and mathematicians interested in 
energy theory has been to consider how exergy, 'the maximum amount of work that can 
be obtained from a stream of matter, heat or work as it comes to equilibrium with a 
reference environment', could be used as a measure of the efficiency of human 
systems.306 This is a highly practical way of applying the idea of a systems-based 
approach, with realisation that attention can be paid to those aspects of the systems that 
are usually lost in consideration (exergy is more than efficiency). In the same paper, 
Rosen and Dincer raise the issue of what is effectively an intuitive response by humans to 
more organised versus less organised systems. They tentatively suggest that, 'perhaps 
human values are related to exergy and order'.307 If they are correct, we have an intuitive 
sense of the graduated flow as more aesthetically satisfying than chaotic systems. This 
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closely parallels the idea of the Dao, or flow, of energy, as something that resonates with 
what we are.  
One other relevant passage from this paper refers to the idea that systems can 'block' 
informational exchanges if the conditions are not right for such exchanges to take place. 
Some latent energy exchanges are almost always present in systems on Earth because the 
conditions are such that 'many chemical reactions in the natural environment are blocked 
because the transport mechanisms necessary to reach equilibrium are too slow at ambient 
conditions'.308 However, the authors also point out that there is a difference between 
constrained and unconstrained exergy: exergy in the form of resources is 'good for' 
systems, because it is constrained by not being able to dissipate energy through systems 
willy-nilly. Unconstrained exergy - for instance, sulphur pumped into the atmosphere 
from stack gases - has negative value because it does not allow other systems to 
participate in the graduated dissipation of energy. This parallels what Parkes and others 
have noted in relation to the dissipation of energy and the blockage of energy dissipation 
in systems that create synthesised artifices like radioactive isotopes (particularly when 
these are unconstrained emissions, as in the heating that took place and continues in the 
Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan) and plastics (from the unconstrained emissions 
involved in extracting the resources to the blocks in systems as a result of their creation). 
The elicitation of compassion increases and deepens our understanding and appreciation 
of the systems that benefit and enhance graduated energetic dissipation. Oceans, 
mountains, and even air can be seen as dynamic systems of interaction with the 
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ecosystems that depend upon them, and that depend upon one another, including us. In 
practical terms, this means questioning any social programme that cuts off human contact 
from these systems. This includes the process of urbanisation (a global phenomenon) that 
requires humans to live in ways that can make it more difficult to access minimally 
‘produced’ clean water, minimally polluted clean air, and access to ecosystems whose 
evolutionary history has not been significantly impacted by deliberate anthropogenic lack 
of attention. It means, in practical terms, considering ways of creating more access to, 
and more awareness of, even more protection and restoration of, the ecosystems and 
species that evolved and are evolving in what have become urban surroundings.  
Compassionate realisation as a practice could include restoration of biodiverse 
ecosystems more broadly.309  The regeneration of these systems is realisation as agency 
by giving space to the system, refraining from or minimising pollution and exploitation, 
and not by proactive engineering, so that these systems are able to regenerate.310 
Compassion, like love, is holding a person or a thing in attentive awareness of their 
fragility, their impermanence. Dōgen uses the stronger idea of love in his 'Mountains and 
Waters as Sutra' fascicle. Awareness of the fragile impermanence of enmeshment evokes 
a sense of compassion. The perceiver identifies with what she is perceiving. Identification 
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with what is being realised is essential to the idea of interdependence, and that is also at 
the heart of what Francis Cook describes in his essay on 'The Jewel Net of Indra', a 
realisation that interconnectedness generates an attitude of attentive awareness:  
One of the most important implications of such a view [of interconnectedness] is that 
every single thing in the universe comes to have an important place in the scheme of 
things.311 
 
Relationships are characterised by the manner of their interaction, so we can conclude 
that how we act, in every single instance of every single relationship, is important as a 
manifestation of realising our enmeshment. Compassion is called a virtue in much of the 
literature on Buddhism, but compassion is also simply the felt response to the realisation 
of being: 
In the home of all, including human civilization, as well as the many other forms 
congregating and being in packs that pulsate through life, one comes to see that even 
rocks are alive, that they too have their own songs, songs particular to their own living 
geology.312 
 
The work of realisation is to appreciate, completely, the resonances of every relationship 
so that we hold them in attentive awareness, neither succumbing to, nor seeking to screen 
out, this reverberation. In terms of interactions within human cultural systems, the same 
approach holds: attentive awareness and the manner of engagement will create a context 
for a response that allows for the ‘good’ of systems, in interchange of information 
between the perceiver and the relationship, whatever the nature of the exchange.  
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Such a compassionate approach risks its own destruction. We are told that the manner of 
perpetuation of ideas is through the development and replication of 'memes', ideas that 
breed, as it were.313 This stance takes a different approach: there is nothing to imitate, no 
way of describing how to practice, other than by practicing. There can be no follower, no 
leader in an approach such as this. Realisation as agency has no purpose, in the sense of 
no aim, or goal, since it is not focused on any end state. The focus is on the manner of our 
action at each moment, and it is through this focus that any mitigation takes place. Each 
time we perceive ourselves as systems in dynamic interaction, and other systems as 
interactive also, we can draw the focus back to the process of engagement. Again, 
Dōgen's insights into how easily we become entangled in trains of thought, replicating 
existing ideas or identifying ourselves with current trends, accurately portrays our 
tendencies: 
You ceaselessly chase things and make them into the self, and you chase the self and 
make it into things. When emotions arise, wisdom is pushed aside.314 
 
The narrative that by acting with compassionate awareness as perceivers, we can shift the 
relationships with those with whom we come into contact, is much more useful than the 
myth that we can use force to impose our views on others. Such radical pacifism is 
unlikely to convince those who maintain that human violence is inevitable. Yet in the 
same way that recognition is a reflection, and so a disassociative process, so realisation is 
                                                           
313
 'Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or building 
arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or 
eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, 
in the broad sense, can be called imitation'. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, (OUP, 1976) 192. 
314
 Dōgen, Chapter Four, 'One Bright Pearl', Ikka Myōju,  Shōbōgenzō: Treasury of the True Dharma Eye, 
(op. cit.): 26.  
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
210 
 
key to freeing ourselves from the inevitability of the reaction with violence to violence. 
This practice is not a practice of altered awareness. It is a process of 'sitting into' the 
realisation that encompasses, and also allows space for, the concerns, interests and issues 
of whatever we pay attention to. Like watching a drop of water disappear into an ocean, 
we can see that the individual set of concerns is part of a much larger set.  
Realising that we are involved in systems of violence, particularly when these systems 
threaten to annihilate us, is good reason to pay attention to them, if paying attention 
allows us to mitigate the violence to any degree. This may mean, as part of the feedback 
process, that we develop strategies to respond by defending ourselves and the cultural and 
other systems we inhabit, and also that we use strategies for evasion so that any aggressor 
becomes exhausted, uses up energy excessively, and is reduced to having to return to 
discussion and negotiation for resolution. Meeting aggression with aggression implies the 
competition of two ideas on the same trajectory and realisation as agency being an 'anti-
meme', an idea that cannot be imposed, is not competitive in this way. In a sense, then, 
this approach cannot 'solve' the ecological crisis, just as it cannot 'win' in any battle of 
ideas. We will never 'solve' the ecological emergency: all we can do is understand that it 
is a part of the way that we manifest our experience and that, individually and 
collectively, our attention shifts this. 
This is a situation that must be acknowledged and appreciated in all its monstrous scale if 
we are to mitigate its effects even to the most meagre degree. The emergency is not 
happening independent of the perceiver. The practice of agency as realisation, very like 
the practice of zazen, is also a practice of preparation for, and an acknowledgement of, 
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our non-being, or death. In accepting a situation that will, undoubtedly, kill us, we can 
move through the stages of grief that such a confrontation demands. 
Coming to terms with disorder and impermanence 
No condition can be perfect in the physical, structurally relational, sense, because each 
state is dynamic, in flux, and as long as informational exchanges are taking place, there is 
rebalancing and only transitory harmony.315 This implies that any effort is not 
aspirational, but pragmatic. All we can do is what we can do at each moment, regardless 
of any final outcome. This is deeply challenging to the mindset and narratives of the 
global North but it is vital to understand if we are to practice exercising what agency we 
have.  
Inherent stability is not 'good' for systems. The idea that natural systems have an inherent 
stability is as false as the idea that there is a goal to this process.316  Biological, and 
indeed physical, systems are never in a steady state. The most common confusion is the 
belief that there are only two possibilities for a system: 'complete stability and complete 
chaos in the Greek sense of without form or pattern. This is incorrect,' as Botkin writes. 
'There are many kinds of non-steady-state systems' that, nevertheless, maintain and 
recreate patterns of interchanges that reduce the solar gradient.317 It is these we need to 
realise.  
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Conclusion 
Dōgen talks of the 'fear that the days and nights are passing quickly' and it is precisely 
this fear that we must confront in the context of the ecological emergency. Doom-laden 
statements about our predicament are not conducive to better relationships. We should 
certainly practice paying attention with a sense of deep urgency, since this is the only 
capacity we have to influence the situation even if the process itself only involves minute 
shifts in perception.318 Realising that what we are enmeshed in, we cannot escape, except 
through death, we can come back to a moment to moment awareness that is free and pure 
and fulfilled.319 Instead of feeling overwhelmed, we can recall that each moment of 
realisation contains the capacity to open and release obstructions throughout the system, 
and so to shift our attitude in each act.320  
Likewise, the realisation of our own death, and of the dynamism of systems, reveals that 
this death is taking place at every moment. The only element of agency we have in regard 
to it, as to the emergency that is its mirror, is to pay attention, to watch it, to watch our 
reaction to it, and to step back from each engagement that clings and blocks the 
graduation of its dissipation.321 
In experiencing realisation as agency, we come to recognise that we are more profoundly, 
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more intimately, more enormously interdependent than we could have realised at any 
other time in human history. One way we can make this less repugnant is to remind 
ourselves that the experience of living with attention brings its own rewards, and 
particularly through the elicitation of an attitude of compassion to the awareness.  
Human realisation is the only intervention over which we can exercise any control. 
Systems transformed without awareness have devastated 'the good' of wider and wider 
systems in a way that systems transformed with awareness have not. The humility with 
which we approach this task is based on the knowledge that there is very little we can do, 
now, given the kind of agency we have, and even this little may prove too much for us: 
The realness and resistance of the world, the difficulty of labor, call us towards a 
modesty with respect to our practices, deriving from a sober and even chastened 
recognition of the inevitable limits of planning and the essentially unpredictable 
consequences of our actions.322 
 
We can also, through this realisation, generate responses to this enmeshment, through 
paying more attention to conditions that are 'good for' systematic flow (in particular 
states) and through paying more attention to those aspects of our systematic enmeshment 
that human cultural systems have distracted us from, or ignored (the links between 
consumption and violence, for instance). Finally, we can see the importance of 
discernment in how we act, so that the way we act becomes the focus or our awareness of 
how we are graduating the dissipation of energy through our own actions.   
                                                           
322
 Steven Vogel, quoted in Michael Zimmerman, ‘What Can Continental Philosophy Contribute to 
Environmentalism?’, in Rethinking nature: essays in environmental philosophy, ed. by Robert Frodeman 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 207–29: 217. 
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
214 
 
Chapter Five: Criticisms and areas for further research 
 
Introduction 
The work of philosophers has often been characterised as that of clearing away 
assumptions and faulty narratives or beliefs.323 Such clearing sometimes reveals 
underlying structures that are fundamental to how we relate to the context. ‘Agency as 
realisation’ is one such structure. Recognising (and responding, in a particular manner) to 
the ‘good’ of systems is another. In seeing ourselves as somatic practitioners rather than 
as theorists, the full implications of our enmeshed identity come to light: it is only 
through practice that we can realise our responsibility to the ecological emergency.  
What this dissertation has attempted to show is that it is possible to make a coherent case 
for revising agency from a rationalist perspective, and that this revision is comparable 
with the ‘practice realisation’ that Zen masters have been pointing us to for many 
centuries. The act of realisation in this manner, and the practice that it implies, is 
inherently a way of responding to the ecological emergency, and this means that all the 
tools for a response are there in our grasp: we can make this shift in our awareness and 
‘see ourselves in context’ at any time. We can take a broader view of context as the 
relationships between systems, and we can discern the ‘good’ of systems with a moment’s 
reflection. The attitudes of humility, forgiveness and compassion arise out of a rational 
reflection on our systematic interdependence. None of these techniques is complicated. 
They do not require a radical readjustment in lifestyle for most of us. The adjustments we 
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need to make will arise out of our realisation. In one sense, the act of realisation is 
already altering our response and systems are already shifting in this process. In another 
sense, however, the delicacy of this system depends on its cumulative impact and it will 
only have an effect if the practice is brought into being with effortful integrity and an 
authentic awareness of responsibility: in doing what we can, we already mitigate the 
obstructions and steepening gradients that are at the heart of suffering.  
There is no ‘one size fits all’. If someone meditates once a week and drives off in their 
SUV to work for a chemical explosives factory, they are not ‘off the hook’. However, 
their degree of reflection can only deepen with practice, and judgement or blame cannot 
create more impetus to change. If this way of practicing is embraced, practitioners will 
become sensitive and self-responsible enough to assess and adjust their own activity. This 
process is really a process of exercising our full capacity for autonomy and responsibility 
as a result of the exercise of the agency we actually have: realisation. There are still a few 
issues to clarify and criticisms that may remain problematic, and I will attempt to address 
these in this chapter, as well as considering what areas could be explored further, and the 
fuller implications of the results of this research.  
 (i) Explicit realisation of implicit context 
On the one hand, we are entirely enmeshed and contextualised by the conditions and 
relationships that create and entwine us, and on the other, that we have the capacity to 
somehow stand outside and observe the very processes that create and sustain us. In 
proposing that agency is exercised through realisation, I am defending the idea that the 
realisation that this generates is itself a system, arising out of, and yet interdependent 
with, existing systems. This claim looks paradoxical: if conscious awareness is no more 
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than the result of physical, evolved processes, how can it bring into being another layer of 
interactions within the mesh? Additionally, how can we both be aware of, and be apart 
enough to realise we are a part of, the system?  
In a sense, the first claim is no more extraordinary than the claim that complex systems 
have characteristics and aspects that are absent in simpler systems and for some critics, 
that sort of defence will suffice. However, some philosophers, following a biological 
lead, suggest there is no flexibility in our (physiological and therefore physical) 
Pleistocene inheritance. If we are physiological organisms, then we are also genetically 
driven to desire more goods, to push back limits, to maximise our capacity to exploit 
'resources', and so on, and no matter what degree of attention we pay to our activity, the 
railtracks of our DNA will dictate our direction.324 If these critics are right, then being 
able to recognise our enmeshment is no more than an accidental evolutionary hiccup, and 
a tragic one at that, since it allows us to watch the uncontrollable acceleration of our 
demise while strapped to the engine that is driving it.325 
Yet recognition of our enmeshment is more than just waking up to the condition we are 
in. To be agents through our capacity for realisation is to exercise a capacity for self-
awareness that, while being subject to natural laws and processes, nevertheless allows for 
the interactions to open to increasing possibilities in reaction and response. The act of 
awareness alters how other interactions take place, and there is modest, but significant, 
evidence to support this.  
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While there is also plenty of scope for further investigation, there is considerable research 
into related fields – neurophysiology, studies of the physiological impact of meditation 
techniques, for instance – that does indeed show a strong correlation between the 
meditative, ‘mindful’ or realising state of conscious awareness, and its impact of the 
physiological state (including states of relaxation, more diffuse circulation, deeper, slower 
breathing and better physiological health).326 Studies into the impact of meditative 
techniques on inter-human relationships are reasonably established, although there are 
few, if any, studies on the impact beyond the human.327  
This research is, of course, beyond the realm of philosophy.328 For the purposes of 
answering the criticism that an awareness of the conditions we are enmeshed in makes no 
difference, what empirical evidence we have suggests that it has no foundation, because 
there is clear evidence that our state of awareness has an impact on our physical, 
physiological experience and relationships. This is most clear when the relationship is 
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intimate (the physiological relationships in the brain and on biochemical reactions in the 
body are the clearest) but there is good reason to suppose that physiological changes 
within one organism will affect responses throughout the systems it is engaged in, 
including the kinds of responses that organism makes when engaging with other 
organisms.  
In other words, a much more global (although more difficult to measure) effect is likely 
to occur as a result of these local effects. It is possible to imagine studies that could 
demonstrate the impact of realising agency on the wider systems of our enmeshment, and 
in particular on those systems that are most affected by human activity (including 
ecosystems, species and habitats). I will speculate on what this might mean for future 
research in the conclusion to this chapter.  
The second claim – that there is a difficulty in both viewing oneself as within, but also as 
having a relatively objective, explicit perspective upon, the interactions of systems – is 
hard to reconcile without acknowledging some level of dualism. We may be able to forget 
the self, and we may even be able to shift our relationship with the systems we are 
enmeshed within, but this still implies that someone is doing the forgetting or the shifting. 
We cannot escape the fact that there is a distinct locus with particular conditions that must 
exist before 'I' can forget itself.   
I want to reiterate here that Warwick Fox’s approach is a useful response to this criticism. 
Fox answers the criticism that we cannot be anything other than anthropocentric by 
pointing out that, while true, this is a ‘trivial’ charge and there are enough parallels to 
merit transposing his response to this criticism. Fox’s critics maintain that it’s impossible 
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to escape anthropocentrism since all our views are necessarily, human views'329. 
Realisation as agency is the idea that we can, with effort, step back and take an 
'unconditioned' view, but this is still, necessarily, conditional on being human. Fox 
identifies the anthropocentrism charge as weakly, or trivially true: we cannot escape 
taking a human view, because that is necessarily where we are looking from. However, 
Fox argues that it is not this weak sense of anthropocentrism that matters and in the 
context of our being conditioned, it is only trivially true that we cannot escape being 
conditioned by our outlook and situation.  
In the weak and tautological sense that we are human 'I's and can only necessarily see 
from the particular place we are in, it is true that 'I' am inescapably an identifiable 
individual with a particular perspective.  But it is palpably untrue that 'I' cannot see 
beyond what is immediately relevant only to me. Fox points out that, when we 
characterise a position as anthropocentric, we mean it in an 'informative, substantive 
sense' and he gives the instance that, in this sense, anthropocentrists necessarily exhibit 
'unwarranted differential treatment of other beings on the basis of the fact that they are 
not human'330. In the case of the charge that we cannot take an ‘unconditioned view’, it is 
similarly true that we can never take a view that is ‘nowhere’. But we undoubtedly have 
the capacity both to view our own experience objectively by becoming aware of it, and to 
imagine what is important from other perspectives. Therefore, we may not be able to take 
a view from ‘nowhere’ in the sense that we, as organisms, do not disappear during 
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realisation, but we can take a view that is ‘now, here’, that is empty of any specific 
reference to the ego except, perhaps, as just another context (like the weather).331 
 (ii) Relational awareness 
One response to the criticism that we cannot have a sense of what to value without a 
valuer, referred to in King’s paper, is given by Karen Warren: it is relevant and 
appropriate to consider not the atomistic positions of different viewpoints, but our 
awareness of the relationships between them. This systems-based approach recognises 
that certain kinds of relationships are ‘good for’, while others are harmful to, the flow of 
information within systems. What is of value is not located in any entity within the 
system but instead, we can recognise, acknowledge and engage with the idea that 
systems, including those we are intimately enmeshed in (biologically, socially, and so on) 
have conditions that allow them to proceed with the graduated dissipation of energy, or 
conditions that obstruct this process.  
By bringing our attention to this process, we are much more able to realise where these 
informational exchanges are being obstructed, and therefore keep our attention and focus 
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on the possibilities (that self generate) for disengaging from such obstruction. Taking a 
relational view also brings into focus the manner of our engagement within systems. The 
more aware we become of how we bring our attention, either during a reflective moment 
(in meditation) or more generally in how we practice during our days, to the social, 
biological, material relationships that enmesh us, the more we alter our sense of 
responsibility for these interactions. We can see that this is comparable with ideas in the 
Asian tradition, where these lay out practices to ‘see through’ the ‘ego-generated 
anthropomorphic projections’, to consider the relationships even with inanimate objects, 
like knives, or a rice bowl, to be as essential to the way of engagement as human to 
human relationships.332 The way of realisation is in the manner of our actions.   
Each time we bring to awareness the manner of our engagement, it alters. Each time we 
become aware of the relationships we are engaged in, whether socially, politically, 
materially or ecologically, we see how violent, aggressive or even neglected aspects of 
these relationships arise. By giving these relationships due observation and regard, we 
can disentangle, to whatever extent possible, from an unthinking acceptance of our 
Pliestocene inheritance. We can, indeed, rein in our impulse to consume unreflectively, 
not through the agency we have mistakenly attributed to ourselves, but through the actual 
capacity we have to see ourselves seeing. Alongside this, we can also rein in our impulse 
to blame or deride others who consume unreflectively. It requires effort to maintain 
attention, and it requires practice, but it is feasible to suggest that the kind of shift that is 
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required to reorientate our relationship with the systems we are enmeshed in lies in the 
potential we have for this kind of realisation and the attitude of detached (but 
compassionate) observation it implies. 
(iii) The inimitable and indescribable experience of realisation 
The specific context of the ecological emergency, examined in the light of the ideas I 
have attempted to outline, is a system of dissipation that is increasing in gradient and 
intensifying in dissipation because of the kinds of failure to pay attention that a traditional 
conception of agency allows. It could be said that the narrative that has encompassed our 
thinking is a meme. Meme theory suggests that ideas compete for survival, like genes. 
This idea of the kind of entities we are, and therefore of how agency operates (the 
Cartesian picture of the (mental) homunculus conducting physical action) has dominated 
our understanding of our interactions. The experience of agency as realisation is 
unreproduceable because it is experiential, and it operates in a way that is the antithesis of 
a 'meme'. Critics might say that such an approach is bound to fail since the very nature of 
evolution shows that only those elements survive that out-compete, dominate and 
reproduce. 
If the narrative of enmeshed, realising agency is a better description of agency than the 
traditional view, then there are two responses to the criticism that a meme is the only 
means of transferring information. The first is the reflection that in order to respond it 
might be helpful to imagine a scenario where human cultural narratives develop not by 
replication, but through investigation and even questioning. Ideas and narratives could 
then be characterised as acting more like migrating geese than competitive runners.  
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I have already argued that there is some direction to human evolution on the grounds that 
it follows the pattern of other physical and biological processes. I have also laid out how 
the underlying narratives on which our beliefs and values depend rely on a mutually 
reinforcing system of interchanges to keep on course. If the dominant narratives have 
pushed us 'off course' by giving us sets of referents that do not lead us to dissipating 
energy, as systems, within systems, then perhaps we can see realisation as agency as a 
reassessment. It creates the space for a reflection that then leads to particular experiences. 
However, it does not (in contrast to an underlying narrative) suggest what shape or 
ideology this experience must accord with. There is nothing in it, as it were, for the 
individual idea. There is only what facilitates a more broadly envisaged, overall 
development.  
The second response to the ‘meme’ criticism is that the 'language of nature' is, of course, 
the language of scientific neutrality, but this is also the language of systems, of the 'long 
broad tongue' of rivers and mountains.333 We can see what creates and maintains the 
graduated flow of energy through systems and we can see which human activities interact 
with and obstruct these flows. In this sense, we can maintain awareness not by receiving 
or replicating an idea from another source, but by becoming our own 'buddha', by being 
awake to what is going on around us.  
Therefore if we have a model of the transfer of information as memetic, the reproductive 
force of ideas predominating as our conceptual model, then we fail to take into account 
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other means of informational transfer, means that leave no trace. For instance, in the 
transfer of information between 'packets' of energy at subatomic level, the only trace of 
the exchange is in any release of energy as structural relationships alter. Biological 
systems are physical systems primarily, even if they are highly complex. Therefore the 
idea that we must work to regenerate or reproduce an idea only follows one conceptual 
model of evolutionary progress and does not take into account other explanations for how 
information is exchanged.334 
'Speaking the language of nature' could mean reassessing the narrative or conceptual 
framework that we use to describe evolutionary 'progress'. Progress itself is not 
hierarchical, necessarily: to progress can mean merely to go onward, rather than to 
increase in complexity or sophistication. Realising that we are not, therefore, at the apex 
of some evolutionary journey, but entirely a party to the unfolding evolutionary project in 
all its manifestations and directions is an important shift in how we couch our 
understanding. Realisation as agency could generate sufficient potency to shift the human 
trajectory if we realise the potential for humans to listen to the language and metaphors of 
their own systems, and to recognise how these echo other evolved conditions. This is the 
teaching that is available in natural systems, of which we are a part. This is not learning 
by transfer of ideas:  
When the finger points to the moon, will we quibble over it after we have hypostasized 
it yet another dogmatic doctrine vying for universal validity?335 
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Instead of considering ourselves from within the mechanistic model of replicator 
machines, and our ideas as having similar kinds of methodological structure, we can 
consider ourselves as relational systems, eluding atomistic categorisation, and likewise 
we can understand the transfer of ideas as relational, dependent on context rather than on 
mechanistic reproduction. We can be open to signs within the context, realising that our 
agency lies in attentive relationship with the context, while at the same time becoming 
aware that this reflective capacity is context also. We take place in the world not just as 
organisms but as realisations that arise out of the context and then reflect back on it. This 
is very like the realisation that our agency is just the way of freeing up obstructions to the 
graduated flow, or dissipation of energy, or Dao: 
But what happens if we “turn it the other way”? What is the wild to the wild? Animals 
become “free agents, each with its own endowments, living within natural systems” 
(PW, 9). As Snyder begins to explore this turn, he indicates the ways in which the wild 
“comes very close to being how the Chinese define the term Dao, the way of Great 
Nature: eluding analysis, beyond categories, self-organizing, self-informing, playful, 
surprising, impermanent, insubstantial, independent, complete, orderly, unmediated . . 
.” (PW, 10). And the Dao, as we know from the rich interpenetration of Mahāyāna and 
Daoist traditions in East Asia, is “not far from the Buddhist term Dharma with its 
original senses of forming and firming” (PW, 10). The early Daoists spoke of Dao as 
“the great mother.”336 
 
Realisation as agency is a non-replicable method of acquiring understanding, but this 
does not discount the validity of this system of acquiring understanding. Realisation is 
not emulation, or the reproduction of a thought. It is an increasing sensitivity to the 
conditions in which awareness develops. Developing empathy does not imply having to 
experience what another has experienced: it implies having had an experience that 
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sensitises one to the process of interdependent relationship: 
Solidarity is not discovered by reflection, but created. It is created by increasing our 
sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts 
of people.337 
 
It is not just people that we can become sensitive to in this way. Indeed, in drawing the 
circle of consideration in the past, we have had a historical tendency to close off what we 
include.338 Ideas do not have to be replicated as the factory-like metaphorical narratives 
of neo-Darwinism might have us believe. They can arise and subside and leave no trace 
and yet the interchange of information, the way that they are realised, is just this 
graduated flow. We are in the difficult situation of bringing to awareness an 
understanding of our condition that can only be experienced, that cannot compete as an 
ideology or an alternative to existing commitments.  
While I have attempted to address some of the criticisms that arise from a consideration 
of the inimitable experience of realisation, there is still a problem with how to elicit an 
incomparable experience without misrepresentation. Perhaps the best we can hope to do 
is to speak in fullest possible awareness that the inescapability of our human condition is 
only partly true. The very fact of being human contains the capacity to increase our 
sensitivity to our situation from any number of viewpoints, or even from an 
unconditioned view.  Agency as realisation is not communicated through reasoning or 
even through language but through pointing towards an experience which must then itself 
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be experienced. This is very like what Jason Wirth describes in his paper ‘Dōgen and the 
Unknown Knowns’: 
One can only see what has been shown by the Buddha’s eye with one’s own Buddha 
eye. Communication for Dōgen is not an exchange of information or the success of a 
logical demonstration. One does not communicate from person to person but from 
enlightened mind to enlightened mind … In a sense, one could say that 
communication is the possibility of two or more people speaking the language of 
nature.339 
 
The second thing we can do is clarify the difference between describing the idea of the 
experience and the experience itself. We quite often describe ideas and phenomena that, 
when experienced by others, remain necessarily obscure (colours, perhaps, or other 
sensory phenomena). Our understanding of, or describing, realisation is not itself 
realisation. To summarise, I suggest that even an idea that cannot be replicated, like the 
idea of realisation, because it arises out of a specific context each time, and because it 
operates as an antithesis to a meme, nevertheless can be pointed towards. It is more 
powerful as a result of this because it is not so vulnerable to mutation, unlike ideological 
memes (religions being the prime examples) that metamorphose, gathering errors even as 
they adapt to different circumstances.  
The very fragility of the act of realisation is its strength. It is indefinable, yet even a child 
can have the experience. It does not matter that it is indescribable because it is possible 
for us to talk around it and indeed, since language is both a game and entirely 
metaphorically dependent, all we need to understand it are some basic guidelines for 
practices that lead us to the act of realisation. 
                                                           
339
 Wirth, ‘Dōgen and the Unknown Knowns’, (op. cit.): 47. 
From respect for nature to agency as realisation in response to the ecological emergency 
228 
 
(iv) Quietism, passivity, fatalism 
The charges that Zen, and other Asian philosophies, are unable to offer a response to the 
ecological emergency that could in any way be meaningful stem from two roots.340 The 
first arises from the argument that, regardless of the validity of Asian traditions of 
thought, the practical impact of these traditions has been just as devastating 
environmentally (and continues to be so) or at least has failed to mitigate the devastation 
to any significant degree, as any western practice.341 The second is the idea that, as 
Lawrence Buell puts it, the ‘crude binary thinking’ that persists in contrasting western 
and eastern cultures relies on a supposition that ‘westerners are active and aggressive 
whereas Asians are unassertive and contemplative’.342 
To begin dealing with these charges, it is worth noting, first, that Asian cultural traditions 
of thought, in the form, most notably, of Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism, did 
indeed represent a relational understanding of context that could have led to the kind of 
reflective, reciprocal understanding of ecological systems and human systems I think we 
need, and realisation as agency gives us. The problem was that the rulers were never 
Daoists or Buddhists, and they tended to enact legalism rather than Confucianism.343  
Viewing the world as a pre-ordained set of structures that will remain the way they are or 
change, regardless of any human action, implies a willingness to keep quiet, to remain 
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disengaged from every process. The practice of detachment implies a willingness to 
tolerate any process, no matter how destructive or harmful, that nothing can be altered, 
and therefore that everything must be endured.344 These charges are levelled at non-
dualist approaches, and could, by extension, be levelled at the idea of agency as 
realisation. Such an approach is bound, not only to be ineffectual, but actually to 
encourage exploitative and self-interested acts and attitudes among those who ridicule 
such an approach.  
Hargrove goes further: non-dualistic philosophers are not only beguiling, but ineffectual: 
they are insidious insofar as they undermine the gains made by the technical advances 
underpinned by the analytic, scientific approach that has achieved so much for western 
civilisation and democracy. Yet, as Hargrove himself counters, we can learn, as we have 
already learnt, much from the aesthetic appreciation for ‘nature’ that emerges from Asian 
traditions. He maintains that it was really only through the Asian tradition that Europeans 
learnt to see the beauty of naturally evolved landscapes.345 I would temper this somewhat 
by suggesting that there were more immediate contextual reasons (the western agrarian 
and then industrial revolutions) that radically altered the relationship between Europeans 
and the world they inhabited.346 Part of the quantitative success of the human 
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evolutionary project has been its capacity for aggressive exploitation.347  However, this 
material success has been at the price of an inherent cultural appreciation of the aesthetic, 
and empathy for those beyond a narrowly self-selected troupe.348 These tendencies to 
narrow focus have been aggravated by cultural and belief systems that Asian traditions 
could do much to counter. 
Cultural understanding of humans as entirely separable from nature estranged Europeans 
from their sense of connectedness to, and therefore, perhaps, from their sense of aesthetic 
appreciation of, nature, in a much more fundamental way than Asian traditions did. This 
resulted in the widespread use of mechanistic metaphors and narratives in describing 
natural processes. More recent research into ecosystems, evolutionary progression, 
ethology, and so on, have allowed us to appreciate as beautiful what we might once have 
rejected as unappealing and this is directly as a result of being able to conceive of 
organisms and ecosystems in non-mechanistic terms, as well as challenging the idea that 
in order to be beautiful, a situation must exhibit signs of human ‘cultivation’. ‘Beauty’ 
lies, not in the ‘eye of the beholder’, but in the relationship between a trained observer 
and a system that is fully functioning in evolutionary integrity: 
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This beauty is more deeply manifest to the trained eye. One person’s idea of a 
‘beautiful’ landscape can be an ecologist’s idea of a ‘disaster area’ – a landscape 
overrun with invasive species and so on; similarly, one person’s idea of an ugly or 
uninteresting landscape – like a ‘swamp’ – can be an ecologist’s idea of a precious 
‘wetland.’349 
 
The second charge, that the practices that arise from Asian traditions of thought are 
ineffective, is one we might frame in terms of passivity. Agency as realisation is not a 
passive process, however. There may not be clarity over the degree to which realisation 
can influence enmeshment. Certainly some aspects are inescapable, and different 
individuals' circumstance will render them more or less entrapped by their enmeshment. 
Financial, social, geographical conditions can all contribute to how deeply one is bound 
by circumstances.   
Yet the process of realisation as agency shifts the balance from attempting the impossible 
task of altering these larger conditions to seeing more clearly, and thereby shifting, some 
of the relationships within them. As a practice, realisation brings to light gaps that reveal 
themselves within, or obstructions to, the flow. If the context of one’s enmeshment allows 
it, this can lead to engagement in the political process. For Dōgen, and for realising 
agents, it is imperative to raise questions, for instance, on factory farm practices, or on 
subsidies for oil and gas projects. This is the practice of directing the attention back to 
where it has been deflected from, through distractions that have sprung up to obscure are 
divert attention. In this, as in all areas where agency as realisation applies, the manner of 
engagement is critically important and as much attention to the manner as to the 
observation itself is a necessary part of the engagement.  
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(v) Agency as realisation is not Zen 
To some degree at least, realisation as agency will fail to capture the richness and depth 
of the Zen, cherrypicking only those elements that suit a secularist approach. Yet this is 
not a fundamental charge. To begin with, taking this pragmatic route in dealing with the 
ecological emergency may mean that any practitioner is naturally drawn deeper into 
exploring meditative traditions. Zen is often seen as the most ‘stripped back’ of 
meditative traditions, so realisation as agency is simply extending the implications of this 
by reducing it to the essential practice of realisation.   
Secondly, understanding philosophy as a practice, rather than as a theoretical field, means 
that every aspect of one’s life is open to scrutiny, and this kind of personalised practice 
does not require a label to further complicate the experience. In reviewing how to live, 
each moment becomes an opportunity to see what allows itself to drop away, to begin to 
find voluntary simplicity a more peaceful way of interacting, to depend less on the 
opinions of others and more on the authentic sense of integrity that arises through 
consistent reflection of activity.  
The Buddha himself pointed out that 'beliefs themselves are the origins of war'. In 
positing the idea that agency is realisation, I have attempted to avoid aggravating the 
existing fray between ideologies. Instead, in delineating the linkages between these two 
very different ways of thinking about the human condition, I have worked to show how 
we can step back from ideological commitments and find a way of responding that is not 
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condition by, because is open to and aware of, its conditioning.350  
Many of the images and ideas of the Shōbōgenzō describe the relationship between 
practicing realisation and the impact of such a practice on the observer and on the 
relationships themselves. Yet Buddhism has shown itself, tragically, to be as vulnerable to 
interpretation for exploitation and self-interest as any dualist religion. Our relationship to 
what active participation we have becomes clearer through the teachings of Zen but it 
does not depend on them. Other traditions have recognised this connection too, and 
therefore there is no need to advocate for one tradition over another.  
The idea of 'buddha dharma', or interdependent arising through awareness, is prevalent 
within formal traditions of Dōgen Zen. Yet we can learn from, and experience, this sense 
of 'buddha dharma' through the practice of realisation as agency, outside its formal 
transmission, What we now know of how energetic systems interrelate and proceed, 
combines with the Zen imagery of co-creation and somatic practice. This is an aspect of 
Zen practice that can usefully be experienced within the physicalist context.  
Viewing this approach as ethically neutral liberates it: realisation is the practice of 
compassionate observation that arises out of understanding that we, like all else, are 
inseparable from context (and that elicits, therefore, a sense of empathy with other 
systems, particularly sentient systems). However, this practice does not require belief in 
any faith tradition. Such a belief could accompany realisation but it is not essential to it, 
since realisation is simply openness to and engagement in a state of consciousness and 
awareness of our condition.  
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One of the most cogent and instructive images that agency as realisation can elicit echoes 
a key insight, not of Zen, but of Daoism: that wu-wei, or the tendency to 'just sit there' 
rather than 'doing something', is the prime manner of engagement. Much of the activity of 
realising involves becoming increasingly aware of both conditions and conditioning, but 
this act of turning attention to interdependence is most effective when there are fewer 
distractions. This means that, while agency as realisation is not passive, or fatalist, or 
quietist, it is disinclined to engage in the narrative of a ‘top-down’ response. We can 
respond more effectively if we are inclined to wait for what is elicited by the context, and 
this can come about through watching, for a moment.  
Our agency is, in this sense, more like the process of wu wei than the confrontational 
forcefulness of Earth First!ers. The linguistic turn with which we focus matters too. In 
focusing on the narrative, we can become aware of the kind of language we and others 
use in engagement, making us more likely to take care in choosing how to express our 
response. This further supports the idea that the manner of engagement is key to our 
response.  
The good of systems 
It is still highly contentious to suggest that any kind of ‘good’, even in the ethically 
neutral sense of a directional flow in systems, exists for us to pay attention to, or ignore, 
beyond the human ‘good’. Yet, there are precedents, even in traditions of thought of the 
global North. Lawrence Vogel, for example, argues that nature (that is, non-human 
organisms, communities and processes) have biological teleology, ends that they 'pursue', 
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regardless of the human project.351 The revised idea that I have suggested of seeing these 
ends not as biological only, but also within the wider context, as physical processes, 
expands and extends the potential for what to include, but also overcomes the difficulty 
with partiality in deciding how to assess what is ‘good’.  
By coming at what is ‘good for’ systems from a physicalist perspective, it is easier to see 
how common ground might be reached in understanding  how to assess human impacts. 
No longer dependent on arguments for a ‘locus’ of value, we can consider the 
relationships within systems, and how various human impacts affect these. It is the 
process, rather than the entities, that we need to pay attention to.  
(i) ‘Good for’ systems 
In seeking to show that the dissolution of the boundary between what is 'good for' an 
individual and what is 'good for' systems in general (or at least those systems that 
maintain us),  there remain many circumstances where we see a potential conflict arising. 
As the ecological emergency evolves, these are likely to become more, not less, frequent. 
I will use just one example to illustrate this problem, and a potential solution.  
If we take the largest possible view of mitigation of human impact, for instance, we may 
end up feeling as though we have to approve policies that most people would find at least 
repugnant, policies that demand restrictions or restraints, that seem, therefore, to close up 
the weave of our enmeshment and give us less opportunity to step back.  If we are to 
mitigate the impact of humans on biodiverse systems, for example, then this might mean 
setting aside and therefore strongly restricting access to relatively unaffected ecosystems.  
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There may be those who are still allowed to visit these places, scientists, or perhaps the 
very rich, but that involves reducing the potential for the vast majority to experience the 
aesthetic joy of wild places and that is a huge imposition to make, and further disconnects 
people from any sense of responsibility towards the richest, most biodiverse systems. 
Again, general principles cannot arise from a 'realisation as agency' approach, but one 
way of addressing this kind of issue might be to both ensure that biodiverse systems are 
supported in microcosms in communities, whether that means in spaces in cities, or in 
suburban enclaves, or even as designated areas in rural regions. It could also mean that 
there is proportionate access to wild places for all, and that access has to be equitable, 
particularly perhaps for indigenous groups and others who have a cultural connection 
with the place, but also for those whose access to wild places is generally restricted by 
poverty or disadvantage.  
Being able to get access to wild places in ways that are least damaging is essential to 
maintaining a realisation of interconnectedness and therefore this has to be a focus in 
considering how the good of systems is to be realised. Tigers and lions are cited in cases 
in India and Africa in competition with humans for food and resources but this too can be 
addressed by deepening the understanding of systems and maintaining or allowing natural 
prey to regenerate so that large predators are not looking for food in villages. This, too, 
demands that villagers have enough access to fuel and food so that they are not foraging 
in areas where they are likely to be preyed upon. These are simplistic responses, but they 
indicate that there are broader solutions to the issues of conflict than might first appear, 
that tackling ecological issues cannot be separated from tackling social issues and that 
both occur within the context of belief systems that must be explicitly realised in order to 
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be appreciated and, perhaps, disengaged from.  
 (ii) Ethical neutrality: an excuse for self-interest, or simply ineffectual?  
Establishing that there can be a common sense of the 'good' that is ethically neutral is a 
further criticism of this approach. It could be argued that we cannot know that our 
understanding of what is 'good for' systems is objective, that we could easily be 
advocating what is 'good for' systems  by focussing on conditions that are proximal and 
ignoring others' perspectives, and then this is a kind of obstruction of their ‘good’. 
This criticism is really only an echo of current bias, however. So-called peripheral 
interests like ecological systems or species that are not seen as central to the survival of 
the human species (wetlands, waders, deep oceans, invertebrates, and so on) or the 
integrity of evolved systems that can be impacted with no obvious or immediate effects 
on human life, are largely discounted as having any weight in discussions. It does not 
matter what is 'good for' those systems, in the dominant narrative. Yet realising that these 
systems – microbial and soil systems, watercourses and their ecosystems, and so on – are 
fundamental to the circulation and dissipation of energy through all peripheral systems 
(including our own) is a strong argument for paying much more attention to how these 
systems work, and how human systems can better accord with them. 
Even if humans have already done too much to impair systems so that the graduation of 
flows is critically affected, it is still important that we respond by recognising that 'the 
good' of systems will go on, regardless of whether or not we survive. And therefore it is 
still important to realise the 'good' of systems, can be discovered impartially, through 
scientific and rational methodologies, whether or not we benefit as a species. Realisation 
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as agency shifts the narrative.  
A further criticism, from this perspective, is that the effectiveness of realisation of the 
importance of systems, approached from an ethically neutral standpoint, lends no weight 
to any call for altering human interaction. It is a recognition that may have implications 
for individuals but it impotent in the face of ethical calls for human expansion. The 
response to this kind of criticism follows the same line as the response that many 
philosophers give to the criticism that anything we do, individually, has so little impact 
on global circumstances that there is no onus on any individual to do what he or she can. 
That response, translated into this context, is that every individual action matters 
precisely because small acts are cumulative. In the terms of agency as realisation, this is 
even more robust as a response, since we are not just affecting a single relationship, but 
shifting our attitude to, and therefore our interactions within, all our relationships.  
Realising what we are and how we relate is our only agency, and therefore forms the 
basis of whatever response we make, and whatever responsibility we are able to take, for 
the impact we have had on systems. However minimal the effect of this response, if it 
mitigates our impact at all (and it does) then that is what we must do (as a reasonable 
response). Even if the human project fails or at least falters, realising our enmeshment is a 
recognition that the entire complex of systems we are enmeshed within dissipate energy, 
whether we, humans, are within the mesh or not. What is significant about what we do 
now is what mitigates suffering (seen at a process of attachment, or obstruction of the 
‘flow’ in the dissipation of energy), in whatever way possible, however minimally. When 
we understand this, we see that exercising any ability we have to respond to this 
understanding is a mitigation of some potentially obstructive impact.  
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Of course, we cannot know that what we do now will actually mitigate obstructions in the 
future, and therefore the attitude with which we come to this realisation is very much one 
of humility.352 For the same reason, the focus is very much on the action now, and not 
some future consequence. When it is too late for mitigation, systems will adapt or 
collapse. The scale of human impact makes collapse more likely than adaptation, but this 
means that we must take every opportunity we can to bring our attention back to our 
interactions now, here, since the manner of our engagement is amplified by time.  
Agency as realisation is paying attention to the manner of our engagement now. The act 
of realising how dependent we are on other systems is also, ultimately, a self-protective 
strategy, but this is not why it is important to exercise this function. The importance of 
realisation as agency is that it is the exercise of a capacity that exists for humans, but is 
often latent. Allowing it to remain latent has caused problems. Using our capacity to 
realise means we pay attention to issues we have ignored, and that have created the 
ecological emergency.  
By realising our agency, we avoid creating the (often hypocritical) gaps that open up 
between principle and practice among those whose actions stem from ethical 
commitments. Yet this elicits the criticism than an ethical response has been barely 
adequate so far, so an ethically neutral one can only lead us deeper into a moral 
vacuum.353 In responding to this criticism, I must point again, to the biophysical nature of 
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systems that make up our being and that are incremental, constantly in flux. If we are 
going towards anything, it is the deep chaos of entropy, where information is to distal to 
be interchanged. The systems that maintain us are in the process of levelling off, even if 
on the way, the gradient is becoming steeper. What we exist within, what biophysical 
systems in general exist within, is the persistence of this gradient at a level that is not too 
steep to sustain it, the ‘golden mean’, the Goldilocks syndrome. This is what we have to 
respond to, regardless of any ethical call of duty. 
This is not to say there are not ‘bumps in the ride’, it is the unpredictability of the systems 
that make it easy for sceptics and deniers to undermine any attempt to characterise what 
we are involved in as a condition requiring our attention. Energy interchanges are not 
mechanisms, and the organic nature of the process means that it waxes and wanes. But 
within the parameters of this dissipation of energy lies our survival range. It is these 
parameters that exploitation and self-interest undermine.  
Paying attention to this process is not passive inaction. It requires absolute attention, and 
activism, in the sense of seeing what is required by relationships for energy to be 
conducted through us as systems and processes in the least disruptive way. It can be very 
unsettling to keep before ourselves an understanding that there is no ultimate meaning, 
nothing that this can end with but annihilation:  
If nature presents us with no ethical norms, then no effort to change our own nature in 
the name of perfection, convenience or experimentation could count as a transgression 
of essential limits or a violation of a natural standard of goodness. Herein lies the 
deepest root of our cultural crisis: nihilism. Lacking grounds for judging nature to be 
good and deprives of any stable ‘image of Humanity’ to which we owe reverence, we 
are unable to answer the fundamental ethical challenge posed by our novel powers: 
‘Why should be care about the distant future of mankind and the planet?’354 
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Yet it is, eventually, no more paralysing to realise that one is within a system that has no 
inherent meaning than it is to realise that one is mortal. The process of acceptance is 
extremely challenging. However, the most appropriate response is an intense awareness 
of current existence, and a sense of compassion for the condition of oneself and one’s 
relationships. 
Attitude divergence 
Drawing attention back to the areas we have distracted ourselves from could include 
pointing out when beliefs are expressed based on an unreflective acceptance of 
questionable facts. However, the manner of approach is central: the way we point out any 
obstruction to interaction (like an unreflectively adhered to belief that is then used to 
defend a position that creates further polarisation) will directly affect the chances of 
engaging and opening up for discussion the unreflective view. If I exercise my awareness 
during interactions that are potentially polarising, this has a potential effect, small but 
significant, on others reacting with less polarity, and more moderation, in response. The 
individual effect may be tiny but the cumulative potential is great.  
It might be argued that exploring possibilities for continuing engagement is feeding into 
the existing exploitative tendencies since unless these tendencies are resisted, they will 
simply quash any alternative view. Yet the success of polarising campaigns is highly 
contentious. Rather than focussing on the very thing that is arousing opposition, like 'No 
Fracking Gas!' it requires more effort, but is potentially more rewarding, to develop a 
clear idea of a positive strategy that is less obstructive, or damaging, to systems. This 
might imply negotiation. It might well imply that much more effort is put into discussion 
of different positive alternatives than on protest, and that as wide an array of scenarios as 
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possible is considered for each area under consideration. 
Acting to de-escalate this sort of conflict, along with paying attention to any tendency for 
fragmentation to increase, or entrenchment in attitudes to deepen, bridges the deepening 
divides that threaten to open up. The more people become entrenched in divergent 
positions, the more unstable and potentially violent situations become and conversely, the 
more people cease to identify with particular positions, the more chance there is of 
mitigating the kind of suffering that violent conflict inevitably involves.  
The final defence for exercising agency as realisation in a situation where attitudes are 
becoming increasingly divergent is that we personally suffer less as a result of careful 
attention to engagement. In coming to appreciate the nature of the divergence, we begin 
to recognise our own role, and our own desire to disengage from or disown the conflict. 
When, instead, we see the external tension interpreted through our own fears and 
aversions, we can simply accept it as an inevitable feature of the interchanges between 
systems, and this defuses much of the tension. It also gives us an opportunity to ‘sit with’ 
the tensions that arise. Doing this with an attitude of compassion at the realisation that all 
biophysical systems, like ours, are attempts to graduate the interchange of energy, but that 
we have the capacity to recognise this, creates less tension in our observation. Humility 
comes from the knowledge that this capacity is all there is to our agency. A less 
obstructed, less violent, graduated interchange of energy is just as beneficial for the 
realising agency as it is for every other system. The boundary, in this sense, between what 
is 'good for' the situation, and what is 'good for' the realising agency, dissolves. 
However, Johnathan Glover raises another important issue in the context of action or 
inaction, and we can apply it here. It is the idea that when one acts with realisation, one 
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might nevertheless have to admit that others, in their enmeshment, are not going to make 
that kind of effort. This argument is widespread: being unable to control others' exercise 
of realisation means that they can continue to obstruct systematic flows. It is much easier 
to continue not paying attention, and the chances are that this is what most people will do, 
and would do, even if they were told the benefits of realisation. One individual's 
mindfulness is, therefore, not going to change the trajectory of human progress and yet it 
requires an extra effort of attention to live mindfully. 
This argument is particularly pertinent when it comes to employment, for instance, or to 
our level of material security. Glover uses the example of research into chemical 
warfare.355 One could equally well point to the tar-sands industry, the fracking industry, 
the oil industry or even the agricultural, industrial or construction industries. In fact, with 
realisation comes the increasing awareness of how difficult it is to find work that does not 
contribute to the ongoing violence of the systems we are enmeshed in. The effort of 
realisation and the attempts to live with less dependence on the violent impacts of human 
activity can become overwhelming, particularly since no agency is independent and our 
networks are also affected by our actions.  
As Jason Brennan, among others, observes, the kind of ecological awareness that 
realisation entails depends, at least to some extent, on having a certain level of material 
and physical security. It is certainly true that it is more difficult to realise one’s condition 
in a broader sense when one is in pain, or financial difficulties, or experiencing addiction, 
or under threat of violence. Yet mindful awareness is possible under these circumstances 
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and indeed this is an area where further research could be very fruitful. In prisons, 
hospitals and refugee camps, the impact of programmes to develop a meditative or 
realising state of awareness have had considerable success, even among those whose 
experiences have been of the most traumatic kind. 
In spite of these admissible privations, and the difficulties created by choosing to make 
the effort to realise one's agency, there is still considerable inherent reward in developing 
independence and resilience. Taking steps towards a less unsustainable, less violent way 
of being enmeshed are deeply enriching, not only for oneself but for the development of 
the resilience of others in one's network. Not being able to consume at the rate of those 
around one can be experienced as poverty but it can also be experienced as a test of one's 
creativity and resourcefulness. We are deeply enmeshed in networks that we can learn to 
educate ourselves from, resent or ignore. When we begin to see how widely the practices 
of resilient living are being exercised, ideas begin to be exchanged and to develop and the 
path becomes less isolating. Further research into how voluntary networks come into 
being as a result of a conscious effort to create relationships based on mutual support and 
local resilience would be useful to investigate this claim. 
Even those who feel they have no choice may engage in discussion and this can lead, in 
some instances, to their beginning to view their own enmeshment in a different light. This 
is realisation as agency not as a meme, but as an elicitation of an experience. Taking the 
unconditioned view is, paradoxically, becoming completely aware of all the conditions of 
one's enmeshment. It is only through the context that one can see how realisation 
disengages, and then interacts with, the context. 
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(i) A pragmatic approach? 
In considering the effectiveness of the realisation as agency response, we can also find 
ourselves troubled by the question of the level of mitigation involved. There are clear 
parallels here with Peter Singer's work on alleviating poverty from a utilitarian 
perspective. Initially, Singer, it was suggested, asked people to go 'too far' – to reduce 
themselves to a position barely less impoverished than those who have less than they 
have themselves.356 Karin Durland criticised Taylor's approach using a similar argument: 
reducing ourselves to barely more than subsistence level on the basis that we can – just – 
survive – but maximally mitigate our impact is impractical and repugnant.357  
However, reducing, for instance, our use of technological and chemical tools to kill other 
living organisms to a level far below the present level, to a level more proportionate to 
the requirements for survival, and less in line with whether or not we need bleached white 
towels to clean ourselves with, seems eminently sensible and accords with agency as 
realisation. If we assess each practical situation on a case by case basis, that will include 
measuring, all things considered, what it would mean to implement a particular strategy. 
Obviously this is never going to be an exact science, but humanities research can 
complement and support scientific research in this area.358 Science is a social process, in 
many senses, and influenced by the general understanding of which conceptual models to 
found interpretations on. This means that sometimes we go on interpreting events 
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according to models that have lost their explanatory power, when new evidence actually 
demands that we alter how we conceive of relationships. We can correct this lag by 
returning to our conceptual models frequently and this practice is inherent in realisation 
as agency where we are on constant look out for a deeper understanding of the conditions 
we are enmeshed in, including the conceptual conditions.   
The human systems we are enmeshed in allow vast quantities of energy to dissipate 
needlessly, as food wasted, and treated water leaked, as plastics or clothes are discarded, 
unused, or destroyed unnecessarily while still serviceable, animals bred for domestic 
consumption slaughtered in order to artificially inflate prices, pets bred and killed 
because they are unwanted. The vast wastage in the energy industry, too, where sites are 
constructed and then left to decompose, where regeneration of natural systems is thereby 
blocked, or where basic housekeeping, cleaning out tailings ponds to allow regrowth of 
marshlands, is not undertaken even though it would add a small fraction to the total 
operational cost of the project.  
Naturally evolved systems can appear to be equally wanton in their dissipation of vast 
amounts of energy. Yet the processes and interactions within naturally evolved systems 
ensure that matter continues to cycle and energy to flow in graduated dissipation where 
ecosystems are concerned. Apart from interventions from far beyond the system (the 
suspected asteroid that wiped out the dinosaurs, for instance), the collapse of systems and 
the extinction rates we now experience are unprecedented. By drawing our attention to 
our involvement in the current collapse, we can see where we might stitch systems back 
so the flow is graduated again, or a further entropic drive by restraining our consumption.  
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 (ii) Integrating realisation  
Human rights, too, are integral to agency as realisation. Ensuring water courses are clean 
involves ensuring that naturally evolved filtering systems, from reed beds to forests, are 
allowed to regenerate, rather than segregating water, or envisaging it as a 'product'. 
Adding sterilisation tablets may be a vital solution to an acute emergency, but it is not one 
that resolves a chronic pollution problem. Exploitation, immigration issues, labour and 
excessive consumption are all impacts that involve us in chains of enmeshment from 
which we can disentangle ourselves if we keep our attention on them. It would be 
pathologically odd if we did not treat our immediate networks, and perhaps, humans in 
general, preferentially in considering the impact of the emergency. But it is essential to 
see any preferential treatment within the broader context of our interdependence and to 
keep returning our attention to that level of engagement as often as possible.  
The criticism that we cannot be completely detached and therefore completely objective 
in our response to the ecological emergency is valid but I do not think it undermines the 
overall argument for this approach. After all, realisation moves us towards compassion, 
not just towards the human species but towards an awareness that the species, just as 
much as we, as individuals, is enmeshed. Taking an unconditioned view does not require 
that we leave, or are indifferent towards, our own perspective and conditions. It requires 
only that we recognise that we can see these in context. The rest is entirely up to us. What 
we do, how much we realise, depends on how unconditioned our view is but even a 
moment of realisation shifts our interactions significantly and this benefits all the systems 
we are enmeshed in, near and far.  
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Conclusion 
Issues to be explored further 
Is it possible to teach agency as realisation? This is a little like asking if it is possible to 
teach ‘wisdom’ and a considerable number of the same objections apply.359 As I have 
outlined it, I think the techniques for understanding agency as realisation, and for 
practicing, exist and can be shared. However, the only test for whether or not the 
techniques have been mastered and the practice incorporated is by seeing the results 
through any mitigation on the ecological emergency, and because we cannot have a 
‘control’ situation to compare this with, such a test is not possible. Nevertheless, we can 
consider ways of measuring the impact on individual lives, on situations where views 
conflict on how to respond to ecologically critical situations, and on the impact of this 
practice on communities. This is an area where more research could be fruitful. This idea 
of agency as realisation may be ethically neutral, but it is still a ‘practical necessity’ in the 
sense that Bernard Williams uses the phrase:  
A reconstructed practice of consideration requires, and is required by, a staying in the 
place of the origination of practical necessities. I state this point this way, in terms of 
practical necessities, in order to accommodate Bernard Williams’ illuminating 
proposition that what lies at the bottom of morality and ethics (which he distinguishes 
as the broader notion) is ‘practical necessity’:  
 
When a deliberative conclusion embodies a consideration that has the highest 
deliberative priority and is also of the greatest importance (at least to the agent), it may 
take a special form and become the conclusion not merely that one should do a certain 
thing, but that one must, and that one cannot do anything else. We may call this the 
conclusion of practical necessity… This is a ‘must’ that is unconditional and goes all 
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the way down360  
 
A major area where further research is necessary is in interdisciplinary, cross-cultural 
work. This includes quantitative and qualitative research collaborations between the 
humanities and other disciplines. An example of a quantitative approach might involve 
conducting brain scans on volunteers who had undertaken extensive zazen training, for 
instance, over a specific period, and to compare groups in retreat with those practitioners 
who also engaged actively with questioning how current systems operate, particularly 
where these engender violence.  
It is more difficult to imagine quantitative research techniques that could capture a 
broader connection between realisation as agency, realising the ‘good’ of systems, and 
responding to the ecological emergency. Elinor Ostrom’s work provides some precedent, 
in the sense that she collected data on the use of resources after discussions about ‘the 
commons’, and her findings showed that participants responded to the insight this gave 
them by negotiating the use of common resources much more equitably. We might 
imagine some similar parameters on participants’ habits when it came to energy use, 
activism (particularly the kind of activism engaged in, and the nature of their 
participation), recycling habits, and other measurable parameters.  
However, external indicators are sometimes misleading and do not always give insight 
into attitudes, or other, more subtle, difficult to capture indicators of change. A qualitative 
approach involving, for example, questionnaires and the collection of oral testimonies 
might be more interesting. In conducting this kind of research, one would find that, as 
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researcher, one was both participant and observer in the process. It would be particularly 
interesting to do this kind of research in countries that have experienced war and other 
difficulties with establishing autonomy. While it is more obvious to conduct this kind of 
research in universities in the global North, the effects, both for the researcher, and for the 
participants, would potentially be more cumulative in a conflict zone. This might be 
particularly interesting research to conduct in a refugee camp, for instance, where people 
might have the opportunity to consider an outcome to their situation that involved 
developing and exercising autonomy and responsibility not just towards other groups of 
people who had been their ‘enemies’, but to the species and ecosystems that had been 
affected by the conflict. This could provide a useful means of practicing reconciliation, 
and deepen awareness of what supports and systems are needed to bring autonomous 
systems back into place.  
An ethically neutral approach explored in ethical diversity 
Taylor wrote that, in an ideal world:  
…where all cultures are in harmony with nature, it is understood that each carries on 
its way of life within the constraints of the human ethics of respect for persons. Thus 
in each community, individuals and organisations pursue their varying interests 
without violating each other’s moral rights. At the same time they are bound by the 
laws and directives of legal and political systems that make their rights secure… 
Similarly, when we turn to the cultures’ ways of regarding nonhuman living things and 
their views concerning the proper place of human life in the natural world, we may 
again have great variation in what constitutes human civilisation in the ethical ideal. 
But this variation must always be consistent with an attitude of respect for nature.361  
 
Taylor went on to say that there are a number of different positions (including various 
monotheistic or polytheistic stewardship approaches, and a Gaia-like religion that sees 
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the Earth as sacred) that are consistent with respect for nature, as well as the ‘national and 
scientifically enlightened’ approach he has taken to respect for nature. In a sense, all I am 
doing is taking one step further back, and agreeing with Hans-Georg Moeller that we do 
not need the extra paraphernalia of an ethic to agree on a set of rules on how to approach 
the ecological emergency. 
I agree with Taylor that it is perfectly consistent with recognising the ‘good’ of systems to 
take a stewardship or a Gaia-like Earth-worship approach, and many other positions are 
also consistent with what I would argue is the ‘rational and scientifically enlightened’ 
approach of recognising the ‘good’ of systems, and creating rules and policies that take 
this into account. I think we can excise the idea that we are aiming for an ideal 
relationship. Recognising our agency lies in our capacity to reflect on, rather than to take 
independent decisions separate from, context. Whatever we need to respond to sits 
alongside ethical approaches. Certainly, there will be those who resent this kind of 
approach and argue that it undermines any sense of volition. In a sense, they are right: 
agency as realisation is the idea of a biophysical feedback process that emerges, either by 
chance, or through the use of techniques like meditative or mindfulness practices, but it is 
not ‘free will’. However, there is nothing inherently contradictory about taking an agency 
as realisation approach, and believing that the capacity to realise is god-given. It seems to 
me that this adds more than we can know, but at least it offers the possibility of 
consistency for those who want to argue for it.  
Undoubtedly, there are religious and other ethical positions that are inconsistent with 
realisation as agency. Those whose ethical code justifies wholesale destruction of 
ecosystems or species on the basis that the world is a temporary resource to be disposed 
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of by humanity do not have a position consistent with a rational and scientifically 
enlightened approach. Just as we have rules that override and constrain personal 
preferences that violate human integrity (female genital mutilation, slavery, and so on), so 
we can have rules of engagement that override and constrain preferences that violate 
systems integrity. These will not be ‘aspirational’ towards an ‘ideal’ or ‘harmonious’ 
relationship, but a pragmatically worked out system of rules that accepts the possibilities 
that these rules may be violated, and considers the Daoist manner of defence (evasion, 
self-defence, techniques to ensure the ‘enemy overpowers himself’ and the like) to be the 
most appropriate strategies (rather than attenpts to overpower, attach, and confront).  
This set of rules could be worked out at a global level, and at a regional level. Their 
effectiveness (a little like the effectiveness of human rights) would lie in the degree wo 
which people were educated to understand and appreciate them, although, of course, like 
rules for a new game, there would be room for negotiation and debate in how they should 
be implemented, and there could well be regional variation.  
At present, the general consensus is that some sort of global system is needed to police 
these rules, because people do not always act responsibly. Yet agency as realisation is 
ultimately the condition of complete self-responsibility. Therefore, rather than concerning 
myself with how this might roll out in political terms, I will limit myself to imagining that 
the act of exercising agency in this way has potentially cumulative effects. Individuals 
practicing agency as realisation can exercise this perspective to discover a method of 
realising the potential alternatives that arise from a consideration of the matter in its 
current, rather than in an ideal, context. They can practice identifying and questioning 
when arguments are made to persuade them on moral or ethical grounds (and these are 
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often couched in emotional terms, so this would be an education in the language of 
propaganda). In terms of negotiations between groups with divergent positions, agency as 
realisation offers a way of engagement that has a potential for reducing conflict through 
bringing to light the context of beliefs, and through a focus on the manner of engagement.  
Implications of results 
The main implications of what I have discovered through this research are that we can, 
and we must, change how we view our agency. This has, potentially, enormous and 
cumulative effects. Let us just indulge in idealism for a moment (in a purely hypothetical 
experiment). If people took full responsibility as a result of realising their agency, in the 
way that I have described, we would have no need for government, nor any need for a 
monetary system.  
We would not see one another as separate individuals, and therefore we would not focus 
on defending ourselves (physically, psychologically) against one another. We would not 
concern ourselves with being unable to understand others’ views, or other ideologies, 
since we would realise that these emerge from context, and we could easily imagine that 
we, in a different set of conditions, might have arrived at these values. Nevertheless, 
given that we would be in the habit of discerning between narratives inherited as a result 
of particular context, and  the ‘good’ of systems as seen from a rationally and 
scientifically enlightened approach, we would come to an overarching consensus on what 
kinds of activity to support and facilitate.  
We would spend more of our time exploring freedom, ideas, and creativity, given the time 
and resources freed up from defence. We would concern ourselves with facilitating the 
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lives of others and exploring how to develop deeper and more significant relationships, 
and less time contemplating how to pre-empt an attach from another. We would delve 
deeper into health indices (since the energy we would have available would allow us to 
spend more time on this kind of activity) and explore communication in far more creative 
ways.  
Dealing with our impermanence would become a key feature of our world, and perhaps 
we could come to understand, and to live more fully, as we set out to embrace, the 
different stages of grief that a full realisation of death entails. We could come to relate to 
possessions and belongings in a completely different way, creating and sharing for the 
sake of well-being and self-expression, rather than for trade. We could, in summary, 
release ourselves from the repetitive cycles of suffering that characterise societies in so 
many ways. Being deeply aware and present to our own existence and its intimately 
relational nature would naturally lead to the end of wars, and of famines. It would end 
research for profitability, and create opportunities for research purely for the benefits of 
systems. Manipulation by advertising or propaganda would end: people would be far too 
secure in their own sense of themselves to feel the anxiety that advertising relies upon. A 
deep understanding that there is no ‘I’ in ‘this body’ separate from ‘you’ in ‘that body’ 
would change how we thought and experienced emotion. All talents would be expressed 
as gifts and available to benefit all. This would not imply that people could not, or would 
not want to, be alone: it would be perfectly normal and safe for individuals to spend as 
much time alone as with others. The pressure to conform to norms would be utterly 
eradicated. The full capacity of realisation would awaken everyone to the deeply 
enriching experience of being aware at each moment.  
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I am not an idealist, however, as I hope I have made clear during this dissertation. 
Indulging in fantasies of a perfectly harmonious future is fun, but only in the way that 
fairy-tales are fun, and it reminds us of the conceptual frameworks that shape our 
experience. I offer the above as a poignant reminder that any idealisation creates a gap 
between the situation we are in, and an unknowable future. We do far better to focus our 
attention on what is going on at present than in dreaming of illusions, however pleasant 
that can be.  
We are in a profoundly dangerous situation, yet we have the capacity, individually and 
collectively, to make the kind of adjustment to perspective, and therefore the 
responsibility that agency as realisation implies. It remains to be seen how many people, 
particularly among those who are in positions of power, and therefore social 
responsibility, at the moment, would be prepared to make this kind of adjustment in 
perspective. Thinking of our agency as something independent of us as biophysical 
systems, and as a capacity superior to the capacities of other organisms, is hugely 
insidious. The revision of agency that I have suggested is a subtle shift from the 
traditional view of agency, and it may be hard to communicate the subtlety more 
generally without risking misunderstanding, but it is worth the attempt.  
After all, while environmental ethics has contributed hugely to our capacity for 
understanding the ecological emergency, in practical terms, the gap between what we 
need to do and what we are actually doing continues to widen. Any serious attempt to 
address this problem can only help to crystallise our thinking on this issue, and therefore, 
even if the approach I suggest is rejected outright, it may allow people to become clearer 
about their own approaches, which means it will not have been a wasted effort. I hope, 
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however, that the idea of moral agency, and the idea of the ‘good’ of systems, can be 
revised with useful effect.  
Acting without a focus on reward may appear counter-intuitive, but the clear indications 
of those who have engaged in this practice are that it is deeply, viscerally, rewarding. 
Acting without hope of resolving or changing anything substantially may challenge our 
ideas of what it is possible to endure, given the current emphasis on positive thinking, and 
the bright optimism that assures us that humans will find a solution to the problem of the 
ecological emergency as soon as it becomes critical to do so. Embracing an acceptance of 
the enormity of our plight allows us to come to better terms with the inevitability of our 
demise, personally and collectively. We can focus, instead, on the manner with which we 
engage at every moment, using restraint not because it is personally of benefit (although, 
incidentally, it is), but because it is part of the process of graduating the flow of energy 
through systems, which is their ‘good’.  
In this understanding of our capacity for realisation, responsibility not just for our own 
enmeshment, but for the denial and violence inherent in the enmeshment, comes to light. 
Drawing our attention to the manner of our engagement with this awareness involves 
recognising our own responsibility for the condition we find ourselves in. We have to find 
ways to ‘sit with’, in the sense of accept, and exercise compassion and forgiveness 
towards, these most challenging conditions, where the urge to consider ourselves as 
actors in the traditional sense is almost overwhelming. The important question, then, in 
mitigating the deeply divisive effects of the ecological emergency, is, what can we 
understand in common? Roger King asks:  
What should our shared conventions and background beliefs be? How should be write 
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the rules for the language games governing our discourses about nature and our 
relationships to it?362  
 
We can write the rules in the language of what we pay attention to, when we realise our 
enmeshment. If beliefs cause wars, and the risks of conflict are rising with this 
emergency and its accompanying character of divergent entrenchment, then we should, 
perhaps, learn to look at our beliefs as a part of the problem. It there is a way of stepping 
back and keeping our engagement in focus, even as we practice realising this 
engagement, then it is incumbent on us to take this backward step. The unconditioned 
view that this gives us, a view where we are both intensely and increasingly aware of our 
context, but also able to see ourselves within the experience of our context, from without, 
as it were, is the place of our agency.  As the great poet might have said of this, too, ‘here, 
the dance is’.  
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